Duncan Development Corp. v. Crestview Sanitary District

125 N.W.2d 617, 22 Wis. 2d 258, 1964 Wisc. LEXIS 324
CourtWisconsin Supreme Court
DecidedJanuary 7, 1964
StatusPublished
Cited by17 cases

This text of 125 N.W.2d 617 (Duncan Development Corp. v. Crestview Sanitary District) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Wisconsin Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Duncan Development Corp. v. Crestview Sanitary District, 125 N.W.2d 617, 22 Wis. 2d 258, 1964 Wisc. LEXIS 324 (Wis. 1964).

Opinion

Hallows, J.

The two questions raised are: (1) Whether the special assessments levied against all the property in the district by the Crestview Sanitary District to finance the cost of the proposed elevated water-storage tank with appurtenances are valid, and (2) whether the particular assessments against the plaintiffs5 property are arbitrary, unreasonable, and excessive.

Plaintiffs contend the town sanitary district is without power to levy a special assessment on all real property there *263 in and special assessments cannot be levied for general improvements which they argue the elevated water-storage tank is. They also contend the assessments against their property are arbitrary, unreasonable, and excessive because acreage was assessed as platted lots, commercially zoned property as residential property, the water-supply system was in excess of the potential development of the district and the plaintiffs’ unimproved lots were assessed at $120 each and the unplatted acreage in multiples of $120 while 296 improved lots were assessed $10.

The defendant contends it may finance this type of improvement by special assessments on all the property in the district because of the special benefits accruing to such property and the assessments made against the plaintiffs’ property were based on special benefits greater in degree than property assessed at the lower rate.

A town sanitary district for the purpose of carrying out and performing its duties in addition to the powers given in sec. 60.307, Stats., may levy special assessments “for any improvement within the limits of a sanitary district.” Sec. 60.309. If this method of financing is used, sec. 60.309 (1) (b) provides the commissioners “shall then examine the entire area to be improved and severally and separately consider each parcel of real estate therein and determine the benefits to each of said parcels and make assessments there-against in an aggregate amount equal to the determined cost of the work to be done. . . .” The assessments are made in accordance with sec. 66.60 relating to special assessments by cities and villages. This latter section provides a city or village may levy “special assessments upon property in a limited and determinable area for special benefits conferred upon such property by any municipal work or improvement,” but the amount assessed against any property for an improvement “which does not represent an exercise of the police *264 power shall not exceed the value of the benefits accruing to the property therefrom.”

Public improvements are generally classified as general or local in character. A general improvement confers a substantially equal benefit and advantage on the property of the whole community or benefits the public at large. Such improvements are generally financed by general taxes which under the Wisconsin constitution, sec. 1, art. VIII, must comply with the rule of uniformity. A local improvement, although it may incidentally benefit all the property in the municipality and the public at large, is made primarily for the accommodation and convenience of inhabitants of a particular area in the community whose property receives a special benefit from the improvement either in the form of service or of enhancement of the value. 14 McQuillin, Mun. Corp. (3d ed.), pp. 67-69, sec. 38.11; 48 Am. Jur., Special or Local Assessments, p. 564, sec. 1. Such improvements may be financed by special assessments against the property specially benefited in proportion to the benefits conferred and although being a species of taxation, such assessments are not limited by the rule of uniformity. Weeks v. Milwaukee (1860), 10 Wis. 186 (*242); Milwaukee v. Taylor (1938), 229 Wis. 328, 282 N. W. 448; Williams v. Madison (1962), 15 Wis. (2d) 430, 113 N. W. (2d) 395.

An improvement which a town sanitary district is authorized to make under sec. 60.30, Stats., may conceivably be general or local depending upon the nature of the improvement and its effect in terms of benefit to the property within the district. The underlying principle determining the method of financing the cost of the public improvement is one of equity and fairness to be determined by the commissioners of the sanitary district. Although an improvement confers a general benefit on all the property in a town sanitary district if in addition and primarily it enhances the value of all the *265 property in the district but in different degrees, such improvement may be financed by the special assessment. We do not construe sec. 66.60 as necessarily requiring special assessments made pursuant to sec. 60.309 to be limited to an area less than the district. Traditionally, improvements such as water mains or sewer mains installed only on certain streets call for special assessments only against the abutting property, but it does not follow that a central improvement benefiting all the properties in a town sanitary district in different degrees cannot also be financed by special assessments.

Designating an improvement a local or a general improvement is merely another way of stating its nature in terms of benefits to property. We find it difficult to classify improvements abstractly as local or general for the purpose of considering special assessments. What may be called a local improvement under one set of facts may well constitute a general improvement in the context of different facts. In the instant case a sufficient water system existed to service part of the defendant district. The elevated storage tank was necessary to provide water to the rest of the district. It seems apparent in a small sanitary district organized for the purpose of providing water and doing so on what might be said an instalment basis that the basic or initial cost of an elevated storage tank necessary to provide water to property to which water was not theretofore available should be borne by the lots or property receiving the benefit in enhanced value from such improvement and in proportion that the increase in value accruing to such property bears to the cost of the improvement.

It is true as contended for by the plaintiffs that a waterworks considered as a whole does not constitute a local improvement. 14 McQuillin, Mun. Corp. (3d ed.), p. 104, sec. 38.27. But even in such a case, special'assessments may be *266 imposed where an assessment district has been created or there is special statutory authorization. Santa Clara Valley Land Co. v. Meehan (1923), 62 Cal. App. 531, 217 Pac. 787; Mills v. Elsinore (1928), 93 Cal. App. 753, 270 Pac. 224; contra, Pomroy v. Pueblo (1913), 55 Colo. 476, 136 Pac. 78.

We need not go so far as to hold sec. 60.309, Stats., authorizes special assessments for “any improvement” (in-eluding a general improvement, the cost of which may be considered to be the cost of sustaining the government) by the sanitary district and removes the traditional limitations on special assessments; it is sufficient to state that an elevated storage tank which was primarily necessary to make water available to part of the district and which also added special benefits to the remaining part of the district may be financed by special assessments authorized by the statute.

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Bluebook (online)
125 N.W.2d 617, 22 Wis. 2d 258, 1964 Wisc. LEXIS 324, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/duncan-development-corp-v-crestview-sanitary-district-wis-1964.