Dunbar v. Scott

Supreme Court of Rhode Island

Dunbar v. Scott

14 R.I. 152, 1883 R.I. LEXIS 23

DecidedApril 5, 1883

StatusPublished

This text of 14 R.I. 152 (Dunbar v. Scott) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Rhode Island primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Dunbar v. Scott, 14 R.I. 152, 1883 R.I. LEXIS 23 (R.I. 1883).

Pincite

Opinion

Per Curiam.

This case comes up on excep *153 tions from the Court of Common Pleas. The action is replevin, brought by Dunbar & Co., a copartnership consisting of Harrison W. Huguley and two other copartners. The replevin bond was signed by Huguley, as principal, in behalf of himself and copart-ners, and by two sureties, but was not signed by either of the other partners. The defendant moved the dismissal of the action on the ground that the bond was insufficient under Pub. Stat. R. I. cap. 285, § 8, which directs that the officer, before serving the writ, shall “ take from the plaintiff, or from some one in his behalf, a bond to the defendant with sufficient sureties,” &c. The court denied the motion, and the defendant excepted. We think the motion was rightly denied. A bond given by one of several plaintiffs, in behalf of himself and coplaintiffs, is just as good for the purposes for which the bond is required, as if given by an indifferent person in behalf of all the plaintiffs. We do not think the language of the statute, reasonably interpreted, excludes such a bond. The exceptions are therefore overruled, and the judgment of the court below affirmed, with costs.

Nathan W. Littlefield, for plaintiff. Charles A. Wilson, for defendant.

Exceptions overruled.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Per Curiam.

This case comes up on excep *153 tions from the Court of Common Pleas. The action is replevin, brought by Dunbar & Co., a copartnership consisting of Harrison W. Huguley and two other copartners. The replevin bond was signed by Huguley, as principal, in behalf of himself and copart-ners, and by two sureties, but was not signed by either of the other partners. The defendant moved the dismissal of the action on the ground that the bond was insufficient under Pub. Stat. R. I. cap. 285, § 8, which directs that the officer, before serving the writ, shall “ take from the plaintiff, or from some one in his behalf, a bond to the defendant with sufficient sureties,” &c. The court denied the motion, and the defendant excepted. We think the motion was rightly denied. A bond given by one of several plaintiffs, in behalf of himself and coplaintiffs, is just as good for the purposes for which the bond is required, as if given by an indifferent person in behalf of all the plaintiffs. We do not think the language of the statute, reasonably interpreted, excludes such a bond. The exceptions are therefore overruled, and the judgment of the court below affirmed, with costs.

Nathan W. Littlefield, for plaintiff. Charles A. Wilson, for defendant.

Exceptions overruled.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

14 R.I. 152, 1883 R.I. LEXIS 23, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dunbar-v-scott-ri-1883.