Dumbleton v. Eckley

33 Pa. D. & C. 215, 1938 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 111
CourtPennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Centre County
DecidedAugust 24, 1938
Docketno. 93
StatusPublished

This text of 33 Pa. D. & C. 215 (Dumbleton v. Eckley) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Centre County primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dumbleton v. Eckley, 33 Pa. D. & C. 215, 1938 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 111 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1938).

Opinion

Walker, P. J.,

— This is a proceeding brought under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act of June 18, 1923, P. L. 840, by Alban C. Dumbleton and Edward Vaughn, who had been duly elected Overseers of the Poor of Rush Township at the general election in 1935, for a term of four years, against Paul Eckley, Balser Weber and Alfred L. Bowersox, County Commissioners of the County of Centre, for the purpose of having the court determine two questions arising under section 601 of the County Institution District Law of June 24, 1937, P. L. 2017.

[216]*216It has been admitted in the answer filed that Alban C. Dumbleton and Edward Vaughn were the duly qualified Overseers of the Poor of the Township of Rush, elected in November 1935 for a period of four years, and that they had assumed the duties of their office and performed the same until the first Monday of January 1938. It is further agreed that the Poor District of the Township of Rush was an independent poor district, not coterminous with the county, and was not situated within a county of the second class or a city of the second class.

The legislature, by its enactment of the County Institution District Law, supra, passed a new poor law which would be applicable to the County of Centre, and provided in article VI, sec. 601, as follows:

“Every independent poor district, lying wholly or partly within any county, is hereby abolished, except to the extent necessary to liquidate its affairs as hereinafter provided. Each of the present poor directors of every such independent poor district is hereby removed from office. Each such poor director, who is now paid for his services, shall be employed by the commissioners of the county in which he resides, until his present term of office shall expire, in the administration of this act and in the liquidation of the affairs of the independent poor district, receiving his present annual salary. The office of poor auditor of every independent poor district is hereby abolished. The commissioners are hereby constituted the poor directors of every district lying in only one county for the purpose of paying its obligations. The commissioners of both counties are hereby constituted the poor directors of any poor district lying in two counties for the purpose of paying its obligations.”

The Township of Rush was an independent poor district lying wholly within Centre County and by said provision was abolished, except to the extent necessary to liquidate its affairs as provided in said act. The said act also removed from office the poor directors of the said independent poor district, which, in this case, would be [217]*217Alban C. Dumbleton and Edward Vaughn. This the legislature had a right to do, as “The offices of a municipality-are not public offices under the protection of the constitution. Such office exists by the will of the legislature only, and may be changed, its duties transferred to some other department of the municipality, or entirely abolished at any time, and the incumbent has no standing to complain” : Robbins v. Wilkes-Barre, 37 Pa. Superior Ct. 382; Poor District Case (No. 2), 329 Pa. 410.

The County Institution District Law, however, provides that:

“Each such poor director, who is now paid for his services, shall be employed by the commissioners of the county in which he resides, until his present term of office shall expire, in the administration of this act and in the liquidation of the affairs of the independent poor district, receiving his present annual salary. The office of poor auditor of every independent poor district is hereby abolished.”

In the petition for declaratory judgment petitioners allege that they have not been employed by the county commissioners as provided in said act last quoted, in the administration of the act and in the liquidation of the affairs of the Poor District of the Township of Rush and contend that under said provision they are entitled to be employed by the county commissioners.

The first question which has been submitted by said proceeding for determination by the court is whether or not Alban C. Dumbleton and Edward Vaughn are entitled to be employed in the administration of the County Institution District Law of 1937, and in the liquidation of the affairs of the Poor District of the Township of Rush. That portion of the act last above quoted provides for the employment of each poor director, and it has been contended by defendant that it does not apply to Alban C. Dumbleton and Edward Vaughn because they are “overseers of the poor”. This position is untenable because the act, in section 102, states:

[218]*218“ ‘Poor Director’ means a director, overseer, guardian or manager of any poor district or home for the destitute as now constituted.”

So that in the use of the words “poor director” in section 601 it would apply to an “overseer of the poor” such as the plaintiffs.

It is also contended by defendants that the legislature, in the enactment of section 601, had in mind those poor districts operating as county units. This position cannot be maintained because in article III, sec. 302, of the Act of 1937, it provides for the abolishment of the office of county poor director, as well as the terms of the incumbents, but also provides that the commissioners shall employ each of the present paid county poor directors until their existing term of office shall expire, in the administration of this act, paying him his present annual salary, and if he now receives no fixed annual salary, then such salary as may be fixed by the commissioners. It is quite evident from both section 601 and section 302 of said act, that the legislature contemplated that someone would have to be employed to assist in the administration of the act and the liquidation of the affairs of the poor districts, and also were aware of the fact that they had the right to abolish the office of poor director or overseer of the poor and remove the incumbents from office, but realizing that the knowledge which the old overseers had' acquired by experience of the poor within their respective districts and of its poor affairs would be helpful in the administration of the affairs of the new county institution district, and in fairness to the individuals who had been removed from office by this act but who were the parties chosen by the electorate of the respective districts to look after their poor affairs, directed that they should be the ones employed by the county institution district, placing the only restriction on their employment that their term of office had not expired, that they had been paid for their services in the past, and that their time of [219]*219employment should cease with the expiration of the term for which they originally had been elected. The language used with reference to their employment was mandatory in its nature, using, as it did, the word “shall”.

It is not a question whether they are protected by the Constitution in their right to hold their office, but it is the language of section 601 which specifically directs that “Each such poor director, who is now paid for his services, shall be employed by the commissioners of the county in which he resides, until his present term of office shall expire, in the administration of this act and in the liquidation of the affairs of the independent poor district”. Section 601 also provides for the abolishment of the office of poor auditor.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Poor District Case (No. 2)
196 A. 837 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1938)
Susquehanna County Auditors' Report
180 A. 148 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1935)
Wayne County v. Waller
90 Pa. 99 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1879)
Albright v. County of Bedford
106 Pa. 582 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1884)
Mansel v. Nicely
34 A. 793 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1896)
Commonwealth v. Paine
56 A. 317 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1903)
County of McKean v. Young
11 Pa. Super. 481 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1899)
Robbins v. Wilkes-Barre
37 Pa. Super. 382 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1908)
Phillips v. Kantner
39 Pa. Super. 570 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1909)
Nowling v. Newell
65 Pa. Super. 67 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1916)
Rothrock v. Easton School District
19 A. 483 (Northampton County Court of Common Pleas, 1890)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
33 Pa. D. & C. 215, 1938 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 111, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dumbleton-v-eckley-pactcomplcentre-1938.