Filed 4/23/25 Dumas v. Escamilla CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
TED DUMAS,
Plaintiff and Appellant, E083252
v. (Super.Ct.No. PSC1601974)
MARY ESCAMILLA, OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Kira L. Klatchko, Judge.
Dismissed.
Ted I. Dumas, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
The Law Office of Simon A. Housman, Simon A. Housman; Bochnewich Law
Offices, and Peter M. Bochnewich for Defendant and Respondent.
Plaintiff Ted Dumas appeals from an order granting defendant Mary Escamilla’s
motion to enforce a settlement agreement under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6
1 (unlabeled statutory references are to this code). We conclude that the order is not
appealable, and we accordingly dismiss the appeal.
BACKGROUND
In 2016, Dumas filed a complaint against Escamilla. The complaint is not
included in the record on appeal. In April 2019, the trial court held a mandatory
settlement conference at which the parties reached a settlement, the terms of which were
read into the record.
At the hearing, counsel for both parties appeared in court, and both Dumas and
Escamilla appeared telephonically. Both attorneys indicated that they had briefed their
clients on the terms of the settlement agreement, and Dumas and Escamilla confirmed
that had happened. The court told the parties that “the terms of the settlement” would be
recited, after which the court would “ask each of [the parties] if [they] approve the
settlement.” The court cautioned: “If you approve of the settlement here in open court,
you are bound by it. That means you cannot change your mind.” The court asked both
parties if they understood, and both indicated that they did.
Escamilla’s attorney read the terms of the settlement agreement into the record,
including that “Mr. Dumas will sell lots 3 and 6 to Ms. Escamilla. The sale price will be
$125,000; $65,000 down payment payable at close of escrow.” Counsel concluded with:
“The parties will execute a settlement—a formal settlement agreement, including a
mutual general release of all claims, known and unknown, a waiver of Civil Code section
2 1542. [¶] The Court will retain jurisdiction to enforce the settlement. [¶] And the
Complaint will be dismissed with prejudice upon execution of the settlement agreement.”
After Escamilla’s counsel recited those terms, the court asked Escamilla if she
understood and agreed to all of the terms, and she stated that she did. The court asked
Dumas if he “hear[d] the terms as articulated by the attorney?” Dumas responded: “Yes.
The only thing I was confused about—” The court reporter interrupted and indicated that
they could not understand Dumas, so the court instructed Dumas to speak louder. Dumas
said: “They’re right across. The gun club does not go between two pieces. It goes
between the Escamilla property and the—” The court interjected: “Mr. Dumas, you are
not agreeing to any particular route. You’re just agreeing that no lot will be isolated and
all lots will have access.” Dumas responded: “Okay. Yeah. I was just concerned about
the right-of-way to the property that the Escamillas are going to have. Yes, I agree, Your
Honor.”
According to the superior court’s register of actions, Dumas moved to enforce the
settlement agreement under section 664.6 in 2020. The moving papers are not included
in the record on appeal. The court denied the motion.
Two years later, Escamilla moved to enforce the settlement agreement under
section 664.6. She learned that Dumas had listed his property for sale online. Escamilla
attested that the terms of the settlement stated on the record at the April 2019 hearing
reflected her understanding of the settlement agreement. Dumas, who was then
representing himself, opposed the motion.
3 In January 2024, the trial court issued a tentative ruling, indicating that it was
inclined to grant the motion. Neither party requested oral argument, so the tentative
ruling became the final ruling of the court.
The order granting the motion provides as follows: At the April 2019 hearing, the
parties entered a valid and binding oral agreement. “[T]here is no dispute between the
parties that a settlement agreement was made or the Settlement Transcript created; that
the parties orally consented to entry of a settlement agreement, and that this Court
retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement under” section 664.6. The court described
the parties’ settlement terms as: (1) Dumas was “Ordered” to sell two specified real
properties to Escamilla for $125,000 with a $65,000 down payment payable at the close
of escrow and with Dumas carrying the balance of $60,000 payable in monthly
increments of $1,375 until the balance was fully paid; (2) “The debt shall be
memorialized in a promissory note secured with a first deed of trust, which documents
shall be completed and exchanged between the settling parties with[in] thirty (30) days
hereof”; and (3) “The parties shall open an Escrow.” The court set forth numerous steps
that the parties would be required to take concurrent with the close of escrow, including
each party deeding the other specific easements. The court retained jurisdiction “for any
further enforcement of this Order that may be necessary” and did not enter judgment.
DISCUSSION
The existence of an appealable order or “judgment is a jurisdictional prerequisite
to an appeal.” (Jennings v. Marralle (1994) 8 Cal.4th 121, 126.) We are independently
4 obligated “‘in this as in every matter to confirm whether jurisdiction exists.’” (Kirk v.
Ratner (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 1052, 1060.) If an “order is not appealable, we must
dismiss the appeal.” (Reddish v. Westamerica Bank (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 275, 277.)
“The right to appeal is wholly statutory.” (Dana Point Safe Harbor Collective v.
Superior Court (2010) 51 Cal.4th 1, 5 (Dana Point).) Section 904.1 “lists appealable
judgments and orders” in civil cases. (Dana Point, at p. 5.) Section 904.1 codifies “the
one final judgment rule,” which provides that an appeal is generally only allowable from
a final judgment. (In re Baycol Cases I & II (2011) 51 Cal.4th 751, 756). Prejudgment
orders generally “‘are not appealable but are “reviewable on appeal” from the final
judgment.’” (Doran v. Magan (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1287, 1292-1293 (Doran).)
Section 904.1 sets forth exceptions to the one final judgment rule and identifies
prejudgment orders that are appealable. (City of Colton v. Singletary (2012) 206
Cal.App.4th 751, 780.) An order granting a motion under section 664.6 is not included
among the appealable prejudgment orders listed in section 904.1. (§ 904.1., subd. (a)(1)-
(14).)
Escamilla argues that the appeal should be dismissed because judgment has not
been entered and the order granting her motion to enforce the settlement agreement is not
appealable. We agree. No judgment has been entered in this case. Nevertheless, in
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Filed 4/23/25 Dumas v. Escamilla CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
TED DUMAS,
Plaintiff and Appellant, E083252
v. (Super.Ct.No. PSC1601974)
MARY ESCAMILLA, OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Kira L. Klatchko, Judge.
Dismissed.
Ted I. Dumas, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
The Law Office of Simon A. Housman, Simon A. Housman; Bochnewich Law
Offices, and Peter M. Bochnewich for Defendant and Respondent.
Plaintiff Ted Dumas appeals from an order granting defendant Mary Escamilla’s
motion to enforce a settlement agreement under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6
1 (unlabeled statutory references are to this code). We conclude that the order is not
appealable, and we accordingly dismiss the appeal.
BACKGROUND
In 2016, Dumas filed a complaint against Escamilla. The complaint is not
included in the record on appeal. In April 2019, the trial court held a mandatory
settlement conference at which the parties reached a settlement, the terms of which were
read into the record.
At the hearing, counsel for both parties appeared in court, and both Dumas and
Escamilla appeared telephonically. Both attorneys indicated that they had briefed their
clients on the terms of the settlement agreement, and Dumas and Escamilla confirmed
that had happened. The court told the parties that “the terms of the settlement” would be
recited, after which the court would “ask each of [the parties] if [they] approve the
settlement.” The court cautioned: “If you approve of the settlement here in open court,
you are bound by it. That means you cannot change your mind.” The court asked both
parties if they understood, and both indicated that they did.
Escamilla’s attorney read the terms of the settlement agreement into the record,
including that “Mr. Dumas will sell lots 3 and 6 to Ms. Escamilla. The sale price will be
$125,000; $65,000 down payment payable at close of escrow.” Counsel concluded with:
“The parties will execute a settlement—a formal settlement agreement, including a
mutual general release of all claims, known and unknown, a waiver of Civil Code section
2 1542. [¶] The Court will retain jurisdiction to enforce the settlement. [¶] And the
Complaint will be dismissed with prejudice upon execution of the settlement agreement.”
After Escamilla’s counsel recited those terms, the court asked Escamilla if she
understood and agreed to all of the terms, and she stated that she did. The court asked
Dumas if he “hear[d] the terms as articulated by the attorney?” Dumas responded: “Yes.
The only thing I was confused about—” The court reporter interrupted and indicated that
they could not understand Dumas, so the court instructed Dumas to speak louder. Dumas
said: “They’re right across. The gun club does not go between two pieces. It goes
between the Escamilla property and the—” The court interjected: “Mr. Dumas, you are
not agreeing to any particular route. You’re just agreeing that no lot will be isolated and
all lots will have access.” Dumas responded: “Okay. Yeah. I was just concerned about
the right-of-way to the property that the Escamillas are going to have. Yes, I agree, Your
Honor.”
According to the superior court’s register of actions, Dumas moved to enforce the
settlement agreement under section 664.6 in 2020. The moving papers are not included
in the record on appeal. The court denied the motion.
Two years later, Escamilla moved to enforce the settlement agreement under
section 664.6. She learned that Dumas had listed his property for sale online. Escamilla
attested that the terms of the settlement stated on the record at the April 2019 hearing
reflected her understanding of the settlement agreement. Dumas, who was then
representing himself, opposed the motion.
3 In January 2024, the trial court issued a tentative ruling, indicating that it was
inclined to grant the motion. Neither party requested oral argument, so the tentative
ruling became the final ruling of the court.
The order granting the motion provides as follows: At the April 2019 hearing, the
parties entered a valid and binding oral agreement. “[T]here is no dispute between the
parties that a settlement agreement was made or the Settlement Transcript created; that
the parties orally consented to entry of a settlement agreement, and that this Court
retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement under” section 664.6. The court described
the parties’ settlement terms as: (1) Dumas was “Ordered” to sell two specified real
properties to Escamilla for $125,000 with a $65,000 down payment payable at the close
of escrow and with Dumas carrying the balance of $60,000 payable in monthly
increments of $1,375 until the balance was fully paid; (2) “The debt shall be
memorialized in a promissory note secured with a first deed of trust, which documents
shall be completed and exchanged between the settling parties with[in] thirty (30) days
hereof”; and (3) “The parties shall open an Escrow.” The court set forth numerous steps
that the parties would be required to take concurrent with the close of escrow, including
each party deeding the other specific easements. The court retained jurisdiction “for any
further enforcement of this Order that may be necessary” and did not enter judgment.
DISCUSSION
The existence of an appealable order or “judgment is a jurisdictional prerequisite
to an appeal.” (Jennings v. Marralle (1994) 8 Cal.4th 121, 126.) We are independently
4 obligated “‘in this as in every matter to confirm whether jurisdiction exists.’” (Kirk v.
Ratner (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 1052, 1060.) If an “order is not appealable, we must
dismiss the appeal.” (Reddish v. Westamerica Bank (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 275, 277.)
“The right to appeal is wholly statutory.” (Dana Point Safe Harbor Collective v.
Superior Court (2010) 51 Cal.4th 1, 5 (Dana Point).) Section 904.1 “lists appealable
judgments and orders” in civil cases. (Dana Point, at p. 5.) Section 904.1 codifies “the
one final judgment rule,” which provides that an appeal is generally only allowable from
a final judgment. (In re Baycol Cases I & II (2011) 51 Cal.4th 751, 756). Prejudgment
orders generally “‘are not appealable but are “reviewable on appeal” from the final
judgment.’” (Doran v. Magan (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1287, 1292-1293 (Doran).)
Section 904.1 sets forth exceptions to the one final judgment rule and identifies
prejudgment orders that are appealable. (City of Colton v. Singletary (2012) 206
Cal.App.4th 751, 780.) An order granting a motion under section 664.6 is not included
among the appealable prejudgment orders listed in section 904.1. (§ 904.1., subd. (a)(1)-
(14).)
Escamilla argues that the appeal should be dismissed because judgment has not
been entered and the order granting her motion to enforce the settlement agreement is not
appealable. We agree. No judgment has been entered in this case. Nevertheless, in
determining whether an “order is interlocutory and nonappealable, or final and
appealable,” we analyze “the substance and effect of the adjudication, and not the form.”
(Doran, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 1293; Dana Point, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 5.) “If no
5 issues in the action remain for further consideration, the decree is final and appealable.
But if further judicial action is required for a final determination of the rights of the
parties, the decree is interlocutory” and not appealable unless it is otherwise statutorily
appealable. (Doran, at p. 1293.) Dumas does not argue that the trial court’s order
“finally determined the rights of the parties.” (Critzer v. Enos (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th
1242, 1252 (Critzer).) We conclude that it did not.
Much remains left to be resolved between the parties, such as the opening of an
escrow, the execution of a promissory note, the payment of the down payment, and the
exchange of deeds granting certain easements. The court expressly retained jurisdiction
to oversee enforcement of the parties’ compliance with the terms of the settlement. This
consequently is not a case in which the trial court merely failed to enter a formal
judgment but at the same time left no issues for future consideration, allowing us to
“amend [the] order to include a judgment.” (Critzer, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th at p. 1252;
Hines v. Lukes (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1183.) Rather, the January 2024 order
granting Escamilla’s motion under section 664.6 did not finally dispose of all issues and
thus is not appealable.
Dumas’s only argument about appealability is that the order is appealable under
subdivision (a)(2) of section 904.1 (§ 904.1(a)(2)). The provision is inapplicable,
because section 904.1(a)(2) makes appealable “an order made after a judgment.” No
judgment has been entered in this case, so the appealed order is not a postjudgment order.
6 DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed. Escamilla shall recover her costs of appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MENETREZ J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
McKINSTER J.