NUMBER 13-13-00079-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
DULCE CASTANEDA, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 40th District Court of Ellis County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Rodriguez, Benavides and Longoria Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria
By two issues, appellant, Dulce Castaneda, appeals her conviction for money
laundering. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 34.02(a)(1) (West 2011). We affirm. I. BACKGROUND1
Appellant requested and received a jury trial, during which evidence and
testimony was presented regarding the following facts. Trooper Lee Coronado testified
that he was working patrol on Highway I-35 in Ellis County, Texas, when he made a
traffic stop on a vehicle for not securing a child in a safety seat. The officer and the
vehicle he stopped were travelling southbound on I-35, which the officer characterized
as a main thoroughfare for drug trafficking organizations.
Appellant was the driver of the vehicle, and her mother, Sonia Flores was a
passenger, along with two minor children. Upon being stopped, appellant jumped out of
the vehicle and walked toward Trooper Coronado, an action that often occurs with
people who are trying to keep an officer away from the vehicle. Appellant said that she
was coming from Dallas, having spent the night at her brother’s house, where she
picked up his children, and was returning to Laredo. At the time of the stop, the children
in the car were ages six and three.
Flores, who was extremely nervous, stated that they were coming from some
unknown place in Dallas, where they had been for three days. She said they were in
Dallas for sightseeing and had stayed in a hotel. Finally, she stated that they went to
Dallas to pick up her grandchildren from her son’s house. When Trooper Coronado
spoke to appellant, she admitted that she had not been honest about staying with her
brother.
Trooper Coronado became suspicious of appellant because of the conflicting
stories and some characteristics that he identified as common among people involved in
1 This case is before this Court on transfer from the Second Court of Appeals in Fort Worth pursuant to an order issued by the Texas Supreme Court. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 73.001 (West 2005).
2 drug trafficking. He asked for consent to search the vehicle, and appellant agreed.
Trooper Coronado specifically asked appellant if there was anything illegal or any
money in the vehicle, and she stated that there was not.
Trooper Coronado called for a drug dog, which alerted to the front passenger
floorboard. The dog was trained to alert only on odors of marijuana, cocaine, heroin,
and methamphetamine. There was a black Adidas bag located there that contained
three separate bundles of money wrapped in rubber bands. The bag was under the feet
of the passenger. The money had the scent of axle grease and marijuana. Axle grease
is used by drug traffickers as a masking agent for large bundles of money, to mask the
odor of drugs from the drug dogs. Additional money, totaling $3,000, was found in
another bag. There were also seven cell phones found in appellant’s purse. Trooper
Coronado testified that drug smugglers typically use several phones for different clients
and suppliers as well as to avoid wire tap investigations.
At the scene, appellant claimed ownership of the Adidas bag, but she claimed
not to know who owned the money. She told Trooper Coronado that she had a friend in
the car while she was in Dallas and that he must have put the money in the vehicle
without her knowledge. The total amount of money found in the vehicle was $43,250.
After Trooper Coronado was cross-examined, the trial court ruled that the door
had been opened for him to testify regarding statements that appellant had made to him
that were not recorded. Trooper Coronado then testified that appellant had told him that
she had been paid $3,000 to transport the money to Laredo and into Mexico. She told
Trooper Coronado that the person who paid her was working with a drug trafficking
organization out of Laredo.
3 The State also offered the testimony of appellant’s sister-in-law, Erika Carrillo,
who authenticated two jail phone calls from appellant. During one call, appellant stated
that she had been given $3,000 to spend and stated that she was working with the
“same person from last time.” At the time of trial, Carrillo’s husband (appellant’s
brother) was serving time in federal prison for conspiracy, drug trafficking, and money
laundering. During the call, Carrillo and appellant were talking about a person that
Carrillo’s husband had worked with in Mexico, someone who had people traffic drugs
and money.
Carrillo also testified that appellant had picked up the children weeks before the
arrest, not just the day before as appellant had told Trooper Coronado, and that Carrillo
had only found out the children were not in Nuevo Laredo on August 6, when the police
called her. She had talked to appellant’s mother on August 5, but she had no idea that
they were coming to Dallas. In fact, they had agreed that Carrillo would pick up the
children in San Antonio on August 8.
Trooper Coronado testified that those transporting illegal narcotics or currency
often “rent a family” because children give a trip the appearance of legitimacy. They
also use their own children and the children of family members.
The jury returned a guilty verdict and assessed a four-year prison sentence and a
fine in the amount of $5,000. This appeal ensued.
II. ANALYSIS
In her first issue, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support
the jury’s verdict.2
2 We do not address appellant’s second issue challenging the factual sufficiency of the evidence because “the Jackson legal-sufficiency standard is the only standard that a reviewing court should apply
4 A. Standard of Review
In a sufficiency review, courts examine the evidence in the light most favorable to
the verdict to determine whether “any rational fact finder could have found guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). This standard
requires reviewing courts to resolve any evidentiary inconsistencies in favor of the
judgment, keeping in mind that the jury is the exclusive judge of the facts, the credibility
of the witnesses, and the weight to give their testimony. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d
893, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.); see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 38.04 (West 1979) (“The jury, in all cases, is the exclusive judge of the facts proved,
and of the weight to be given to the testimony . . . .”). Appellate courts do not re-
evaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence; they only ensure that the fact finder
reached a rational decision. Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 517 (Tex. Crim. App.
2009).
Sufficiency of the evidence is measured by the elements of the offense as
defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. Villarreal v. State, 286 S.W.3d 321, 327
(Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Malik v.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NUMBER 13-13-00079-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
DULCE CASTANEDA, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 40th District Court of Ellis County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Rodriguez, Benavides and Longoria Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria
By two issues, appellant, Dulce Castaneda, appeals her conviction for money
laundering. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 34.02(a)(1) (West 2011). We affirm. I. BACKGROUND1
Appellant requested and received a jury trial, during which evidence and
testimony was presented regarding the following facts. Trooper Lee Coronado testified
that he was working patrol on Highway I-35 in Ellis County, Texas, when he made a
traffic stop on a vehicle for not securing a child in a safety seat. The officer and the
vehicle he stopped were travelling southbound on I-35, which the officer characterized
as a main thoroughfare for drug trafficking organizations.
Appellant was the driver of the vehicle, and her mother, Sonia Flores was a
passenger, along with two minor children. Upon being stopped, appellant jumped out of
the vehicle and walked toward Trooper Coronado, an action that often occurs with
people who are trying to keep an officer away from the vehicle. Appellant said that she
was coming from Dallas, having spent the night at her brother’s house, where she
picked up his children, and was returning to Laredo. At the time of the stop, the children
in the car were ages six and three.
Flores, who was extremely nervous, stated that they were coming from some
unknown place in Dallas, where they had been for three days. She said they were in
Dallas for sightseeing and had stayed in a hotel. Finally, she stated that they went to
Dallas to pick up her grandchildren from her son’s house. When Trooper Coronado
spoke to appellant, she admitted that she had not been honest about staying with her
brother.
Trooper Coronado became suspicious of appellant because of the conflicting
stories and some characteristics that he identified as common among people involved in
1 This case is before this Court on transfer from the Second Court of Appeals in Fort Worth pursuant to an order issued by the Texas Supreme Court. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 73.001 (West 2005).
2 drug trafficking. He asked for consent to search the vehicle, and appellant agreed.
Trooper Coronado specifically asked appellant if there was anything illegal or any
money in the vehicle, and she stated that there was not.
Trooper Coronado called for a drug dog, which alerted to the front passenger
floorboard. The dog was trained to alert only on odors of marijuana, cocaine, heroin,
and methamphetamine. There was a black Adidas bag located there that contained
three separate bundles of money wrapped in rubber bands. The bag was under the feet
of the passenger. The money had the scent of axle grease and marijuana. Axle grease
is used by drug traffickers as a masking agent for large bundles of money, to mask the
odor of drugs from the drug dogs. Additional money, totaling $3,000, was found in
another bag. There were also seven cell phones found in appellant’s purse. Trooper
Coronado testified that drug smugglers typically use several phones for different clients
and suppliers as well as to avoid wire tap investigations.
At the scene, appellant claimed ownership of the Adidas bag, but she claimed
not to know who owned the money. She told Trooper Coronado that she had a friend in
the car while she was in Dallas and that he must have put the money in the vehicle
without her knowledge. The total amount of money found in the vehicle was $43,250.
After Trooper Coronado was cross-examined, the trial court ruled that the door
had been opened for him to testify regarding statements that appellant had made to him
that were not recorded. Trooper Coronado then testified that appellant had told him that
she had been paid $3,000 to transport the money to Laredo and into Mexico. She told
Trooper Coronado that the person who paid her was working with a drug trafficking
organization out of Laredo.
3 The State also offered the testimony of appellant’s sister-in-law, Erika Carrillo,
who authenticated two jail phone calls from appellant. During one call, appellant stated
that she had been given $3,000 to spend and stated that she was working with the
“same person from last time.” At the time of trial, Carrillo’s husband (appellant’s
brother) was serving time in federal prison for conspiracy, drug trafficking, and money
laundering. During the call, Carrillo and appellant were talking about a person that
Carrillo’s husband had worked with in Mexico, someone who had people traffic drugs
and money.
Carrillo also testified that appellant had picked up the children weeks before the
arrest, not just the day before as appellant had told Trooper Coronado, and that Carrillo
had only found out the children were not in Nuevo Laredo on August 6, when the police
called her. She had talked to appellant’s mother on August 5, but she had no idea that
they were coming to Dallas. In fact, they had agreed that Carrillo would pick up the
children in San Antonio on August 8.
Trooper Coronado testified that those transporting illegal narcotics or currency
often “rent a family” because children give a trip the appearance of legitimacy. They
also use their own children and the children of family members.
The jury returned a guilty verdict and assessed a four-year prison sentence and a
fine in the amount of $5,000. This appeal ensued.
II. ANALYSIS
In her first issue, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support
the jury’s verdict.2
2 We do not address appellant’s second issue challenging the factual sufficiency of the evidence because “the Jackson legal-sufficiency standard is the only standard that a reviewing court should apply
4 A. Standard of Review
In a sufficiency review, courts examine the evidence in the light most favorable to
the verdict to determine whether “any rational fact finder could have found guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). This standard
requires reviewing courts to resolve any evidentiary inconsistencies in favor of the
judgment, keeping in mind that the jury is the exclusive judge of the facts, the credibility
of the witnesses, and the weight to give their testimony. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d
893, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.); see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 38.04 (West 1979) (“The jury, in all cases, is the exclusive judge of the facts proved,
and of the weight to be given to the testimony . . . .”). Appellate courts do not re-
evaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence; they only ensure that the fact finder
reached a rational decision. Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 517 (Tex. Crim. App.
2009).
Sufficiency of the evidence is measured by the elements of the offense as
defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. Villarreal v. State, 286 S.W.3d 321, 327
(Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
“Such a charge is one that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment,
does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the
State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the
defendant was tried.” Villarreal, 286 S.W.3d at 327; Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240.
B. Applicable Law
in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.” Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.).
5 A person commits the offense of money laundering if the person possesses the
proceeds of criminal activity. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 34.02(a)(1). “Knowledge of
the specific nature of the criminal activity giving rise to the proceeds is not required to
establish a culpable mental state under this section.” Id. § 34.02(a–1).
C. Discussion
Appellant argues that she “lacked the knowledge of possessing the proceeds of
criminal activity as alleged in the indictment against her from illegal narcotic sales.”
According to appellant, “the State failed to offer sufficient evidence as to any specific
criminal activity,” and “[t]here was no evidence connecting appellant and the money to
any specific felony.” We disagree.
In his testimony, Trooper Coronado related statements made by appellant
confirming that she was paid to transport, and was knowingly transporting, proceeds
from an illegal drug organization located in the Laredo area and in Mexico through a
contact named “Sergio,” who operated out of the Dallas area. Trooper Coronado also
testified that the money smelled of marijuana and axle grease, an odor-masking agent
used by drug traffickers to avoid detection. Other evidence admitted at trial included
audio recordings of phone calls appellant made from jail to her sister-in-law in which the
two women discussed “Sergio,” for whom appellant’s brother had worked in Mexico.
The sister-in-law testified that “Sergio” was involved in trafficking drugs and money.
Based on the foregoing, a rational fact finder could have found guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319.
We note that appellant relies on a case from the Amarillo Court of Appeals for the
proposition that an officer’s testimony that a person’s actions match a drug courier
6 profile is insufficient to establish a nexus between the money transported and some
criminal activity beyond a reasonable doubt. See Deschenes v. State, 253 S.W.3d 374,
385 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2008, pet. ref’d). However, appellant’s reliance on
Deschenes is misplaced because the evidence in the instant case includes much more
that mere “speculative statements” about the source of the money possessed and
transported by appellant. See id. at 385–86. As set forth above, appellant made
incriminating statements to Trooper Coronado to the effect that she had been paid by a
drug cartel to transport money from Dallas to the Laredo area and then into Mexico.
Accordingly, we reject appellant’s argument that the evidence is insufficient under the
precedent set in Deschenes.
Appellant’s issue is overruled.
III. CONCLUSION
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
_______________________ NORA L. LONGORIA Justice Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Delivered and filed the 1st day of August, 2013.