Dulberger v. Lippe

District of Columbia Court of Appeals

Dulberger v. Lippe

202 A.2d 777, 1964 D.C. App. LEXIS 263

CourtDistrict of Columbia Court of Appeals

DecidedJuly 31, 1964

Docket3510

StatusPublished

Cited by6 cases

This text of 202 A.2d 777 (Dulberger v. Lippe) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District of Columbia Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Dulberger v. Lippe, 202 A.2d 777, 1964 D.C. App. LEXIS 263 (D.C. 1964).

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Opinion

QUINN, Associate Judge.

' This was a suit by appellee to recover the balance due on a personal loan. The loan was made on April 21, 1960, and suit was brought on September 25, 1963. The sole question for our determination is whether the claim was barred by the statute of limitations. Code 1961, § 12-201 as amended, § 12-301 (Supp. Ill, 1964).

The complaint ‘ alleged an indebtedness of $520.27 plus interest “since about July 1960 for moneys used and advanced.” Appellant’s motion to dismiss on the basis of the statute of limitations was denied, the trial court ruling that “the question of limitations was a mixed question of fact and law and that the cause must proceed to trial and evidence be taken.” Pretrial discovery elicited admissions from appellant that he signed a document on April 21, 1960, acknowledging receipt of $1,061.26 from appellee and that he promised repayment. Appellant admitted that he had ¡made payments totaling approximately $540.99. At trial appellee testified that part payments were received -fro'm appellant at various intervals between April 21, 1960, and August 16, 1963. Appellee filed a ledger sheet showing the amounts received in part payment and the corresponding dates.

The general rule is that part payment on a debt or obligation interrupts or tolls the statute of limitations. 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 321.' In this jurisdiction, a plaintiff who is pressing a claim which on its. face is barred by limitations has the burden of proving an acknowledgment or new promise in the form of part payment. Stern Equipment Company v. Pogue, D.C.Mun.App., 117 A.2d 447, 448 (1955); Tendler. v. L. E. Massey, D.C.Mun.App., 33 A.2d 626, 628 (1943).

Considering the circumstances outlined above, we hold appellee satisfied his burden and that the motion to dismiss was properly denied.

Affirmed.

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QUINN, Associate Judge.

' This was a suit by appellee to recover the balance due on a personal loan. The loan was made on April 21, 1960, and suit was brought on September 25, 1963. The sole question for our determination is whether the claim was barred by the statute of limitations. Code 1961, § 12-201 as amended, § 12-301 (Supp. Ill, 1964).

The complaint ‘ alleged an indebtedness of $520.27 plus interest “since about July 1960 for moneys used and advanced.” Appellant’s motion to dismiss on the basis of the statute of limitations was denied, the trial court ruling that “the question of limitations was a mixed question of fact and law and that the cause must proceed to trial and evidence be taken.” Pretrial discovery elicited admissions from appellant that he signed a document on April 21, 1960, acknowledging receipt of $1,061.26 from appellee and that he promised repayment. Appellant admitted that he had ¡made payments totaling approximately $540.99. At trial appellee testified that part payments were received -fro'm appellant at various intervals between April 21, 1960, and August 16, 1963. Appellee filed a ledger sheet showing the amounts received in part payment and the corresponding dates.

The general rule is that part payment on a debt or obligation interrupts or tolls the statute of limitations. 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 321.' In this jurisdiction, a plaintiff who is pressing a claim which on its. face is barred by limitations has the burden of proving an acknowledgment or new promise in the form of part payment. Stern Equipment Company v. Pogue, D.C.Mun.App., 117 A.2d 447, 448 (1955); Tendler. v. L. E. Massey, D.C.Mun.App., 33 A.2d 626, 628 (1943).

Considering the circumstances outlined above, we hold appellee satisfied his burden and that the motion to dismiss was properly denied.

Affirmed.

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202 A.2d 777, 1964 D.C. App. LEXIS 263, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dulberger-v-lippe-dc-1964.

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