Duke v. Thompson

16 Ohio St. 34
CourtOhio Supreme Court
DecidedDecember 15, 1847
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 16 Ohio St. 34 (Duke v. Thompson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Duke v. Thompson, 16 Ohio St. 34 (Ohio 1847).

Opinion

Hitchcock, J.

The complainant introduces in evidence, in this case, a patent bearing date August 30, 1841, by which the land sought to be divided was granted to himself and the heirs of Nathaniel Massie; and upon this evidence he claims the legal title to the land, and that it is his right to have the same partitioned, as prayed for in the bill. There being no evidence to prove that this land had been previously granted by the government, it must be held that by this patent the legal title to a moiety of this survey was vested in the complainant as tenant in common with the heirs of Massie; or rather with the defendants, who claim under Massie, by deeds of warranty. Whether the proofs upon which this grant was made, were such as would have satisfied this court that the complainant was entitled to the land, is not a subject for our consideration, and can make no difference in the case. The [40]*40proper officers of the government were satisfied, and the patent was accordingly made. It conferred the legal title; and the complainant must have partition, unless some of the grounds of defense relied upon by the defendants can avail to defeat his claim.

The first ground of defense is that the defendants, and those under whom they claim, have been in possession of this land more than twenty-one years, under claim of title. That this possession has been open, notorious, exclusive, and adverse to the complainant, and therefore that his rights are barred by the statute of limitations. The proofs in the case show that survey No. 2,204, including the land in controversy, was made by Nathaniel Massic as early as September, 1792; and that the papers connected with it remained in hi3 hands until his death. One-half of the survey was assigned to him, and the other half to James Duke. According to the testimony before the coart, James Duke, in 1809, assigned his interest to the complainant, Alexander Duke. James Duke was a resident in Maryland, and seems never *to have been in the State of Ohio. Massie, in 1794, conveyed the one-half of this survey to Wickersham, and the other half to Miller, in 1799. Wiekersham and Miller took possession of their shares immediately after their respective purchases; and they, and those claiming under them, have been in possession ever since. Here, then, has been an adverse possession of one-half of this land, of fifty-three years; and of the other half, of forty-eight years.

But it is insisted by the complainant that neither James Duke, under whom he claims, nor himself, was ever within the State of Ohio until a short time before the patent was issued, and that therefore the statute can not operate against him. The adverse possession commenced during the lifetime of James Duke. If he died more than twenty-one years before the filing of the bill, the statute beginning to run at his death, would, if there were no other difficulty in the way, operate as a bar. But the fact is that statute did not begin to run until 1841. Until that time the title of the land remained in the government, and the principle is well Bettled that the statute of limitations does not run against the government. Although, then, these defendants have been so long in possession of this land, they can not be protected by this statute.

The next ground of defense is, that this is a stale claim, and that the complainant is barred by lapse of time. To this defense the same objection, perhaps, applies as to that last considered. It [41]*41was not until 1841 that the complainant could prosecute this claim, and since that period the lapse of time has not been so great that the court can with propriety say that the demand is a stale one, according to the common acceptation of the - term. In this case, 1 owever, it is not necessary to decide this point.

The last ground of defense relied upon by the defendant is, that Massie was justly entitled to, or had g,n equitable interest in, the whole survey. This is a point of more difficulty. If the fact be so,—if, in equity, Massie was invested with an equitable interest in the entire survey,—it must be a *good defense for these defendants. Had the complainant presented himself before a court of law in an action of ejectment, this defense could not have been made. In such case the legal title must prevail. But he is in a court of equity, and, although he has the legal title, yet if the defendants have a perfect equity in the land, he holds that legal title in trust for them. He is the trustee—they the cestuis que trust. And I apprehend that, under such circumstances, a trustee can not claim that the trust property shall be divided between himself and his cestuis que trust.

In order to sustain this point of defense the defendants insist that the circumstances disclosed in evidence are such that the court must presume that Alexander Duke transferred bis interest in this survey to Nathaniel Massie. If the circumstances are such as necessarily to raise such a presumption, there is no reason in law why it should not prevail. Assignments of warrants, entitling the holder to lands in the Virginia military district, have been presumed, both in the Supreme Court of the United States and of this state, 7 Wheat. 59 ; 8 Ohio, 518.

Whether such presumption can be made, must depend upon the circumstances disclosed in each particular case. The first circumstance relied upon by defendants in this case is, the great lapse of time. The testimony shows that Alexander Duke first became interested in this survey in 1809, by assignment from his father, James Duke. That he first came to Kentucky in the same year, and that since 1811 he has been a resident in Mason county. Mason county, although in the State of Kentucky, is yet in the vicinity of this land. It would seem strange, under such circumstances, that if the complainant had an inchoate interest in this land, he should not have set up a claim to it, or have made any effort to perfect his title for a period of thirty years. But we are [42]*42not prepared to say that an assingment of the certificate of survey can be presumed from, mere lapse of time.

What other circumstances are there in the case, taken in connection with the lapse of time, and those circumstances ^already named, which would lead us to the conclusion that there must have been an assignment, or- some other transfer, so as to vest the equity in Massie? This depends upon the testimony. This I do not propose to recapitulate, but merely to state facts as they-are disclosed by the proofs.

As before observed, this survey was made by Massie, in 1792. It was made in the name of Fowler and Wilson, claiming as assignees of parts of two different warrants, upon which the entry was based. It is shown that the plat and certificate of survey were delivered to Massie in 1793, and, from anything which appeal’s in the case, remained in his hands until the time of his death, which happened in 1813. Fowler transferred his interest to Massie, and Wilson his interest to James Duke. The date of this latter transfer does not appear. Wilson and James Duke wore brothers-in-law. Before the year 1800, this entire survey had been conveyed by Massie, as before stated, and the purchasers under him took possession. This possession by them, and those claiming under them, has continued and been uninterrupted to the present time.

Two of the brothers and a sister of Alexander Duke swear that their father gave to their brother Alexander all his interest in the survey, in the year 1809. Alexander, by his own oath, confirms this statement.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
16 Ohio St. 34, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/duke-v-thompson-ohio-1847.