Duhon v. Tatje

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Louisiana
DecidedMay 9, 2025
Docket2:90-cv-01669
StatusUnknown

This text of Duhon v. Tatje (Duhon v. Tatje) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Duhon v. Tatje, (E.D. La. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

KATHY R. DUHON, ET AL. CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO: 90-1669

ANN T. TATJE, ET AL.

CONSOLIDATED WITH

HERMON HARRIS, JR., ET AL. NO. 13,212

VERSUS

ST. JOHN THE BAPTIST PARISH SECTION: "A" SCHOOL BOARD

ORDER AND REASONS The following motion is before the Court: Motion for Authorization to Close Fifth Ward Elementary and to Operate Early College Option Program (Rec. Doc. 241) filed by the St. John the Baptist Parish School Board (“the Board”). The NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. (“the LDF”) and local counsel, Mr. Gideon Carter, have filed an opposition on behalf of “Plaintiffs.”1 The United States, as plaintiff- intervenor in the case, has no objection to the Board’s motion. The motion, submitted

1 “Plaintiffs” refers to the original plaintiffs (Hermon Harris, Jr., et al. ) from a desegregation case that was first initiated in 1963—over 61 years ago. The purpose of the Harris case was to challenge and dismantle the prior de jure segregated school system in the parish. The efforts in Harris were successful and resulted in certain consent decrees/orders that remain in effect today. No person who was a plaintiff in the 1963 case is participating in the matters currently before the Court, and given that no new plaintiff has been added to the Harris case since 1963, the LDF does not represent any actual plaintiff in this lawsuit. Therefore, the Board questions the propriety of the LDF filing an opposition to its motion. Page 1 of 11 for consideration on April 30, 2025, is before the Court on the briefs without oral argument. I. Since July of 2023, the LDF on behalf of “Plaintiffs” (see note 1 above) has been seeking this Court’s intervention to compel the Board to close the Fifth Ward

Elementary School (“FWE”) in light of its proximity to the Denka Performance Elastomer plant. The LDF maintained that the plant emits unacceptably dangerous levels of chloroprene into the surrounding air, and given that FWE is a predominately black school located a mere half-mile from the plant, the FWE school facility constituted an inferior and unequal facility. The Denka plant was built after the school was already located at its current site so the LDF’s theory was that by continuing to operate the school at its current site, the Board was in violation of the various desegregation orders/decrees entered in resolving the Harris case.2 Recently, for reasons unrelated to FWE’s proximity to the Denka plant, the Board

adopted a plan to close FWE, and to reassign its students between East St. John Prep and LaPlace Elementary School.3 The Board’s plan would reconfigure East St. John Prep into a PK-8 school (currently a 5th-8th grade school), and rename East St. John Prep to Fifth Ward Preparatory School. The Board’s plan also includes modifying attendance zones for East St. John Prep, LaPlace Elementary School, and Emily C.

2 Again, the Denka plant was built after the school was already located at its current site. Thus, if the FWE facility was in fact inferior and unequal because of its proximity to the Denka plant, it only became so due to the actions of a private entity over which the Board had no control.

3 The Board explained that it is closing the school of its own initiative following a comprehensive study for the entire school district. Page 2 of 11 Watkins.4 The Board has filed the instant motion seeking this Court’s authorization to implement its plan.5 In June of 2024, the LDF filed a Motion for Further Relief, Discovery, and Evidentiary Hearing (Rec. Doc. 220, Motion), in which it sought an order from the Court to compel the Board to close the FWE school and reassign all of the school’s students

to LaPlace Elementary. Before the Court was able to issue its ruling on that motion, the Board had voted to close FWE at the end of the 2024-25 school year, thereby mooting for the most part the relief that the LDF was seeking in its motion. (Rec. Doc. 236, Status Report). The Board did not adopt the LDF’s preferred reassignment plan, which was to reassign all of FWE’s students to LaPlace Elementary, but the issue of whether the Board’s reassignment plan, which included reassigning some students to East St. John Prep School, was problematic was not an issue before the Court at that time. (Rec. Doc. 237, Order and Reasons at 11). But even if some aspect of the LDF’s motion had survived mootness, the Court

explained why it nonetheless lacked subject matter jurisdiction to proceed to act on the motion because the LDF had filed a motion seeking coercive relief against the Board without having an actual plaintiff before the Court. (Id.) Implicit in the requirements for Article III standing, which is necessary to subject matter jurisdiction in federal court, is that there be a plaintiff on whose behalf relief is being sought. (Id. at 12). Given that the

4 The Board advises that no students are impacted by the modification of the Emily C. Watkins zone change.

5 The Board’s motion also seeks authorization to operate an Early College Option program in collaboration with River Parishes Community College. This portion of the Board’s motion has already been granted and is now moot. (Rec. Doc. 244, Order). The Early College Option program had no implications for the desegregation order(s) that remain in place in the parish. Page 3 of 11 LDF represented no plaintiff in the case, and given that it was not itself an aggrieved party with a claim or injury of its own to pursue, the Board had legitimately questioned who had authorized the LDF to move for relief in the name of the Harris plaintiffs from 61 years ago.6 Without a “real” plaintiff with legal standing to pursue the relief being sought, to the extent that any aspect of the Motion for Further Relief, Discovery, and

Evidentiary Hearing might not be moot, the Court had no choice but to deny the motion without prejudice. (Id. at 14). As the Court observed, desegregation cases do not present an exception to the requirement for legal standing, which goes to subject matter jurisdiction in federal court.7 (Id. at 13). II. The question before the Court is whether the Board can, consistent with its obligations under the extant desegregation order,8 move forward to implement its plan to not only close the FWE school but to reassign its students to both LaPlace Elementary and East St. John Prep.

As long as a school district remains under the superintendence of a federal

6 The LDF is a legal non-profit organization that provides legal representation to aggrieved parties. The LDF is not itself an aggrieved party with a claim or injury of its own to pursue so it has no legal authority or legal standing to pursue relief in its own name. It may only do so on behalf of an actual party and that party must have Article III standing to pursue the relief being sought.

7 After the Board filed its opposition to the Motion for Further Relief, Discovery, and Evidentiary Hearing, which seized upon the doubts regarding standing that the Court had raised in its July 27, 2023 Minute Entry (Rec. Doc. 202), the LDF sought to put an actual plaintiff before the Court by filing a Motion to Substitute Named Plaintiffs (Rec. Doc. 228). But none of the persons who sought to join the lawsuit as plaintiffs had standing to prosecute the Motion for Further Relief, Discovery, and Evidentiary Hearing because none of the proposed plaintiffs had a particularized injury-in-fact attributable to the ongoing operation of the FWE school. (Order and Reasons at 16). 8 For simplicity, from this point forward the Court will refer to the desegregation orders entered in Harris in the singular. Page 4 of 11 desegregation order, it has a duty “to take all steps necessary to eliminate the vestiges of the unconstitutional de jure system.” Hull v. Quitman Cty. Bd.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Freeman v. Pitts
503 U.S. 467 (Supreme Court, 1992)
Hull v. Quitman County Board of Education
1 F.3d 1450 (Fifth Circuit, 1993)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Duhon v. Tatje, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/duhon-v-tatje-laed-2025.