IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ATHENS DIVISION CORNELIUS DUGGANS, Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. v. 3:25-cv-100-TES GEORGIA DHR SERVICES, Defendant.
ORDER
Pro se Plaintiff Cornelius Duggans commenced this civil action on June 17, 2025, by filing a Complaint [Doc. 1] and moving for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). [Doc. 2]. Because the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed IFP [Doc. 2] and waives the filing fee, the Court must review his Complaint. See U.S.C. § 1915(e). MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS Authority for granting a plaintiff permission to file a lawsuit without prepayment of fees and costs is found in 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which provides as follows: [Generally], any court of the United States may authorize the commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal therein, without prepayment of fees or security therefor, by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such prisoner possesses1 that the person is unable to pay such fees or give security therefor. Such affidavit shall state the nature of the action,
1 “Despite the statute’s use of the phrase ‘prisoner possesses,’ the affidavit requirement applies to all persons requesting leave to proceed [in forma pauperis].” Martinez v. Kristi Kleaners, Inc., 364 F.3d 1305, 1306 n.1 (11th Cir. 2004). defense or appeal and affiant’s belief that the person is entitled to redress.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). A plaintiff’s application is sufficient to warrant a waiver of filing fees if it “represents that the litigant, because of his poverty, is unable to pay for the court fees and costs, and to support and provide necessities for himself and his dependents.” Martinez v. Kristi Kleaners, Inc., 364 F.3d 1305, 1307 (11th Cir. 2004). After
reviewing Plaintiff’s application, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis [Doc. 2] or, stated differently, grants him IFP status. FRIVOLITY REVIEW
A. Legal Standard Since Plaintiff is proceeding IFP, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) requires the Court to review his Complaint to determine whether it is frivolous or malicious or fails to state a claim for which relief may be granted.2 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(ii). The proper contours of
the term “frivolous,” have been defined by the Supreme Court to encompass complaints that, despite their factual allegations and legal conclusions, lack an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). These types of
complaints are subject to sua sponte dismissal by a district court. Id. at 324 (noting that dismissals under § 1915(e) “are often made sua sponte prior to the issuance of process,
2 The Eleventh Circuit has determined that “28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), which governs proceedings in forma pauperis generally . . . permits district courts to dismiss a case ‘at any time’ if the complaint ‘fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.’” Robinson v. United States, 484 F. App’x 421, 422 n.2 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). so as to spare prospective defendants the inconvenience and expense of answering such complaints[]”).
More specifically, to survive this initial screening, a claim must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
“authorizes a court to dismiss a claim on the basis of a dispositive issue of law.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 326 (citing Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984)). Such dismissal procedure—operating on the assumption that the factual allegations in the complaint
are true—streamlines litigation by dispensing with unnecessary discovery and factfinding. Id. “Nothing in Rule 12(b)(6) confines its sweep to claims of law which are obviously unsupportable.” Id. at 327. To the contrary, if it is clear, as a matter of law, that no relief could be granted under “any set of facts that could be proven with the
allegations,” a claim must be dismissed. Id. (quoting Hishon, 467 U.S. at 73). Frivolity review under § 1915(e), on the other hand, has a separate function. Section 1915(e) is designed to discourage the filing of—and waste of judicial and private
resources upon—baseless lawsuits that paying litigants generally do not initiate due to filing costs and the potential threat of sanctions associated with filing such a lawsuit. Id. “To this end, the statute accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil
of [a] complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Id. Even though Rule 12 and § 1915(e) both counsel dismissal and share “considerable common ground” with each other, one dismissal standard does not
invariably encompass the other. Id. at 328. “When a complaint raises an arguable question of law which the district court ultimately finds is correctly resolved against [a] plaintiff, dismissal on Rule 12(b)(6) grounds is appropriate, but dismissal on the basis of
frivolousness is not.” Id. B. Frivolity Review In his Complaint, Plaintiff seeks relief for alleged violations of his “unalienable
rights” by individuals that the Court can only assume are unnamed employees of the state government. [Doc. 1, p. 1]. Plaintiff argues that Defendant has violated his constitutional rights, including those protected under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Amendments to the United States Constitution. [Doc. 1, pp. 4-5]. Plaintiff
appears to generally allege that his constitutional rights were violated in connection with a child support order filed in the Superior Court of Clarke County, Georgia, in 2013. [Id.].
Plaintiff’s first issue is that he has named a defendant that does not presently exist by that name. Plaintiff names the “Georgia DHR Services” as the defendant in this action. [Doc. 1]. The Court takes the risk of assuming that Plaintiff is referring to what used to be known as the Georgia Department of Human Resources. However, the
Georgia Department of Human Resources has not existed by that name since 2009. As such, Plaintiff seemingly seeks relief from an agency that no longer exists. Because Plaintiff’s allegations primarily concern issues with his child support obligations, the
Court will hazard a guess that Plaintiff meant, instead, to refer to the Georgia Department of Human Services. Although it is now apparent that Plaintiff has sued the wrong party, the Court may not dismiss his claims for misjoinder alone. See Fed.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ATHENS DIVISION CORNELIUS DUGGANS, Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. v. 3:25-cv-100-TES GEORGIA DHR SERVICES, Defendant.
ORDER
Pro se Plaintiff Cornelius Duggans commenced this civil action on June 17, 2025, by filing a Complaint [Doc. 1] and moving for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). [Doc. 2]. Because the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed IFP [Doc. 2] and waives the filing fee, the Court must review his Complaint. See U.S.C. § 1915(e). MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS Authority for granting a plaintiff permission to file a lawsuit without prepayment of fees and costs is found in 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which provides as follows: [Generally], any court of the United States may authorize the commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal therein, without prepayment of fees or security therefor, by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such prisoner possesses1 that the person is unable to pay such fees or give security therefor. Such affidavit shall state the nature of the action,
1 “Despite the statute’s use of the phrase ‘prisoner possesses,’ the affidavit requirement applies to all persons requesting leave to proceed [in forma pauperis].” Martinez v. Kristi Kleaners, Inc., 364 F.3d 1305, 1306 n.1 (11th Cir. 2004). defense or appeal and affiant’s belief that the person is entitled to redress.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). A plaintiff’s application is sufficient to warrant a waiver of filing fees if it “represents that the litigant, because of his poverty, is unable to pay for the court fees and costs, and to support and provide necessities for himself and his dependents.” Martinez v. Kristi Kleaners, Inc., 364 F.3d 1305, 1307 (11th Cir. 2004). After
reviewing Plaintiff’s application, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis [Doc. 2] or, stated differently, grants him IFP status. FRIVOLITY REVIEW
A. Legal Standard Since Plaintiff is proceeding IFP, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) requires the Court to review his Complaint to determine whether it is frivolous or malicious or fails to state a claim for which relief may be granted.2 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(ii). The proper contours of
the term “frivolous,” have been defined by the Supreme Court to encompass complaints that, despite their factual allegations and legal conclusions, lack an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). These types of
complaints are subject to sua sponte dismissal by a district court. Id. at 324 (noting that dismissals under § 1915(e) “are often made sua sponte prior to the issuance of process,
2 The Eleventh Circuit has determined that “28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), which governs proceedings in forma pauperis generally . . . permits district courts to dismiss a case ‘at any time’ if the complaint ‘fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.’” Robinson v. United States, 484 F. App’x 421, 422 n.2 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). so as to spare prospective defendants the inconvenience and expense of answering such complaints[]”).
More specifically, to survive this initial screening, a claim must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
“authorizes a court to dismiss a claim on the basis of a dispositive issue of law.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 326 (citing Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984)). Such dismissal procedure—operating on the assumption that the factual allegations in the complaint
are true—streamlines litigation by dispensing with unnecessary discovery and factfinding. Id. “Nothing in Rule 12(b)(6) confines its sweep to claims of law which are obviously unsupportable.” Id. at 327. To the contrary, if it is clear, as a matter of law, that no relief could be granted under “any set of facts that could be proven with the
allegations,” a claim must be dismissed. Id. (quoting Hishon, 467 U.S. at 73). Frivolity review under § 1915(e), on the other hand, has a separate function. Section 1915(e) is designed to discourage the filing of—and waste of judicial and private
resources upon—baseless lawsuits that paying litigants generally do not initiate due to filing costs and the potential threat of sanctions associated with filing such a lawsuit. Id. “To this end, the statute accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil
of [a] complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Id. Even though Rule 12 and § 1915(e) both counsel dismissal and share “considerable common ground” with each other, one dismissal standard does not
invariably encompass the other. Id. at 328. “When a complaint raises an arguable question of law which the district court ultimately finds is correctly resolved against [a] plaintiff, dismissal on Rule 12(b)(6) grounds is appropriate, but dismissal on the basis of
frivolousness is not.” Id. B. Frivolity Review In his Complaint, Plaintiff seeks relief for alleged violations of his “unalienable
rights” by individuals that the Court can only assume are unnamed employees of the state government. [Doc. 1, p. 1]. Plaintiff argues that Defendant has violated his constitutional rights, including those protected under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Amendments to the United States Constitution. [Doc. 1, pp. 4-5]. Plaintiff
appears to generally allege that his constitutional rights were violated in connection with a child support order filed in the Superior Court of Clarke County, Georgia, in 2013. [Id.].
Plaintiff’s first issue is that he has named a defendant that does not presently exist by that name. Plaintiff names the “Georgia DHR Services” as the defendant in this action. [Doc. 1]. The Court takes the risk of assuming that Plaintiff is referring to what used to be known as the Georgia Department of Human Resources. However, the
Georgia Department of Human Resources has not existed by that name since 2009. As such, Plaintiff seemingly seeks relief from an agency that no longer exists. Because Plaintiff’s allegations primarily concern issues with his child support obligations, the
Court will hazard a guess that Plaintiff meant, instead, to refer to the Georgia Department of Human Services. Although it is now apparent that Plaintiff has sued the wrong party, the Court may not dismiss his claims for misjoinder alone. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 21. Instead, the Court must add the proper party since the Georgia Department of Human Services is essential to Plaintiff’s claims. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a). But the Court declines to do so in this case because Plaintiff’s claims—regardless of who has been
named as a Defendant—are nonetheless barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiff alleges that a state agency has violated his constitutional rights, including his right to due process, stemming from a court order requiring him to pay child support. [Doc. 1]. This would presumably result, if proven, in a violation of
Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment or Fourteenth Amendment rights. See Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 167 (2002) (“The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the United States, as the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits the States, from depriving any person of property without ‘due process of law.’”). As discussed, Plaintiff also levies claims for violation of his Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Amendment rights. [Doc. 1, pp. 4-5]. Such claims are properly brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and carry a two-year statute of limitations when brought in
the Georgia federal courts. Uboh v. Reno, 141 F.3d 1000, 1002 (11th Cir. 1998) (“Federal courts apply their forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions to actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983[.]”); Kelly v. Serna, 87 F.3d 1235, 1238 (11th
Cir. 1996) (“[T]he Georgia two-year personal injury limitations period applies to § 1983 actions in a Georgia district court.”). Where it “appear[s] beyond a doubt from the complaint itself that the [plaintiff] can prove no set of facts which would avoid a statute
of limitations bar,” the Court may dismiss the complaint as time-barred prior to service. Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1163 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Leal v. Georgia Dep’t of Corr., 254 F.3d 1276, 1280 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam)).
It is clear from Plaintiff’s Complaint that the superior court order requiring him to pay child support was entered in 2013, over 12 years before Plaintiff filed this action. [Doc. 1-1]. Given the applicable two-year statute of limitations, Plaintiff’s claims are clearly time-barred.
Finally, even giving Plaintiff the benefit of the doubt on all of the above issues, his claims nonetheless fail as a result of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Because it appears that Plaintiff intended to assert a claim against a state agency and seeks to
recover for some sort of injury, the Court will liberally construe this claim as having been filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 creates a private cause of action that allows individuals to seek damages for deprivations of federal constitutional or statutory rights by persons acting under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.3 To state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) an act or omission deprived him of a right, privilege, or
immunity secured by the United States Constitution or a federal statute; and (2) the act or omission was committed by a state actor or a person acting under color of state law. Hale v. Tallapoosa Cnty., 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir. 1995). Although Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, it does require “more than . . . unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s].” McCullough, 907 F.3d at 1333 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678) (alteration in original).
In this case, Plaintiff has levied claims against a state agency. The Eleventh Amendment provides that “[t]he judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. Accordingly, the amendment precludes actions against an unconsenting State brought in federal court. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167–69 (1985); see also Green v. Waystack, No. 5:18-cv-00042-TES, 2018 WL 3097019,
at *5–6 (M.D. Ga. June 22, 2018). The Eleventh Amendment’s prohibition of suits against an unconsenting State expends equally to state agents in their official capacity. Id. at 166
3 Section 1983 provides that “[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (“[A]n official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the [state itself].”). The State of Georgia has not waived its Eleventh
Amendment immunity and therefore has not consented to suit in federal courts. See O.C.G.A. § 50-21-23(b) (“The state does not waive any immunity with respect to actions brought in the courts of the United States.”). In other words, federal courts lack
jurisdiction to hear claims brought against state officials in their official capacity. Williams v. Monroe Cnty. Dist. Att’y, 702 F. App’x 812, 813 (11th Cir. 2017). Therefore, Plaintiff may not bring his claims against the state agency in this Court.
CONCLUSION Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed IFP [Doc. 2]. Then, upon review of Plaintiff’s Complaint [Doc. 1] under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the Court DISMISSES it without prejudice for failure to state a claim.4 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). SO ORDERED, this 2nd day of July, 2025. S/ Tilman E. Self, III TILMAN E. SELF, III, JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
4 Since the applicable statute of limitations has run as to Plaintiff’s claims, the Court’s dismissal without prejudice is tantamount to dismissal with prejudice. “[W]here a dismissal without prejudice has the effect of precluding the plaintiff from re-filing his claim due to the running of the statute of limitations, it is tantamount to a dismissal with prejudice.” Stephenson v. Doe, 554 F. App’x 835, 837 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Justice v. United States, 6 F.3d 1474, 1482 n.15 (11th Cir. 1993)).