Duggan v. Uppendahl

64 N.E. 289, 197 Ill. 179
CourtIllinois Supreme Court
DecidedJune 19, 1902
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 64 N.E. 289 (Duggan v. Uppendahl) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Illinois Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Duggan v. Uppendahl, 64 N.E. 289, 197 Ill. 179 (Ill. 1902).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Boggs

delivered the opinion of the court:

The appellant instituted an action in ejectment against the appellees to recover a small parcel of land twenty-five feet and four inches in width and five hundred and eighteen feet in length, situate adjacent to the right of way of the Peoria, Decatur and Evansville railroad, in the village of Dalton City, in Moultrie county, more particularly described by metes and bounds in the declaration. Trial by jury was waived and the cause was heard before and submitted to the court for decision. The finding was the defendants, appellees here, were not guilty, and judgment was entered in accordance with such finding. The plaintiff below has brought the record into this court by appeal.

Appellees Henry and John Uppendahl held possession of the disputed premises as tenants of the appellee W. H. Taylor. The appellant and said appellee Taylor each sought to trace title from a common source, namely, the title formerly resting in one James Roney. Roney was the owner of the north-east quarter of section 31, town 15, north, range 4, east of the third principal meridian, in Moultrie county. The track and right of way of the Peoria, Decatur and Evansville Railroad Company passed through the said north-east quarter of said section 31. On the second day of May, 1883, said Roney and wife executed and delivered to one S. D. Moore a deed conveying a portion of said north-west quarter of section 31, described in the deed as follows: “One acre of land described as follows: Beginning one hundred feet west of the center of the main track of the Peoria, Decatur and Evansville railroad; thence running west on the south line of Walnut street ninety-two (92) feet; thence running south-east on a parallel line with the Peoria, Decatur and Evansville railroad track five hundred and eighteen (518) feet-; thence running north two hundred and thirteen (213) feet; thence running north-west on a parallel line with said railroad track one hundred and sixty-eight (168) feet; thence running west fifty (50) feet; thence north-west on a parallel line with said railroad track one hundred and twenty-seven (127) feet to the place of beginning, in section number thirty-one (31),” etc. Moore entered into the possession of a parcel of said north-west quarter of said section 31 under this deed, built a lumber shed on the north-westerly corner and constructed a post-and-board fence along the westerly side thereof. This lumber shed is upon the. strip sought to be recovered in this action of ejectment, and such strip so sought to be recovered lies entirely within the enclosure of the post-and-board fence. On the 24th day of September, 1884, said Roney executed and delivered to the appellant a deed conveying to her said north-west quarter of said section 31, except certain portions therein specified, the strip here in controversy not being included in any of such excepted parts of the tract conveyed by the deed. This deed also conveyed block 31 as originally platted in the village of Dalton City, and also other parcels not here involved. The lumber shed and portions of the strip here sought to be recovered are upon said block 31. On the 28th day of June, 1886, said S. D. Moore and wife executed and delivered to the appellee Taylor a deed conveying to him the same parcel of land which Roney had conveyed to Moore, and describing it in the same manner as in the deed from Roney to Moore. In each of these deeds the point of beginning the boundaries of the tract to be conveyed is: “Beginning one hundred feet west of the center of the main track of the Peoria, Decatur and Evansville railroad; thence running west on the south line of Walnut street ninety-two (92) feet,” etc. Walnut street runs directly east and west. The main track of the Peoria, Decatur and Evansville railroad runs from the south-east to the north-west and crosses Walnut street at that angle.

The appellant contends that, following the description in the deed, the point of beginning the boundaries of the tract therein described is to be found by drawing a line from the center of the main track of the railroad due west one hundred feet along the south line of Walnut street. If that is the true construction of the description in the deed, the strip of land described in the declaration will be found situate beyond or without the boundaries of the tract described in the deeds from Roney to Moore and Moore to Taylor. The strip described in the declaration, as before said, is included in the description of the lands conveyed to the appellant by said Roney. We concur in the view advanced by the appellant as to the true mode of ascertaining the beginning point of the boundary of the tract described in these deeds. The language of the deeds is explicit. There is neither room nor need for construction. The starting point is to be found on the south line of Walnut street, one hundred feet due west from the center of the main track of the railroad. Nor, as we understand the argument of counsel, is it otherwise claimed in behalf of the appellees.

The appellees, over the objection of the appellant, were allowed to introduce evidence to show that before the execution of the deed from Roney to Moore, Roney and Moore procured a surveyor and proceeded upon the premises for the purpose of ascertaining and determining the actual boundary lines of the tract to be sold by Roney to Moore; that said parties and the surveyor located the beginning point on the south line of Walnut street at a distance of one hundred feet from the center of the main track of the railroad,—not west therefrom, but at right angles with the railroad,—which would make the starting point south-west from the point in the center of the main track of the railroad; that they placed a stake at this beginning point,on Walnut street, surveyed and located from thence, according to the calls now appearing in the description set forth in the deed, and placed stakes at each corner, and that said Moore entered into possession of the tract according to the boundaries and stakes so established by himself and said Roney, and that he retained possession of the said premises, built the lumber shed and the said fence thereon, and continued in the possession thereof until he sold to the appellee Taylor and then delivered the possession thereof to Taylor, who thenceforth held and retained the same up to the time of the beginning of this action.

The point "on the south line of Walnut street one hundred feet due west from the center of the main track of the railroad is twenty-five feet and four inches east of a point reached by drawing a line one hundred feet from the center of the main track of the railroad to a point on the south line of Walnut street at right angles with the line of the railroad. The adoption of the latter means of ascertaining the starting point would operate to extend the boundaries of the south-westerly side of the tract to be conveyed and thereby include the strip in controversy within such boundaries. But to accomplish this the line drawn from the center of the track of the railroad to the south line of Walnut street would not proceed west from the center of the railroad track, but due south-west therefrom. Therefore, the effect of the introduction of this evidence was but to vary and contradict the description of the premises set forth in the deed from Roney to Moore and that from Moore to Taylor. There is no ambiguity or uncertainty in the description in these deeds. The starting point is on the south line of Walnut street, one hundred feet west of the center of the track of the railroad, etc.

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Bluebook (online)
64 N.E. 289, 197 Ill. 179, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/duggan-v-uppendahl-ill-1902.