Dugan v. Dugan

Berks County Court of Common Pleas

Dugan v. Dugan

15 Pa. D. & C. 558, 1930 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 135

CourtPennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Berks County

DecidedNovember 5, 1930

DocketNo. 11

StatusPublished

This text of 15 Pa. D. & C. 558 (Dugan v. Dugan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Berks County primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Dugan v. Dugan, 15 Pa. D. & C. 558, 1930 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 135 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1930).

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Opinion

Mays, J.,

This is a rule for leave to discontinue a proceeding in divorce. The libellant asks leave to discontinue the proceeding for the reason that “your petitioner, on account of business conditions, is unable to proceed further with the proceedings.” The respondent objects to the discontinuance. A master was appointed, and, after several hearings, filed his report on April 4, 1930, wherein he recommended that the libel be dismissed and the petition for divorce refused.

The reason alleged for the discontinuance is not sufficient, particularly in view of the fact that the libellant has failed to withdraw the charges made. In a case of this kind it is not sufficient merely to ask for a withdrawal or discontinuance of the cause itself.

And now, to wit, November 5, 1930, rule to show cause is discharged and the discontinuance disallowed.

From Charles K. Derr, Reading, Pa.

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Mays, J.,

This is a rule for leave to discontinue a proceeding in divorce. The libellant asks leave to discontinue the proceeding for the reason that “your petitioner, on account of business conditions, is unable to proceed further with the proceedings.” The respondent objects to the discontinuance. A master was appointed, and, after several hearings, filed his report on April 4, 1930, wherein he recommended that the libel be dismissed and the petition for divorce refused.

The reason alleged for the discontinuance is not sufficient, particularly in view of the fact that the libellant has failed to withdraw the charges made. In a case of this kind it is not sufficient merely to ask for a withdrawal or discontinuance of the cause itself.

And now, to wit, November 5, 1930, rule to show cause is discharged and the discontinuance disallowed.

From Charles K. Derr, Reading, Pa.

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Bluebook (online)

15 Pa. D. & C. 558, 1930 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 135, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dugan-v-dugan-pactcomplberks-1930.