Duffany v. Duffany, No. Fa99-0151363 (Oct. 17, 2000)

2000 Conn. Super. Ct. 12885
CourtConnecticut Superior Court
DecidedOctober 17, 2000
DocketNo. FA99-0151363
StatusUnpublished

This text of 2000 Conn. Super. Ct. 12885 (Duffany v. Duffany, No. Fa99-0151363 (Oct. 17, 2000)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Duffany v. Duffany, No. Fa99-0151363 (Oct. 17, 2000), 2000 Conn. Super. Ct. 12885 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000).

Opinion

[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.]

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This is an action for dissolution of marriage and. other relief brought to the judicial district of Waterbury. Many of the facts that give rise to this action are not in dispute. The plaintiff whose maiden name is Gail St. Mary and the defendant were married on December 1, 1939 in Waterbury, Connecticut. The plaintiff has resided continuously in the State of Connecticut for at least 12 months immediately prior to the date the complaint was filed. The marriage between the parties has broken down irretrievably without any reasonable prospects of reconciliation. There are three minor children issue of this marriage, Zachary Duffany born September 21, 1991; Spencer Duff any born June 19, 1993; and Brandon Duffany born July 10, 1995. The plaintiff does not have any other minor children. Neither party has received state assistance.

The parties are in dispute as to the cause of the breakdown of the marriage. From the evidence presented, the court finds that the defendant's conduct is the cause of the breakdown of the marriage.

The plaintiff is 36 years old.

The plaintiff is in fair health. She has a family history of heart problems and diabetes. She has a heart murmur for which she is not presently receiving medical treatment. She has a back injury, as well as a neck injury. She is not under a doctor's care for her back. Her employment requires her to care for a brain injured adult as a private home aide. She is a high school graduate. The stipulation entered into between the parties dated September 19, 2000 provided in part that the plaintiff shall be entitled to obtain COBRA coverage at her cost as available through the defendant's employer. The court finds that the cost for that COBRA coverage for the plaintiff will be $152.37 per month.

CT Page 12886 The plaintiff has a secure job as a nurse's aide for a multi-handicapped adult male. Her gross weekly income is $512.33 less deductions. Her financial affidavit of September 18, 2000 lists as other sources of income: child support of $250.00 per week and "mortg." (cont.) of $100.00 per week. The $250.00 per week is the existing pendente lite support order and the $100.00 per week is the existing pendente lite order for the defendant to contribute to the mortgage payment. The plaintiff owns a 1993 Ford with a value of $3,000.00 and no loan balance. She also has $20.00 in her checking account. She does not have any other assets.

The defendant is 33 years old.

The defendant is a high school graduate and has attended college for 2 1/2 years.

The defendant is employed as a restaurant manager with gross weekly income of $1,057.00. He has been employed in that field for a number of years. He has $591.00 in his Webster Bank checking account. He has life insurance through his employment on his life in the face amount of $10,000.00. He has a 401K plan with a gross value of approximately $2,164.00. The defendant owns a 2000 Dodge Intrepid. That vehicle was purchased by him in January 2000 and costs close to $23,000.00. There is a loan balance due on that vehicle of $25,000.00. The Intrepid was purchased in part through a trade-in of another automobile that the parties owned together with the loan that the defendant obtained. The defendant also paid $1,000.00 down on the vehicle using his credit card.

The family home located at 186 Fanning Road, Waterbury, Connecticut, was purchased on December 21, 1989, for a purchase price of $109,500.00 in the name of the defendant only. It is encumbered by two separate mortgages. The first mortgage is a "growing equity mortgage" at an interest rate of 8.56%. This mortgage was used to purchase the family home and was in the face amount of $103,600.00. The final payment on the mortgage to pay it off in full is due July 1, 2006. The monthly payments on the mortgage for principal and interest through December 1, 2001, is $1,137.71. Thereafter, the monthly installment for principal and interest is $1,205.05. The second mortgage on the family home was in the face amount of $8,300.00, dated December 22, 1989. The final payment on that mortgage is due on January 1, 2020. On June 5, 1997, the defendant transferred the title to the family home into both his name and the plaintiff as part of reconciliation conditions she imposed.

The court finds that the fair market value of the family home is $85,000.00 and that it has a first mortgage with a balance of approximately $64,000.00. The approximate balance due on the second CT Page 12887 mortgage is $4,800.00. The monthly payment on the second mortgage is $49.77. The combined mortgage balance is approximately $68,800.00 and there is an equity in the home of approximately $16,200.00.

In the calendar year of 1996, the parties had gross wages of $40,778.00. The plaintiff had gross wages of $7,875.00. and the defendant had gross wages of $32,902.73. In the calendar year 1997, the parties had gross wages of $48,254.00. The plaintiff had approximately $15,000.00 in gross wages in 1997, and the defendant had approximately $33,800.00 in gross wages in 1997. In the calendar year of 1998, the parties had gross wages of $67,792.00. The plaintiff earned approximately $15,000.00 in 1998 and the defendant earned approximately $53,000.00 in 1998. In the calendar year of 1999, the parties has gross wages of $75,568.00. During the calendar year 1999, the plaintiff had gross wages of $28,832.25 and the defendant had gross wages of $46,735.45. The court finds that the defendant has a much greater earning capacity than the plaintiff.

The parties entered into a partial stipulation dated September 19, 2000 which the court has reviewed and finds to be fair and equitable. All the provisions of that stipulation will therefore be incorporated into the judgment file. That stipulation provided as follows:

THE PARTIES DO HEREBY AGREE: 1. PENSION

Defendant shall assign to plaintiff one-half (1A) of the value of any and all pension and profit sharing assets currently held by the defendant, specifically including those assets in The Briad Group, account #93307-1.

2. LIFE INSURANCE

Defendant shall provide and maintain life insurance on the life of the defendant naming the children as irrevocable beneficiaries thereof, in an amount up to $15,000.00 so long as available through his employer at no cost to defendant (currently $10,000.00).

3. LIABILITIES

Defendant shall make payment of the Fleet Bank credit card listed on the parties' respective financial affidavit and hold plaintiff harmless thereon. Defendant make payment of all other liabilities on his CT Page 12888 financial affidavit and hold the plaintiff thereon. Plaintiff shall make payment of all other liabilities on her financial affidavit and hold the defendant harmless thereon.

4. HEALTH INS.

Defendant shall maintain medical and dental for the benefit of the children as it is available to him through his employer. Plaintiff shall be entitled to obtain COBRA coverage1 at her cost, as available through defendant's employer.

5. CUSTODY

The parties shall have joint legal custody of the children with primary residence to be with the plaintiff.

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Bluebook (online)
2000 Conn. Super. Ct. 12885, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/duffany-v-duffany-no-fa99-0151363-oct-17-2000-connsuperct-2000.