Duenas Quinto v. Garland

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedMarch 8, 2023
Docket21-919
StatusUnpublished

This text of Duenas Quinto v. Garland (Duenas Quinto v. Garland) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Duenas Quinto v. Garland, (9th Cir. 2023).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 8 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JORGE DUENAS QUINTO, No. 21-919

Petitioner, Agency No. A206-236-922

v. MEMORANDUM* MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted March 07, 2023** San Francisco, California

Before: FRIEDLAND and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges, and KATZMANN,*** Judge.

Jorge Duenas Quinto, a Peruvian native and citizen, petitions for review of

the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) affirmance of an Immigration Judge’s

(IJ) denial of his applications for asylum and withholding of removal under the

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Gary S. Katzmann, Judge for the United States Court of International Trade, sitting by designation. Immigration and Nationality Act and withholding of removal under the

Convention Against Torture (CAT). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252.

Wang v. Sessions, 861 F.3d 1003, 1007 (9th Cir. 2017).

“We review the BIA’s denials of asylum, withholding of removal, and

CAT relief for ‘substantial evidence’ and will uphold a denial supported by

‘reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a

whole.’” Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting

Kamalyan v. Holder, 620 F.3d 1054, 1057 (9th Cir. 2010)). “In order to reverse

the BIA, we must determine that the evidence not only supports a contrary

conclusion, but compels it—and also compels the further conclusion that the

petitioner meets the requisite standard for obtaining relief.” Id. (cleaned up).

“Where the BIA issues its own decision but relies in part on the immigration

judge’s reasoning, we review both decisions.” Singh v. Holder, 753 F.3d 826,

830 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Flores-Lopez v. Holder, 685 F.3d 857, 861 (9th Cir.

2012)).

1. Duenas Quinto contends that the BIA and IJ erred in denying his

asylum application after determining that the Shining Path did not persecute him

on account of his political opinion or membership in a particular social group.

See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). He argues that he was persecuted on account of his

imputed political opinion, or in the alternative, for remaining politically neutral

when it was hazardous to do so. The BIA and IJ found that Duenas Quinto was

not persecuted on account of his political opinion; he was threatened to obtain

2 information about his aunt and was subject to recruitment efforts for his

intelligence.

Duenas Quinto’s brief asserts only that he and his family opposed the

Shining Path. He has not presented evidence of persecution based on this

opposition or any other political stance. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478,

483–84 (1992) (holding that petitioner must show persecution because of his

political opinion, not just refusal to join criminal organization); Barajas-Romero

v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 357 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[I]f the persecutor has no idea what

the victim’s political opinion is and does not care what it is, then even if the victim

does reasonably fear persecution, it would not be ‘on account of’ the victim’s

political opinion.”); Navas v. INS, 217 F.3d 646, 659 (9th Cir. 2000) (“To

establish imputed political opinion, an applicant must show that his persecutors

actually imputed a political opinion to him.” (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted)). The BIA and IJ’s rejection of this protected ground is

supported by substantial evidence.

Duenas Quinto also argues that because he was threatened by the Shining

Path to gain information about his aunt’s whereabouts, he has shown persecution

on account of his membership in a particular social group: his aunt’s family. The

BIA and IJ found that Duenas Quinto had not shown the requisite nexus because

the Shining Path did not threaten Duenas Quinto based on animus toward his

family, but to obtain information about his aunt’s location. The BIA and IJ both

3 relied on Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 40, 45 (B.I.A. 2017),1 which held that

“the fact that a persecutor targets a family member simply as a means to an end

is not, by itself, sufficient to establish a claim, especially if the end is not

connected to another protected ground.” The BIA further noted that no other

family members were threatened by the Shining Path.

Reviewing the BIA and IJ’s findings about a persecutor’s motive for

substantial evidence, Lkhagvasuren v. Lynch, 849 F.3d 800, 803 (9th Cir. 2016)

(per curiam), the record supports the agency’s conclusion that any persecution or

fear of future persecution Duenas Quinto experienced was not based on his family

membership but because of the Shining Path’s desire to locate his aunt. The

record also supports the BIA and IJ’s conclusion that Duenas Quinto was targeted

“simply as a means to an end.” See Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 45; see

also id. at 45–47. The evidence does not compel a contrary result, so we must

uphold the BIA’s decision.2 Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 738 (9th

Cir. 2009).

1 A portion of Matter of L-E-A, 27 I & N. Dec. 40 (B.I.A. 2017) that is not relevant here was overruled by the Attorney General. See Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 581 (A.G. 2019). But that decision was later “vacated in its entirety” by the Attorney General—thereby reinstating the BIA’s 2017 decision. Matter of L-E-A-, 28 I & N. Dec. 304 (A.G. 2021). 2 The Government does not defend the IJ’s determination that Duenas Quinto’s asylum claim was time-barred or the IJ’s determination that he would have denied asylum as a matter of discretion had Duenas Quinto demonstrated the required nexus. Thus, like the BIA, we presume Duenas Quinto timely filed his asylum application and need not address the IJ’s denial as a matter of discretion.

4 2. Because the BIA’s denial of Duenas Quinto’s asylum application is

supported by substantial evidence, Duenas Quinto has likewise not satisfied the

more stringent standard for withholding of removal. See Farah v. Ashcroft, 348

F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003).

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Related

Kamalyan v. Holder
620 F.3d 1054 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Jamal Ali Farah v. John Ashcroft, Attorney General
348 F.3d 1153 (Ninth Circuit, 2003)
Carlos Flores-Lopez v. Eric H. Holder Jr.
685 F.3d 857 (Ninth Circuit, 2012)
Parussimova v. Mukasey
555 F.3d 734 (Ninth Circuit, 2009)
Jagtar Singh v. Eric Holder, Jr.
753 F.3d 826 (Ninth Circuit, 2014)
Lydia Garcia-Milian v. Eric Holder, Jr.
755 F.3d 1026 (Ninth Circuit, 2014)
Raul Barajas-Romero v. Loretta E. Lynch
846 F.3d 351 (Ninth Circuit, 2017)
Yali Wang v. Jefferson Sessions
861 F.3d 1003 (Ninth Circuit, 2017)
L-E-A
27 I. & N. Dec. 581 (Board of Immigration Appeals, 2019)
L-E-A
27 I. & N. Dec. 40 (Board of Immigration Appeals, 2017)
Lkhagvasuren v. Lynch
849 F.3d 800 (Ninth Circuit, 2016)

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