Duenas Barraza v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: December 3, 2025
• Docket: 23-1874
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 3 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

CHRISTIAN EMMANUEL DUENAS BARRAZA, No. 23-1874

Petitioner, Agency No. A037-566-561 v.

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General, MEMORANDUM*

Respondent.

*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted October 22, 2025 Portland, Oregon

Before: W. FLETCHER, CHRISTEN, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

Christian Emmanuel Duenas Barraza, a native and citizen of El Salvador,

petitions for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)

dismissing his appeal from an order of removal issued by an Immigration Judge

(IJ). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. “Where, as here, the BIA adopts

the decision of the IJ, we review the IJ’s decision as if it were that of the BIA.”

Hoque v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1190, 1194 (9th Cir. 2004). We review purely legal

questions de novo, Lopez v. Garland, 116 F.4th 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 2019), and

findings of fact for substantial evidence, Gonzaga-Ortega v. Holder, 736 F.3d 795,

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. 800 (9th Cir. 2013). We dismiss the petition for review in part and deny it in part.

1. Petitioner first contends that the IJ erroneously applied a “reason to

believe” standard in determining removability. But even assuming error, remand is

not required where, as here, “neither the result nor the BIA’s basic reasoning

would change.” Singh v. Barr, 935 F.3d 822, 827 (9th Cir. 2019). Any error was

harmless because the record contained overwhelming evidence that petitioner

committed a human trafficking offense within the meaning of 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(a)(2)(H)(i) and was therefore removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(F).

Petitioner pled guilty in state court to one count of human trafficking of a minor

under California Penal Code § 236.1(c)(1), and admitted before the IJ that he

prostituted his girlfriend’s underage daughter for profit. The government thus

easily met its burden of establishing removability by “clear and convincing

evidence.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(a).

2. The IJ was not required, as petitioner claims, to apply the categorical

approach to determine whether his conduct matched the statutory grounds of

removability. The categorical approach is only required when removability turns

on conviction, not conduct. See, e.g., Mellouli v. Lynch, 575 U.S. 798, 806 (2015)

(recognizing that the categorical approach is “[r]ooted in Congress’ specification of

conviction, not conduct, as the trigger for immigration consequences”). Here,

petitioner was found removable for having committed human trafficking, not for

2 23-1874 having been convicted of it. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(2)(H)(i), 1227(a)(2)(F).

3. Because the IJ denied petitioner’s application for cancellation of removal

in the exercise of discretion, we have no jurisdiction to review that denial. We

therefore dismiss the relevant portion of the petition for review. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i); Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209, 225 n.4 (2024).

4. Petitioner challenges the IJ’s determination that he committed a

“particularly serious crime” (PSC), rendering him ineligible for asylum and

withholding of removal. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii).

Although aggravated felony offenses constitute PSCs per se, the agency may in its

discretion determine that other offenses qualify as PSCs. Hernandez v. Garland,

52 F.4th 757, 765 (9th Cir. 2022). We review those determinations for abuse of

discretion, id., and our review is “limited to ensuring that the agency relied on the

appropriate factors and proper evidence,” id. (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). The IJ appropriately weighed a range of relevant factors, including the

seriousness of the crime, the sentence imposed, and the effect on the victim. The IJ

adequately considered petitioner’s mental health in light of the evidence presented.

See Gomez-Sanchez v. Sessions, 892 F.3d 985, 996 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that

“an individual’s mental health could be relevant to the determination of whether a

crime is particularly serious” (emphasis added)). The IJ also considered police

reports, which was appropriate because an IJ may consider “all reliable

3 23-1874 information” in making a PSC determination, so long as the information “is

probative and its admission is fundamentally fair.” Hernandez, 52 F.4th at 766

(citations omitted).

5. The IJ’s determination that petitioner did not qualify for relief under the

Convention Against Torture (CAT) is supported by substantial evidence.

Applicants for CAT relief must establish it is “more likely than not” that they will

be tortured upon removal. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2). Petitioner expressed fear that

he would be targeted due to his tattoos, including one that he says looks gang-like,

and his criminal record. The IJ considered petitioner’s argument and offered

detailed reasons as to why he did not find petitioner had established a likelihood of

torture due to his tattoos.

The petition for review is therefore DISMISSED IN PART AND DENIED

IN PART.

The temporary stay of removal remains in place until the mandate issues.

4 23-1874