Dudgeon v. Sonoma

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: February 11, 2020
• Docket: 3:19-cv-05615
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 DANIEL DUDGEON, Case No. 19-cv-05615-JCS

8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 9 v. DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT 10 COUNTY OF SONOMA, et al., Re: Dkt. No. 23 Defendants. 11

12 Plaintiff Daniel Dudgeon (“Plaintiff”) filed this suit against Defendants County of 13 Sonoma, Robert Woodworth, Brent Kidder, Kensell Williams, Matthias Williams, Randy 14 Williams, and George Minaglia (collectively, “Defendants”) alleging violations of his civil rights 15 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, violation of his civil rights under California Civil Code § 52.1, false 16 arrest, battery, assault, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, negligent infliction 17 of emotional distress, and a Monell claim. Plaintiff also named Defendant City of Sonoma in the 18 complaint but voluntarily dismissed this defendant. Before the Court is Defendants’ motion to 19 dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to 20 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The Court finds the motion suitable for resolution 21 without oral argument and vacates the motion hearing set for February 14, 2020. Having 22 considered the papers filed in support of and in opposition to the motions, the Court hereby 23 GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the motion to dismiss the complaint and grants Plaintiff 24 leave to amend. 25 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 26 On or about January 22, 2019, Plaintiff was attempting to detox from his opiate addiction 27 and started consuming a 750 ml bottle of Vodka. Compl. ¶ 21-23. Plaintiff’s wife noticed that 1 pm, Plaintiff’s wife retired to their bedroom with their 12-year-old daughter. Id. ¶¶ 20, 25. 2 Plaintiff’s wife noticed that the vodka bottle was still half full. Id. ¶ 25. While in bed, Plaintiff’s 3 wife could hear Plaintiff walking around their home and having a conversation with himself. Id. ¶ 4 26. Around 12 [a]m, Plaintiff’s wife exited the bedroom to tell Plaintiff he needed to lay down 5 because he was making too much noise. Id. ¶ 27. At this time, she noticed that the vodka bottle 6 was completely empty. Id. Plaintiff’s wife brought their 8-year-old son to their bedroom and 7 locked the door because Plaintiff was heavily intoxicated. Id. ¶ 28. Around 3 am, Plaintiff 8 attempted to enter the locked bedroom with the front door key and Plaintiff’s wife told him that he 9 needed to lay down on the couch or she would call the hospital. Id. ¶¶ 29-31. Plaintiff’s wife 10 called the hospital but the hospital said they could not assist Plaintiff until he was physically 11 present and suggested Plaintiff’s wife call 911 if she was unable to bring him. Id. ¶ 32. Around 12 3:38 am, Plaintiff’s wife called 911 requesting paramedic assistance because she was concerned 13 that Plaintiff was having a stroke. Id. ¶ 33. While Plaintiff’s wife was on the phone with 911, 14 Plaintiff continued to request to enter the bedroom and the 911 operator asked Plaintiff’s wife to 15 confirm that she was safe. Id. ¶¶ 34-35. She was adamant that she was safe but while she was on 16 the phone with the 911 operator, Plaintiff forcefully entered the room. Id. ¶¶ 35-36. 17 Plaintiff’s wife had previously opened the front door of the home leaving only the 18 transparent screen door closed in anticipation of paramedics. Id. ¶ 37. Defendant Woodworth, a 19 Sonoma County deputy sheriff, responded to the 911 call and announced his presence by yelling 20 “Sheriff’s Office!” Id. ¶¶ 38-39. Plaintiff was dancing and told the officer, “Come inside. You’re 21 in my house. What do you need?” Id. ¶ 42. Plaintiff alleges that at no point did he assume a 22 fighting stance, clench his fist, or act in a threatening manner. Id. ¶ 44. Plaintiff began walking 23 towards his wife when Defendant Woodworth inserted himself between Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s 24 wife, instructed Plaintiff to stay away from Plaintiff’s wife, and placed his hands onto Plaintiff. 25 Id. ¶¶ 45-46. Plaintiff became defensive and asked Defendant Woodworth if he was really going 26 to come between him and his wife. Id. ¶¶ 47-49. Defendant Woodworth grabbed Plaintiff’s arm 27 and Plaintiff resisted. Id. ¶¶ 50-51. A struggle ensued and Defendant Woodworth allegedly 1 Daniel in handcuffs and stop and further violence.” Id. ¶¶ 52-53. While Defendant Woodworth 2 was attempting to handcuff Plaintiff, Defendant Woodworth placed his shin on the back of 3 Plaintiff’s head allegedly causing further injury. Id., ¶ 56. No other officers were present during 4 the confrontation. Id. ¶ 57. After Plaintiff was detained, Defendant Minaglia and one of the 5 defendants with the last name Williams arrived on scene to assist Defendant Woodworth. Id. ¶ 58. 6 Approximately three officers physically carried Plaintiff out of his home. Id. ¶ 61. At some point 7 during the struggle, or during his subsequent arrest and questioning, Plaintiff sustained severe 8 injury to his collar bone and shoulder. Id. ¶ 62. Plaintiff does not recall any of the interactions 9 between him and the Sheriff’s deputies and only remembers coming to in the hospital handcuffed 10 to the hospital bed. Id. ¶ 63. Plaintiff alleges that the assault and battery within his home, and the 11 subsequent violent removal of Plaintiff left him with severe injuries. Id. ¶ 64. 12 II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 13 On September 05, 2019, Plaintiff filed this complaint. On January 7, 2020, Defendants 14 filed this motion to dismiss. On January 17, 2020, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed Defendant City 15 of Sonoma. 16 III. LEGAL STANDARD 17 A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 18 pleader is entitled to relief” to give the defendant “fair notice” of what the claims are and the 19 grounds upon which they rest. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 20 555 (2007). A complaint does not need detailed factual allegations, but “a plaintiff’s obligation to 21 provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a 22 formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be 23 enough to raise a claim for relief above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 24 (internal citations omitted). 25 A claim for relief may be dismissed under FRCP 12(b)(6) for a “failure to state a claim 26 upon which relief can be granted.” See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to 27 dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations, which when accepted as true, 1 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads 2 factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 3 for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability 4 requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” 5 Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely 6 consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility 7 of ‘entitlement to relief.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557) (internal quotations omitted). 8 The Ninth Circuit has “repeatedly held that ‘a district court should grant leave to amend even if no 9 request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly 10 be cured by the allegation of other facts.’” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) 11 (citing Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)). 12 IV. DISCUSSION 13 A. Plaintiff’s First Claim, Second Claim, and Third Claim for Violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983 Against the County of Sonoma Fails to State a Claim. 14 “A local governmental entity may be sued under section 1983 where the alleged 15 constitutional deprivation was inflicted pursuant to an official policy or custom.” Arpin v. Santa 16 Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 925 (9th Cir. 2001). However, a local government 17 entity cannot be sued under §1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents under a 18 respondeat superior theory. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 19 658, 691 (1978). A government entity is liable under section 1983 “when execution of a 20 government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts 21 may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. 22 of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). 23 In order to establish liability for governmental entities under Monell, a plaintiff must prove 24 “(1) that [the plaintiff] possessed a constitutional right of which [s]he was deprived; (2) that the 25 municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's 26 constitutional right; and, (4) that the policy is the moving force behind the constitutional 27 violation.” Plumeau v. Sch. Dist. No. 40 Cnty. of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir.1997) 1 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted; alterations in original); see also Lee v. City of Los 2 Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 681-682 (9th Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by Bell Atlantic v. 3 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Municipal liability for a constitutional violation “only 4 attaches where (1) the alleged constitutional tort resulted from a municipality’s custom, policy, or 5 practice; (2) the tortfeasor was an official ‘whose acts fairly represent official policy such that the 6 challenged action constituted official policy’; (3) an official with policymaking authority ratified 7 the tortfeasor’s actions; or (4) the municipality failed to adequately train the tortfeasors.” Inmam 8 v. Anderson, 294 F. Supp. 3d 907, 921 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (citations omitted). 9 Bare allegations that some unidentified policy, practice, or custom exists fail to state a 10 claim. AE ex rel. Hernandez v. Cnty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012); see also 11 Gonzalez v. Cnty. of Merced, 289 F. Supp. 3d 1094, 1116 (E.D. Cal. 2017) (where allegations 12 identified only two or three incidents, facts alleged were insufficient to allege a widespread 13 practice of repeated constitutional violations sufficient to state a Monell claim). “Liability for 14 improper custom may not be predicated on isolated or sporadic incidents; it must be founded upon 15 practices of sufficient duration, frequency, and consistency that the conduct has become a 16 traditional method of carrying out policy.” Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2008). 17 An “isolated instance . . . is insufficient evidence of a ‘policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or 18 decision officially adopted and promulgated by’ the County.” Marsh v. County of San Diego, 680 19 F.3d 1148, 1159 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal citations omitted). Likewise, mistakes or errors of 20 municipal officials do not rise to the level of “policy” sufficient for §1983 liability. Erdman v. 21 Cochise County, Arizona, 926 F.2d 877, 882 (9th Cir. 1991). 22 In the complaint, Plaintiff merely alleges that Defendant County of Sonoma had a duty to 23 adequately train, supervise and discipline their deputy officers in order to protect members of the 24 public and incarcerated individuals from being harmed by sheriff deputies unnecessarily and 25 Defendant County of Sonoma was deliberately indifferent to such duties and thereby proximately 26 caused injury to Plaintiff. Compl. ¶ 78-79. While these allegations mimic the legal standard, 27 Plaintiff failed to identify or allege a specific County custom, policy, or practice that was the 1 facts alleging any particular instances of notice or a pattern of conduct. Plaintiff also fails to 2 allege that the purported tortfeasor was an official whose acts fairly represent official policy or 3 that training was inadequate. Despite Plaintiff’s argument to the contrary, bare allegations are not 4 enough to form the basis of Plaintiff’s Monell claim. See Turano v. Cty. of Alameda, No. 17-CV- 5 06953-KAW, 2018 WL 3054853, at *10 (N.D. Cal. June 20, 2018); Gardner v. Las Vegas Metro. 6 Police Dep't, No. 216CV01384GMNCWH, 2018 WL 1091977, at *3 (D. Nev. Feb. 28, 2018). 7 Furthermore, although Plaintiff attempts to provide the Court with additional facts in his 8 opposition, these facts are not pled in the complaint. Thus, Plaintiff’s Monell claim is dismissed 9 with leave to amend. 10 B. Plaintiff’s First Claim Alleging Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Fails to State a Claim. 11 Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s first claim should be dismissed because it improperly 12 alleges both a violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment but only the Fourth Amendment 13 is an appropriate source for constitutional protections for this incident. The Supreme Court has 14 held that “all claims that law enforcement officials used excessive force in the course of an arrest, 15 investigatory stop, or other seizure of a free person must be brought under the Fourth Amendment 16 and analyzed under its objective reasonableness standard, rather than under a substantive due 17 process approach.” Nguthe yen v. Ponce, 2012 WL 1247165, at *15-16 (C.D. Cal. March 7, 18 2012) citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) and County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 19 523 U.S. 833, 8442 (1998). Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit has held that “the Fourth Amendment 20 sets the applicable constitutional limitations on the treatment of an arrestee detained without a 21 warrant up until the time such arrestee is released or found to be legally in custody based upon 22 probable cause for arrest.” Pierce v. Multnomah Cty., Or., 76 F.3d 1032, 1043 (9th Cir. 1996). A 23 court in this district has held that a “plaintiff may not bring a Fourteenth Amendment claim 24 because the Fourth Amendment applies to defendants’ use of force.” Wroth v. Cty. of Sonoma, 25 No. 14-CV-05519-SI, 2015 WL 3903023, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 24, 2015) (citing Albright v. 26 Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) for the proposition, “Where a particular Amendment ‘provides 27 an explicit textual source of constitutional protection’ against a particular sort of government 1 behavior, ‘that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of “substantive due process,” must be 2 the guide for analyzing these claims.’”). However, an excessive force claim may arise under the 3 Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when there is no search or seizure. Cty. of 4 Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 843-44 (1998). 5 Here, Plaintiff alleges that there was a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights because 6 he was struck in the face, handcuffed, and then violently removed from his home. Compl. ¶¶ 56, 7 58, 64. Plaintiff further alleges that “[a]t some point during the struggle with WOODWORTH, or 8 during his subsequent arrest and questioning, PLAINTIFF sustained severe injury to his collar 9 bone and shoulder.” Id. ¶ 62. Although Plaintiff alleges that he may have sustained severe injury 10 after his arrest, the Fourth Amendment sets the applicable constitutional limitations because 11 Plaintiff has not alleged that he sustained these allege injuries after he was released or found to be 12 legally in custody based upon probable cause for arrest. Plaintiff’s First Claim is dismissed to the 13 extent that he alleges violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. 14 C. Plaintiff Seeks to Withdraw His Second Claim. 15 Plaintiff seeks to withdraw his second claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment. The 16 Court dismisses Plaintiff’s second claim. 17 D. Plaintiff’s Complaint Fails to State a Claim Against Defendants Kidder, Kensell Williams, Matthias Williams, and Randy Williams but States a Viable 18 Claim Against Defendant Minaglia and the involved Williams Defendant. 19 1. Defendant Kidder 20 Plaintiff merely alleges that Defendant Kidder “was an employee of the COUNTY and a 21 contracted agent of the CITY, and it is believed, that he was employed as a Deputy Sheriff at the 22 time of the incident. PLAINTIFF believes that Mr. KIDDER is legally responsible and liable for 23 the incident, injuries and damages herein set forth. Mr. KIDDER proximately caused injuries and 24 damages because of his intentional and/or negligent actions, breach of duty, violation of public 25 policy and/or use of excessive force. Mr. KIDDER is liable for his personal conduct, vicarious or 26 imputed negligence, fault, breach of duty, whether severally or jointly, or whether based upon 27 agency, employment, ownership, entrustment, custody, care or control upon any other act of 1 along with the other deputy sheriffs (including the three deputies named Williams), “perpetrated a 2 vicious physical attack on PLAINTIFF, and battered him by forcefully striking his face, forcing 3 his injured face into the ground, and then injuring him further during the removal from his home 4 and during transportation to the hospital.” Compl. ¶ 90. However, in his statement of facts, 5 Plaintiff never alleged that Defendant Kidder was at the scene of the incident. 6 In Plaintiff’s opposition, Plaintiff states that Defendant Kidder was the supervising officer 7 whose name appears on the incident report where “Defendant Sonoma County’s agents 8 fraudulently misrepresent what occurred, stating in the report that ‘[d]uring a Domestic Violence 9 Investigation the male half was arrested for resisting arrest.’” Opp. at 16. Plaintiff states in his 10 opposition that the deputy sheriffs fabricated a domestic violence investigation and Defendant 11 Kidder falsely charged Plaintiff with resisting arrest in order to keep him quiet about the attack. 12 Opp. at 16-17. None of these facts are alleged in the complaint. Thus, Defendants’ motion to 13 dismiss is granted as to Defendant Kidder with leave to amend. 14 2. Kensell Williams, Matthias Williams, and Randy Williams 15 “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the 16 court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 17 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Furthermore, for a section 1983 claim, 18 “a plaintiff must plead that each government-official defendant, through the official’s own 19 individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. 20 Here, Plaintiff fails to allege specific facts regarding the individual defendants with the last 21 name of Williams. Instead, Plaintiff named all deputies with the last name of Williams in his 22 complaint and alleges that one of the defendants with the last name of Williams arrived on scene. 23 Compl. ¶ 58. Although the County Counsel advised Plaintiff’s counsel which Williams defendant 24 arrived at the scene, Plaintiff refuses to dismiss the other two Williams defendants. Plaintiff’s 25 claim does not have facial plausibility because Plaintiff has not plead factual content that allows 26 the Court to draw the reasonable inference that each defendant with the last name of Williams is 27 liable for the alleged misconduct when only one Williams defendant was involved. Thus, 1 Williams with leave to amend. 2 3. Defendant George Minaglia and the Involved Williams Defendant 3 Defendants allege that Plaintiff has failed to “alleged in what manner each defendant 4 carried Plaintiff out of the home, whether or how the physical contact was allegedly unreasonable, 5 or whether Plaintiff sustained any additional injuries while being carried out and if so, which of 6 the individual defendants are liable for any purported injuries.” Mot. At 16. However, Plaintiff 7 alleges that after he was handcuffed, he was physically carried from his home by three officers, 8 presumably Defendants Woodworth, Minaglia, and Williams whom Plaintiff alleges were at the 9 scene. Compl. ¶¶ 56, 58, 61, 64. Plaintiff also alleges that “[a]t some point during the struggle 10 with WOODWORTH, or during his subsequent arrest and questioning, PLAINTIFF sustained 11 severe injury to his collar bone and shoulder.” Id. ¶ 62. Plaintiff further alleges that, “ [t]he 12 assault and battery within his home, and the subsequent violent removal of PLAINTIFF from his 13 home, left PLAINTIFF with severe injuries to his right brow ridge, right cheek bone, collar bone, 14 shoulders, and extremities, including an orbital fracture to his right eye socket, permanent vision 15 impairment, and severe mental illness.” Id. ¶ 64. Plaintiff has alleged that the physical removal 16 by the three officers was violent, although Plaintiff was already handcuffed, and that Plaintiff 17 sustained specific injuries during the incident. 18 “The pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’” 19 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Therefore, Defendants’ argument that the complaint does not allege “which 20 defendant touched Plaintiff, in what manner, or how the physical conduct caused his purported 21 injuries” is unpersuasive. Likewise, the Court is not persuaded by Defendants’ argument that 22 Plaintiff’s complaint is too speculative because the injury could have happened during the struggle 23 with Defendant Woodworth or during the subsequent arrest and questioning. Although Plaintiff 24 did not specify the exact moment he suffered each injury, Plaintiff has adequately alleged facts 25 that would support a plausible claim against Defendant Minaglia and the involved Williams 26 defendant when he alleged that the subsequent violent removal left him with severe injuries. 27 Defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied as to Defendant Minaglia and the involved Williams 1 || defendant.' 2 E. Plaintiff Seeks Leave to Amended to Include Specific Statutory Exceptions to 3 Immunity. Defendants argue that Plaintiff's state law claims against the County of Sonoma are not 4 viable because Plaintiff has not identified a statutory duty upon which the County can be liable. In 5 his opposition, Plaintiff seeks leave to amend the complaint to specifically allege violations of $$ 6 820 and 815.2 of the California Government Code. The Court grants Plaintiff leave to amend. 7 3 V. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED in part and 9 DENIED in part. The amended complaint must be filed within 28 days of the date this order is 10 filed and must include the caption and civil case number used in this order and the words 11 AMENDED COMPLAINT on the first page. Because an amended complaint completely replaces 12 the original complaint, Plaintiff must include in it all the claims he wishes to present. See Ferdik 13 v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Plaintiff may not incorporate material from the 14 original complaint by reference. Failure to amend within the designated time may result in the 15 dismissal of this case. 16 IT IS SO ORDERED. 17 Dated: February 11, 2020 Z 18 19 20 JQSEPH C. SPERO United States Magistrate Judge 22 23 24 25 26 27 ' Although all three defendants with the last name of Williams are dismissed with leave to amend 28 in section IV(D)(2) above, presumably Plaintiff will amend to include allegations specifically identifying which Williams defendant was actually involved on the scene.