Dudas v. Dudas

30 A.3d 359, 423 N.J. Super. 69, 2011 N.J. Super. LEXIS 197
CourtNew Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
DecidedApril 11, 2011
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 30 A.3d 359 (Dudas v. Dudas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dudas v. Dudas, 30 A.3d 359, 423 N.J. Super. 69, 2011 N.J. Super. LEXIS 197 (N.J. Ct. App. 2011).

Opinion

L.R. JONES, J.S.C.

In this case, a supporting spouse’s (husband’s) income substantially increased between the date of the filing of the divorce complaint and the date of the divorce trial. The issue is whether the court may consider this post-complaint increase in determining the amount of alimony which the husband must pay to the wife.

The court holds in this case that the husband’s post-complaint increase in income is relevant, and may be considered in determining the extent of his alimony obligation to his wife.

Plaintiff-wife and defendant-husband wed on July 25, 1981. They subsequently lived together for twenty-six years, raising two sons. Throughout the lengthy marriage, plaintiff was principally a homemaker and caretaker for the children, taking on sporadic part-time employment which never exceeded $18,000 in any year. Conversely, defendant was the household’s primary financial pro[71]*71vider, working for virtually the entire marriage as a W-2 employee in auto part sales. Spending years developing expertise in his field, defendant’s income steadily rose from approximately $14,000 at the beginning of the marriage to the mid-$40,000 range, with a one year high of $59,000 by the end of the marriage. While there was a brief period of time when defendant left his W-2 employment in an attempt to start his own auto part business, that venture quickly proved unsuccessful and defendant shortly thereafter returned to W-2 employment in auto part sales. In no year prior to the divorce litigation did defendant ever earn in excess of $60,000.

During the last decade of the marriage, plaintiff planned to pursue a career in psychology. She attended community college and achieved a straight-A, 4.0 grade point average towards an associate’s degree. However, by agreement of both parties she discontinued her college attendance prior to earning a bachelor’s degree in order to invest available time and resources into supporting defendant’s attempt to build his auto part business.

The parties permanently separated in 2007 and plaintiff filed a divorce complaint in 2008. The litigation was administratively dismissed for procedural reasons and plaintiff thereafter filed a new divorce complaint under the present docket number. Between the date of the original complaint in 2008 and the divorce trial in 2011, defendant’s W-2 income in auto part sales sharply jumped to a personal high of $64,000 in 2009, and then ballooned again to $76,000 in 2010. In 2011, defendant is on pace to earn $68,000. He has now achieved national ranking in his employer’s company as one of its most successful salespersons. Accordingly, defendant’s post-marriage annual earnings are at a level markedly higher than his earnings during the marriage.

Plaintiff presently seeks alimony from defendant, and contends that the court should consider defendant’s increased, post-complaint income as part of the support analysis. Conversely, defendant urges that the court should not consider his post-complaint income, and instead should limit the alimony analysis to [72]*72the income he earned during the marriage up to separation and the inception of litigation. Defendant argues that his post-complaint earnings are irrelevant because, (a) alimony should be based upon the parties’ marital standard of living, and (b) that standard of living was never based on the heightened level of earnings he presently enjoys.

While on the surface there may appear to be logic and an attractive simplicity to defendant’s position, the financial complexities of divorce weigh heavily against completely excluding defendant’s post-complaint income from consideration in the alimony analysis. This is especially true in a court of equity, where the goal is to reach a result which is economically fair and equitable to both parties. The court finds in this case that both defendant’s pre-complaint income history and his current, post-complaint income history are relevant in equitably determining defendant’s alimony obligation to plaintiff.

As a starting point in the alimony analysis, a court must consider the enumerated statutory factors for consideration set forth N.J.SA 2A:34-23(b). These factors include:

(1) The actual need and ability of the parties to pay;
(2) The duration of the marriage or civil union;
(3) The age, physical and emotional health of the parties;
(4) The standard of living established in the marriage or civil union and the likelihood that each party can maintain a reasonably comparable standard of living;
(5) The earning capacities, educational levels, vocational skills, and employability of the parties;
(6) The length of absence from the job market of the party seeking maintenance;
(7) The parental responsibilities for the children;
(8) The time and expense necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the party seeking maintenance to find appropriate employment, the availability of the training and employment, and the opportunity for future acquisitions of capital assets and income;
(9) The history of the financial or non-financial contributions to the marriage or civil union by each party including contributions to the care and education of the children and interruption of personal careers or educational opportunities;
[73]*73(10) The equitable distribution of property ordered and any payouts on equitable distribution, directly or indirectly, out of current income, to the extent this consideration is reasonable, just and fair;
(11) The income available to either party through investment of any assets held by that party;
(12) The tax treatment and consequences to both parties of any alimony award, including the designation of all or a portion of the payment as a non-taxable payment; and
(13) Any other factors which the court may deem relevant.

While all of the thirteen enumerated factors must be considered, the court will specifically address four of these factors in this opinion as particularly relevant to the legal issue at hand.

The first such factor is “actual need and ability of a party to pay.” The language in the statute clearly directs an analysis of the parties’ present needs and ability to pay, and does not in any fashion artificially limit the judicial analysis only to the past needs of the supported spouse during the marriage or the past ability of the supporting spouse to pay. If the Legislature had intended for an alimony analysis to be capped at the level of income previously earned by the parties during the marriage, such limiting language could have easily been included in the statute itself.

The fourth enumerated factor is the “standard of living established in the marriage.” Defendant essentially contends that the “standard of living” factor is the predominant consideration, to the virtual exclusion of all others. However, the statute clearly requires the court to consider more than simply the standard of living. This factor does not stand alone, but rather is to be analyzed in conjunction with all of the other enumerated factors including present needs and ability to pay.

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Related

M.G. v. S.M.
199 A.3d 318 (New Jersey Superior Court App Division, 2018)
M.G. VS. S.M. (FM-12-0446-15, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
New Jersey Superior Court App Division, 2018

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
30 A.3d 359, 423 N.J. Super. 69, 2011 N.J. Super. LEXIS 197, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dudas-v-dudas-njsuperctappdiv-2011.