Ducksworth v. Feltes

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedJuly 25, 2024
Docket2:24-cv-00659
StatusUnknown

This text of Ducksworth v. Feltes (Ducksworth v. Feltes) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ducksworth v. Feltes, (E.D. Wis. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN ______________________________________________________________________________ BRIAN ARMON DUCKSWORTH,

Plaintiff, v. Case No. 24-cv-659-pp

CHERYL EPLETT, et al.,

Defendants. ______________________________________________________________________________

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING FILING FEE (DKT. NO. 2) AND SCREENING COMPLAINT UNDER 28 U.S.C. §1915A ______________________________________________________________________________

Plaintiff Brian Armon Ducksworth, who is incarcerated at Oshkosh Correctional Institution and is representing himself, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that the defendants violated his civil rights. This decision resolves the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee, dkt. no. 2, and screens his complaint, dkt. no. 1. I. Motion for Leave to Proceed without Prepaying the Filing Fee (Dkt. No. 2)

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) applies to this case because the plaintiff was incarcerated when he filed his complaint. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(h). The PLRA lets the court allow an incarcerated plaintiff to proceed with without prepaying the civil case filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(2). When funds exist, the plaintiff must pay an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §1915(b)(1). He then must pay the balance of the $350 filing fee over time, through deductions from his prison trust account. Id. On June 10, 2024, the court ordered the plaintiff to pay an initial partial filing fee of $1.55. Dkt. No. 6. The court received that fee on July 8, 2024. The court will grant the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee and will require him to pay the remainder of the filing fee over time in

the manner explained at the end of this order. II. Screening the Complaint A. Federal Screening Standard Under the PLRA, the court must screen complaints brought by incarcerated persons seeking relief from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint if the incarcerated person raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b). In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the court applies the same standard that it applies when considering whether to dismiss a case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, 668 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2012)). To state a claim, a complaint must include

“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must contain enough facts, “accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and that whoever deprived him of this right was acting under the color of state law. D.S. v. E. Porter Cnty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. County of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). The court construes liberally complaints filed by plaintiffs who are representing themselves and holds such complaints to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cesal, 851 F.3d at 720

(citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015)). B. The Plaintiff’s Allegations The complaint names as defendants Oshkosh Warden Cheryl B. Eplett, Unit Manager/Litigation Coordinator S. Feltes, Sergeant VanZand, Sergeant Dellfoss, Sergeant Klimke, Correctional Officer Hutch and two Jane/John Doe correctional officers who worked in the mailrooms at Oshkosh and Jackson Correctional Institutions. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶4–11. The plaintiff sues all

defendants in their individual capacities only. Id. at ¶12. The plaintiff alleges that on October 13, 2023, Unit Manager Feltes “rec[ei]ved discovery material (video) for review by Plaintiff” from Attorney General Josh Kaul and two assistant attorneys general. Id. at ¶13. The plaintiff alleges that he “made numerous requests to” Feltes to review the video from January through April 2024, but that Feltes never responded. Id. at ¶14. On April 4, 2024, the plaintiff filed “a second motion to compel the discovery material (video) to the U.S. District Court.” Id. at ¶15. He says that before that,

on March 28, 2024, he wrote to Warden Eplett “to remedy the video problem,” and he wrote to Attorney General Kaul on April 1, 2024. Id. at ¶16. The plaintiff says he had an April 22, 2024 “summary judgment deadline to respond to.” Id. at ¶17. The plaintiff alleges that on March 22, 2024, Assistant Attorney General Bradley Soldon sent to the plaintiff for his review a flash drive containing the video. Id. at ¶18. He says that six days later, he “rec[ei]ved a response from the litigation department saying there was no ‘DFLM’ on file” for the plaintiff. Id. at ¶19.

The plaintiff then alleges several separate, unrelated events from other dates: • He alleges that on January 3, 2024, Feltes “held in her possession” the plaintiff’s “transcription info sheet for the U.S. Court of Appeals (7th Circuit) for a week,” which he says “delayed [his] appeal process.” Id. at ¶20. • The plaintiff alleges that on April 18, 2024, Sergeants VanZand and

Dellfoss “verbally, and emotionally abused [him] for requesting to have his toilet fixed.” Id. at ¶21. • He alleges that on February 10, 2023, the Jane or John Doe mailroom officer at Jackson opened his “legal correspondence . . . without him present.” Id. at ¶22.

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Bluebook (online)
Ducksworth v. Feltes, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ducksworth-v-feltes-wied-2024.