F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 3 1999 TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk
BRIAN DALE DUBUC,
Plaintiff-Appellant, v. No. 99-5107 SATAYABAMA JOHNSON, sued as: (D.C. No. 96-CV-430-BU) Dr. Johnson of the Tulsa County Jail; (N.D.Okla.) NURSE ROSE; NURSE LINDA; DOYLE EDGE, Sgt.; EARL McCLAFLIN, sued as: Corporal McLoughlon; DIANA JANE COOK, sued as: Corporal Cook; ZACHARY J. VIERHELLER, sued as: Detention Officer Zack Veirhiller; OFFICER WARREN, detention officer; OFFICER SHAWN, detention officer; WENCESLAO AGUILA, sued as: detention officer Aguila; OFFICER MARTAIN, detention officer; STANLEY GLANZ, Sheriff Tulsa County; RON ISAAC, also known as Ron Isman,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. Before ANDERSON, KELLY and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Brian Dubuc appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to
defendants in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action and seeks to proceed on appeal in
forma pauperis. We grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis, affirm in part,
reverse in part, and remand.
Dubuc was held as a pretrial detainee in the Tulsa, Oklahoma, County Jail.
His § 1983 action alleged unconstitutional conditions of confinement, inadequate
health care, excessive use of force by officers, physical attacks by prisoners, and
disciplinary segregation without a due process hearing.
I.
Dubuc first contends the district court erred in denying him leave to amend
his complaint. Dubuc sought to add allegations of conduct that occurred after the
complaint was filed and to name additional defendants. The district court noted
that Dubuc’s motion to amend came almost seven months after defendants’
motions for summary judgment. We cannot say the district court’s denial
constituted an abuse of discretion. See Viernow v. Euripides Dev. Corp. , 157
2 F.3d 785, 799 (10th Cir. 1998).
II.
Dubuc next contends the district court erred in dismissing part of his
complaint. The court properly dismissed his Eighth Amendment claims because
he was a pretrial detainee. See Lopez v. LeMaster , 172 F.3d 756, 759 n.2 (10th
Cir. 1999) (“Pretrial detainees are protected under the Due Process Clause rather
than the Eighth Amendment.”).
The district court also dismissed Dubuc’s case against medical defendants
Isaac, Johnson, Rodriguez, and Russell because Dubuc’s allegations against them
did not rise to the level of deliberate indifference. To state a claim, Dubuc must
allege “acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference
to serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble , 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). After
reviewing the record, we conclude Dubuc failed to state a claim against the
medical defendants. See Realmonte v. Reeves , 169 F.3d 1280, 1283 (10th Cir.
1999) (“In reviewing a motion to dismiss, we accept the well-pleaded allegations
of the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party.”).
III.
Dubuc argues the district court erred in refusing to appoint counsel for
him. The court denied his request for counsel after “reviewing the merits of
3 [Dubuc’s] case, the present procedural posture of the case, the nature of the
factual issues involved, [Dubuc’s] ability to investigate the crucial facts, the
probable type of evidence, [Dubuc’s] capability to present his case, and the
complexity of the legal issues.” Record Doc. 59 at 6. After reviewing the
record, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in not
appointing counsel for Dubuc. See Rucks v. Boergermann , 57 F.3d 978, 979
(10th Cir. 1995).
IV.
Dubuc also asserts the district court erred in denying his request for
discovery. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) allows a district court to order
discovery when the affidavits of a party indicate that the party “cannot . . .
present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party’s opposition [to summary
judgment].” After reviewing the record, we conclude the district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Dubuc’s request for discovery. Building and
Const. Dept. v. Rockwell Intern. Corp. , 7 F.3d 1487, 1496 (10th Cir. 1993).
V.
The district court granted summary judgment to defendants on Dubuc’s
remaining claims. We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de
novo, viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences derived therefrom in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Kidd v. Taos Ski Valley,
4 Inc. , 88 F.3d 848, 851 (10th Cir. 1996).
Dubuc contends the district court erred in deciding the credibility of
witnesses in granting summary judgment. The court noted “it is not possible to
know precisely what happened without adjudging the credibility of the two
differing versions” of the story, but used the absence of evidence of physical
harm to conclude there was no evidence of excessive force. Record Doc. 53 at
17. It is inappropriate for a court to weigh credibility on a motion for summary
judgment. This court has found that physical injury is not required to prove the
use of excessive force. Martin v. Board of County Comm’rs , 909 F.2d 402, 406-
07 (10th Cir. 1990). Therefore, the district court erred in using lack of physical
injury as a basis to grant summary judgment on Dubuc’s excessive force claims.
The district court refused to consider Dubuc’s newly discovered evidence of a
witness to the incident because it did not affect the court’s conclusion that Dubuc
failed to prove he had suffered any physical injury. As we have concluded the
court’s reliance upon the absence of evidence of physical harm was erroneous,
the court also erred when it relied upon the same rationale in rejecting Dubuc’s
newly discovered evidence. The court should reconsider that ruling upon
remand.
The district court granted summary judgment to defendants on Dubuc’s
condition of confinement claims, finding Dubuc did not establish the existence of
5 a condition that would amount to punishment or otherwise constitute an
unconstitutional condition of confinement. The court granted summary judgment
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F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 3 1999 TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk
BRIAN DALE DUBUC,
Plaintiff-Appellant, v. No. 99-5107 SATAYABAMA JOHNSON, sued as: (D.C. No. 96-CV-430-BU) Dr. Johnson of the Tulsa County Jail; (N.D.Okla.) NURSE ROSE; NURSE LINDA; DOYLE EDGE, Sgt.; EARL McCLAFLIN, sued as: Corporal McLoughlon; DIANA JANE COOK, sued as: Corporal Cook; ZACHARY J. VIERHELLER, sued as: Detention Officer Zack Veirhiller; OFFICER WARREN, detention officer; OFFICER SHAWN, detention officer; WENCESLAO AGUILA, sued as: detention officer Aguila; OFFICER MARTAIN, detention officer; STANLEY GLANZ, Sheriff Tulsa County; RON ISAAC, also known as Ron Isman,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. Before ANDERSON, KELLY and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Brian Dubuc appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to
defendants in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action and seeks to proceed on appeal in
forma pauperis. We grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis, affirm in part,
reverse in part, and remand.
Dubuc was held as a pretrial detainee in the Tulsa, Oklahoma, County Jail.
His § 1983 action alleged unconstitutional conditions of confinement, inadequate
health care, excessive use of force by officers, physical attacks by prisoners, and
disciplinary segregation without a due process hearing.
I.
Dubuc first contends the district court erred in denying him leave to amend
his complaint. Dubuc sought to add allegations of conduct that occurred after the
complaint was filed and to name additional defendants. The district court noted
that Dubuc’s motion to amend came almost seven months after defendants’
motions for summary judgment. We cannot say the district court’s denial
constituted an abuse of discretion. See Viernow v. Euripides Dev. Corp. , 157
2 F.3d 785, 799 (10th Cir. 1998).
II.
Dubuc next contends the district court erred in dismissing part of his
complaint. The court properly dismissed his Eighth Amendment claims because
he was a pretrial detainee. See Lopez v. LeMaster , 172 F.3d 756, 759 n.2 (10th
Cir. 1999) (“Pretrial detainees are protected under the Due Process Clause rather
than the Eighth Amendment.”).
The district court also dismissed Dubuc’s case against medical defendants
Isaac, Johnson, Rodriguez, and Russell because Dubuc’s allegations against them
did not rise to the level of deliberate indifference. To state a claim, Dubuc must
allege “acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference
to serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble , 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). After
reviewing the record, we conclude Dubuc failed to state a claim against the
medical defendants. See Realmonte v. Reeves , 169 F.3d 1280, 1283 (10th Cir.
1999) (“In reviewing a motion to dismiss, we accept the well-pleaded allegations
of the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party.”).
III.
Dubuc argues the district court erred in refusing to appoint counsel for
him. The court denied his request for counsel after “reviewing the merits of
3 [Dubuc’s] case, the present procedural posture of the case, the nature of the
factual issues involved, [Dubuc’s] ability to investigate the crucial facts, the
probable type of evidence, [Dubuc’s] capability to present his case, and the
complexity of the legal issues.” Record Doc. 59 at 6. After reviewing the
record, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in not
appointing counsel for Dubuc. See Rucks v. Boergermann , 57 F.3d 978, 979
(10th Cir. 1995).
IV.
Dubuc also asserts the district court erred in denying his request for
discovery. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) allows a district court to order
discovery when the affidavits of a party indicate that the party “cannot . . .
present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party’s opposition [to summary
judgment].” After reviewing the record, we conclude the district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Dubuc’s request for discovery. Building and
Const. Dept. v. Rockwell Intern. Corp. , 7 F.3d 1487, 1496 (10th Cir. 1993).
V.
The district court granted summary judgment to defendants on Dubuc’s
remaining claims. We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de
novo, viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences derived therefrom in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Kidd v. Taos Ski Valley,
4 Inc. , 88 F.3d 848, 851 (10th Cir. 1996).
Dubuc contends the district court erred in deciding the credibility of
witnesses in granting summary judgment. The court noted “it is not possible to
know precisely what happened without adjudging the credibility of the two
differing versions” of the story, but used the absence of evidence of physical
harm to conclude there was no evidence of excessive force. Record Doc. 53 at
17. It is inappropriate for a court to weigh credibility on a motion for summary
judgment. This court has found that physical injury is not required to prove the
use of excessive force. Martin v. Board of County Comm’rs , 909 F.2d 402, 406-
07 (10th Cir. 1990). Therefore, the district court erred in using lack of physical
injury as a basis to grant summary judgment on Dubuc’s excessive force claims.
The district court refused to consider Dubuc’s newly discovered evidence of a
witness to the incident because it did not affect the court’s conclusion that Dubuc
failed to prove he had suffered any physical injury. As we have concluded the
court’s reliance upon the absence of evidence of physical harm was erroneous,
the court also erred when it relied upon the same rationale in rejecting Dubuc’s
newly discovered evidence. The court should reconsider that ruling upon
remand.
The district court granted summary judgment to defendants on Dubuc’s
condition of confinement claims, finding Dubuc did not establish the existence of
5 a condition that would amount to punishment or otherwise constitute an
unconstitutional condition of confinement. The court granted summary judgment
on Dubuc’s claim of lack of personal safety, finding no evidence that defendants
disregarded any known risk to Dubuc. After reviewing the entire record before
us, including the district court’s detailed order filed October 9, 1997, we
conclude that Dubuc failed to establish these claims.
In regard to his procedural due process claims, Dubuc argues that the issue
of whether defendants had qualified immunity was a question for the jury. The
district court found defendants were protected by qualified immunity because
Dubuc did not show they had violated “clearly established . . . constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald ,
457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Dubuc does not attack the substance of the district
court’s finding that whether a pretrial detainee was entitled to procedural due
process for disciplinary confinement was not clearly established. Whether the
law was clearly established is a legal question, not appropriate for jury review.
The district court did not err in granting summary judgment on Dubuc’s
procedural due process claims.
VI.
The district court denied Dubuc’s motion for leave to proceed on appeal in
forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), finding Dubuc had brought three prior
6 civil actions that were dismissed as frivolous or malicious or for failure to state a
claim. However, the court erred in counting Dubuc’s appeal in Dubuc v. City of
Tulsa , No. 97-CV-650-B (N.D. Okla. 1998), because that appeal was pending
when Dubuc filed his notice of appeal in this case, see Dubuc v. City of Tulsa ,
1999 WL 668823 (10th Cir. 1999). See Jennings v. Natrona County Detention
Center Med. Facility , 175 F.3d 775, 780 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding that
unexhausted proceedings are not counted for purposes of § 1915(g)). The district
court erred in denying Dubuc leave to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis under
§ 1915(g).
Dubuc’s motion to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis is GRANTED.
Defendants’ motion to dismiss the appeal is DENIED. The decision of the
district court is AFFIRMED IN PART and REVERSED AND PART, and this
matter is REMANDED for further proceedings on Dubuc’s excessive force claim.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe Circuit Judge