Duane Edward Roeder v. State of Alaska

Opinion

2026 WL 2111301

Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.

NOTICE: UNPUBLISHED OPINION

NOTICE Memorandum decisions of this Court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d) and Paragraph 7 of the Guidelines for Publication of Court of Appeals Decisions (Court of Appeals Order No. 3). Accordingly, this memorandum decision may not be cited as binding authority for any proposition of law, although it may be cited for whatever persuasive value it may have. See McCoy v. State, 80 P.3d 757, 764 (Alaska App. 2002).

Court of Appeals of Alaska.

DUANE EDWARD ROEDER, Appellant,

v.

STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.

Court of Appeals No. A-14770

July 22, 2026

Trial Court Nos. 3AN-19-10610 CR, 3AN-19-11039 CR, & 3AN-14-06871 CR

Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, Josie Garton, Judge.

Attorneys and Law Firms

Appearances: Duane Edward Roeder, in propria persona, Wasilla, Appellant. Michal Stryszak, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Cori M. Mills, Acting Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.

Before: Allard, Chief Judge, Beach, Judge, and Terrell, Senior Judge.^*

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Judge ALLARD.

Star page 1*1 Duane Edward Roeder appeals the superior court's denial of his untimely motion for reconsideration of a previous court order denying Roeder's motion to correct illegal sentence. For the reasons explained here, we affirm the superior court's order.

Factual background and prior proceedings

In October 2021, Roeder was sentenced after pleading guilty in two separate cases pursuant to two separate written plea agreements.¹ In the first case (3AN-19-10610 CR), Roeder pleaded guilty to attempted second-degree assault and received a sentence of 4 years with 1 year suspended (3 years to serve).² In the second case (3AN-19-11039 CR), Roeder pleaded guilty to fourth-degree misconduct involving a controlled substance and received another sentence of 4 years with 1 year suspended (3 years to serve).³ The written plea agreement in the first case specified that 12 months of the unsuspended time to serve would be served concurrently to the second case. The written plea agreement in the second case did not specify that 12 months of the unsuspended time to serve would be served concurrently to the first case, but as a matter of reciprocal logic that was necessarily true.

At the sentencing hearing, the superior court reviewed the written plea agreements and stated that 12 months of the time in the first case (3AN-19-10610 CR) would run concurrently to the second case (3AN-19-11039 CR). The defense attorney emphasized that those 12 months would be concurrent to the time imposed, not the suspended time, in the second case. After a clarifying discussion with the defense attorney, and receiving no objection from the State, the court entered the written judgment for the first case, specifically noting “12 months to run concurrent with time imposed in 3AN-19-11039 CR [the second case].”

Before preparing the written judgment for the second case, the superior court asked whether it needed to note again that 1 year of the sentence was concurrent. Roeder's attorney agreed that this language should be added if it would make the sentences clearer to the Department of Corrections. The State again non-opposed. The court then added the same language from the first case's written judgment to the second case's written judgment, specifying “12 months to run concurrent with time imposed in 3AN-19-10610 CR [the first case].” After doing so, the court orally noted for the record that it had added this language to the second written judgment, stating in shorthand that “time served is to run concurrent with time imposed in 3AN-19-10610 CR.”

Eight months later, in June 2022, Roeder, acting pro se, filed a motion for clarification of an alleged conflict between the oral pronouncement of his sentence and the written judgment. In the motion, Roeder cited, without context, the sentencing judge's shorthand oral statement about the “time served” in the second case running concurrently with the “time imposed” in the first case; Roeder then argued that this oral statement should be interpreted as making all the time to serve in the second case concurrent with the first case.

Star page 2*2 The sentencing judge disagreed that there was any conflict between the oral pronouncement of sentence and the written judgment, and the judge issued an order denying Roeder's motion. In the order, the judge explained that the plea agreement clearly required 12 months of the time to serve to be served concurrently and that there was therefore “no basis” to conclude that the judge's oral statement during sentencing about concurrent time to serve “meant anything other than what had been agreed to.”

Two months after the sentencing judge issued its order denying Roeder's motion, Roeder filed a motion to correct illegal sentence, again arguing that the oral pronouncement of sentence conflicted with the written judgment. Roeder again relied on the sentencing judge's decontextualized statement at sentencing about the “time served” in the second case running concurrently to the “time imposed” in the first case.

The sentencing judge denied this motion as well. In greater detail, the judge explained that Roeder was taking that statement out of context and that, in the context of the sentencing as a whole, it was clear that the sentence imposed was the sentence agreed upon, which was that 12 months of the time to serve in each case was concurrent with the time imposed in the other case.

Three years later, Roeder filed another motion to correct illegal sentence, again arguing that the written judgment conflicted with the judge's oral pronouncement of sentence. By this time, the sentencing judge had retired and a new superior court judge was assigned to the case.

The new judge issued an order denying Roeder's motion. The court treated the motion as a “late-filed motion to reconsider” and denied the motion on both procedural grounds (because it was untimely) and on substantive grounds (because it was without merit). The court “adopt[ed]” the findings of the sentencing judge in the previous order on this same issue.

This appeal followed.

Why we affirm the superior court's order denying Roeder's motion to correct illegal sentence

On appeal, Roeder argues that the superior court erred in denying his motion to correct illegal sentence. He relies again on the sentencing judge's decontextualized statement about the “time served” in the second case running concurrently to the time imposed in the first case to argue that the written judgment is inconsistent with the oral pronouncement of sentence. In support of this claim of error, Roeder cites to numerous cases that stand for the general legal rule that, when there is a conflict between the court's oral pronouncement of sentence and the written judgment, the oral pronouncement governs.⁴

Star page 3*3 The purpose of the oral pronouncement rule is to protect defendants from having a written judgment impose terms that were never actually pronounced at sentencing.⁵ But the rule does not mean that a defendant is entitled to exploit an ambiguous statement at sentencing that does not reflect the sentencing court's actual intent.⁶

As we explained in Alvin v. State, where a written judgment seemingly departs from an oral pronouncement of sentence, the “ultimate issue” is not the judge's “wording, but rather [their] intention.”⁷ There are two rules that apply in these circumstances. First, when we “seek to ascertain the sentencing judge's intention, [we] are confined to the contemporaneous sentencing record” and cannot rely on the court's subsequent explanations.⁸ “Second, any reasonable debate regarding the sentencing judge's intention must be resolved in favor of the defendant.”⁹

Here, the contemporaneous sentencing record makes clear that the judge's intention was to impose the agreed-upon sentences under the Alaska Criminal Rule 11 agreements. The Rule 11 agreements were also clear — Roeder was to receive a sentence of 4 years with 1 year suspended (3 years to serve) in both cases, with 12 months of the unsuspended time to serve in each case running concurrently with the time to serve in the other case. Indeed, a review of the sentencing hearing confirms that when the judge initially orally imposed sentences in the two cases, the judge did so in accordance with the plea agreement, making clear that only 12 months of the time to serve would run concurrently.

In arguing against this clear indication of the sentencing judge's intent, Roeder focuses on an ambiguous statement that the sentencing judge made about the “time served” in the second case running concurrently with the “time imposed” in the first case. But, in context, it is clear that the judge was referring in shorthand to the 12 months of unsuspended time in the second case which would run concurrently to the time imposed in the first case. This is what the plea agreement contemplated and what the judge imposed.

Under these circumstances, we conclude that there is no “reasonable debate” regarding the sentencing judge's intended sentences and we find no error in the court's denial of Roeder's motion to correct illegal sentence. Contrary to Roeder's claims, there is no conflict between the oral pronouncements of the sentences and their written judgments.

Conclusion

Star page 4*4 The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.

Footnotes

*

Sitting by assignment made pursuant to Article IV, Section 11 of the Alaska Constitution and Administrative Rule 23(a).

1

He was also sentenced in a petition to revoke probation in another case (3AN-14-06871 CR) not at issue in this appeal.

2

AS 11.41.210(a)(1) & AS 11.31.100(a).

3

AS 11.71.040(a)(12).

4

See, e.g., Scudero v. State, 496 P.3d 381, 391 (Alaska 2021) (“As a general rule, when the terms of a defendant's sentence as stated in the court's written [judgment] differ from the terms of the sentence announced orally by the sentencing judge at the defendant's sentencing hearing, the oral sentence controls.” (alteration in original) (quoting Marunich v. State, 151 P.3d 510, 514 (Alaska App. 2006))); Burrell v. State, 626 P.2d 1087, 1089 (Alaska App. 1981) (“Where, as here, there is a conflict between the written order of probation and the oral pronouncement of sentence, the latter ordinarily controls.”); see also United States v. Lee, 77 F.4th 565, 583 (7th Cir. 2023) (“When a written judgment fails to reflect an unambiguous oral pronouncement, [Federal Criminal] Rule 36 allows for correction of such clerical error at any time.” (quoting United States v. McClain, 16 F.4th 487, 490-91 (7th Cir. 2021))).

5

See Marunich, 151 P.3d at 514; Alvin v. State, 42 P.3d 1156, 1159 (Alaska App. 2002) (noting that judicial amendments to the written judgment in a criminal case can raise “substantial double jeopardy problems”).

6

See Shagloak v. State, 582 P.2d 1034, 1038 (Alaska 1978) (explaining that an “objectively ascertainable mistake” has occurred where the court's description of the sentence “obviously conflict[s] with the intention of the court”); Alvin, 42 P.3d at 1159 (explaining that amendments were restricted in Shagloak to ensure an amended written judgment conformed with the sentencing judge's intention); United States v. Tanner, 984 F.3d 454, 456 (5th Cir. 2021) (“If ... ‘the written judgment simply clarifies an ambiguity in the oral pronouncement, we look to the sentencing court's intent to determine the sentence.’ ” (quoting United States v. Tang, 718 F.3d 476, 487 (5th Cir. 2013))); see also United States v. English, 400 F.3d 273, 276 (5th Cir. 2005) (explaining that, where there is ambiguity, courts determine the sentencing judge's intent by examining the entire record).

7

Alvin, 42 P.3d at 1159.

8

Id.

9

Id.

End of Document