Du Pont v. Deputy

26 F. Supp. 773, 22 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 788, 1939 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3018
CourtDistrict Court, D. Delaware
DecidedMarch 7, 1939
Docket4
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 26 F. Supp. 773 (Du Pont v. Deputy) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Du Pont v. Deputy, 26 F. Supp. 773, 22 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 788, 1939 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3018 (D. Del. 1939).

Opinion

NIELDS, District Judge.

Action for the recovery of moneys wrongfully collected by defendant 1 from plaintiff as an internal revenue tax upon gifts, with interest. This action for the refund of a tax wrongfully collected is under Section 3226 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 1672-1673. The case was tried by the court without a jury.

Pleadings

Plaintiff’s declaration contains eight counts in indebitatus assumpsit. Defendant’s plea of non assumpsit to each count is the sole defense relied upon.

In counts 1 and 2 plaintiff alleges violations of the United States Constitution and seeks in count 1 recovery of all amounts exacted by defendant, and in count 2 recovery of substantially all of such amounts. Counts 1, 2 and 3 will be first dealt with and will be summarily disposed of by the court. Count 4 raises the broad issue in the case and will be considered at length. Count 5 relates to policies of life insurance and is out of the case. Count 6 is admitted by stipulation of defendant to be sound. Counts 7 and 8 are general and the issues raised thereby will be considered under count 4.

Count 1. Plaintiff contends that the gift tax, as applied to him under the Revenue Act of 1932, as amended, 26 U.S.C.A. § 550 et seq., is an unapportioned direct tax prohibited by the Constitution of the United States, Article 1, Section 9, Clause 4, U.S.C.A. Plaintiff argues that making a gift is one of the available uses to which property may be put; that if taxes are levied upon every available use to which property can be put, the net effect is a property tax. Thus, if plaintiff held the stock he would be subjected to a tax on dividends. If he sold the stock he would be subjected to a tax on capital gain. If he should die he would be subjected to estate taxes. If he gives the stock away he would be subjected to a gift tax. In a word, he is taxed by reason of the ownership of the stock. The Supreme Court held the gift tax levied under the 1924 Act, 43 Stat. 313, was not a direct tax but an excise. Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124, 50 S.Ct. 46, 74 L.Ed. 226. The controlling authority of that case to the facts here is not affected by the provision in the 1932 Act, as amended, that the tax is a lien upon the property which is the subject of the gift and that the donee is personally liable for payment of the tax to the extent of the value of the property given.

Count 2. Plaintiff also contends that the gift tax as applied by the Commissioner to him violates the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, U.S.C.A., since the Government’s construction of the Act makes it arbitrary arid capricious. The Government seeks a construction of the gift tax law, says the plaintiff, which will support a tax not measured by the value of the gift as required by Section 506, 26 U.S.C.A. § 555, but measured by the value of other stock in the portfolio of Christiana Securities Company dissimilar in characteristics and not subject to the burden of a tax on capital gain. The court ultimately passing upon this constitutional objection, however, may not adopt the Commissioner’s construction of the law.

The unconstitutionality of the Revenue Act of 1932, as amended, as urged by plaintiff in support of counts 1 and 2 is not obvious. Under such conditions a District Court should not hold an act of Congress unconstitutional.

Count 3. Plaintiff further contends that the Revenue Act of 1932, as amended, imposes no tax upon gifts made in the year 1934 after May 10, 1934. Thus, says plaintiff, gifts made in December, 1934, could not be taxed. A brief recital will show this position of plaintiff to be unsound. Section 501(a) of the Revenue Act of 1932, 26 U.S.C.A. § 550(a)', imposes a tax upon the transfer of property by gift. Section 502 of that Act, 26 U.S.C.A. §551 note, contains a schedule of rates of *775 taxation. Section 520(a) of the Revenue Act of 1934, 26 U.S.C.A. § 551, amends this schedule. Further, Section 520(b) of the Revenue Act of 1934, 26 U.S.C.A. § 551 note, provides that the amended schedule shall be applied in computing the tax 'for the year 1935 and succeeding years but not in computing the tax for the year 1934. Section 803 of the Revenue Act of 1934 provides “Except as otherwise provided, this Act shall take effect upon its enactment”. 48 Stat. 772. It was approved May 10, 1934.

Plaintiff contends that for the period from May 10, 1934 to the end of 1934 there was no schedule of tax rates in force. It is obvious that the rates in section 502 of the Revenue Act of 1932 prevailed throughout the year 1934. Such construction is not repugnant to the amendment of the act wrought by Sections 520(a) and 520(b) and is in accord with common sense.

Count 4. Plaintiff alleges that the Commissioner determined the value of Christiana Securities stock on the dates of the gifts at $1,812,329 per share; and that this determination is wrong. Plaintiff alleges the true value of the stock was $9,288,000 or $1,080 per share and that such amount should be the basis for the computation of the gift tax.

The Statute

Revenue Act of 1932 so far as material provides:

“Sec. 501.(a). For the calendar year 1932 and each calendar year thereafter a tax, computed as provided in section 502 [section 551], shall be imposed upon the transfer during such calendar year by any individual, resident, or non-resident, of property by gift.” 26 U.S.C.A. § 550(a).
“Sec. 506. If the gift is made in property, the value thereof at the date of the gift shall be considered the amount of the gift”. 26 U.S.C.A. § 555.

Regulations

Shortly after the passage of the gift tax provisions in 1932, the Treasury Department issued regulations thereunder:

“Art. 19. Valuation of Property. — (1) General. The statute provides that if the gift is made in property, the value thereof at the date of the gift shall be considered the amount of the gift. The value of property is the price at which such property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or to sell.
“(3) Stocks and bonds. — * * * If the securities are not listed upon an exchange, but are dealt in actively through brokers, or have an active market, the value should be determined by taking the sale price as of the date of the gift, or, where there was no sale on that date, of the nearest date thereto upon which a sale was made, if within a reasonable period. Securities in which there are occasional transactions, but which are not dealt in actively enough to establish a fair market value, should be valued upon the basis of the nearest sale to the date of the gift, provided such sale was made in the normal course of business between a willing buyer and a willing seller, and within a reasonable period from the date of the gift. * * * Stock in a close corporation should be valued upon the basis of the company’s net worth, earning and dividend-paying capacity, and all other factors having a bearing upon the value of the stock. * * *

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Bluebook (online)
26 F. Supp. 773, 22 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 788, 1939 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3018, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/du-pont-v-deputy-ded-1939.