D.T. v. Tahoma School District

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: May 16, 2023
• Docket: 2:23-cv-00029
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

THE HONORABLE JOHN C. COUGHENOUR 1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 8 AT SEATTLE 9 D.T. and J.H., parents of minor student J.T., CASE NO. C23-0029-JCC 10 Plaintiffs, ORDER 11 v. 12 TAHOMA SCHOOL DISTRICT, 13 Defendant. 14

15 This matter comes before the Court on appeal of a decision by the Office of 16 Administrative Hearings in accordance with 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2). (Dkt. No. 1.) Having 17 thoroughly considered the briefing and the relevant record, and finding oral argument 18 unnecessary, the Court AFFIRMS the administrative decision for the reasons explained below. 19 I. BACKGROUND 20 J.T., is a 14-year-old with special education needs. (Dkt. No. 10-1 at 104.) J.T. attended a 21 private educational institution in Utah in the Logan City School District beginning in late 2021. 22 (Id. at 105.) Prior to that, J.T. lived with her parents in the Issaquah School District. (Id. at 104.) 23 In May 2022, while J.T. lived and studied in Utah, her parents moved from Issaquah School 24 District to the Defendant Tahoma School District (“Defendant”). (Id. at 105) On June 13, 2022, 25 Defendant issued a written notice of its refusal to fund J.T.’s individualized education plan 26 (“IEP”) “because “[J.T.] is not a current Tahoma resident and has never resided in Tahoma.” (Id. 1 at 99.) On June 15, 2022, the Logan City School District issued a written notice documenting 2 J.T.’s eligibility for special education but refusing to offer a placement or an IEP because she is 3 not a Logan City School District resident under the applicable Utah residency law. (Id.) 4 On September 2, 2022, J.T.’s parents filed suit with the Office of Administrative 5 Hearings, pursuant to 34 C.F.R § 300.508, alleging Tahoma denied J.T. a free appropriate public 6 education (“FAPE”) by refusing to develop an IEP for her. (Dkt. No. 12 at 4.) The 7 Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) dismissed the parents’ complaint on the grounds that J.T. “is 8 not a resident of the Tahoma School District, and [therefore] the District does not have a legal 9 duty to develop an IEP” for her. (Dkt. No. 10-1 at 112.) Plaintiffs filed this appeal seeking 10 reversal of the administrative decision and an order requiring the Tahoma district to develop an 11 IEP, based on the Logan City School District’s evaluation. (See generally Dkt. No. 1.) 12 II. DISCUSSION 13 A. Legal Standard 14 In an appeal of an administrative decision brought under the IDEA, a court “shall receive 15 the records of the administrative proceedings, shall hear additional evidence at the request of a 16 party, and, basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the 17 court determines is appropriate.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2). Disputes arising under the IDEA are 18 subject to the Act’s formal procedure requirements, allowing an aggrieved party to log a 19 complaint with a relevant local or state agency before the matter proceeds to a due process 20 hearing. See Fry v. Napoleon Comty. Schs., 580 U.S. 154, 158 (2017). At a due process hearing, 21 an administrative officer will grant relief if they conclude that a child was denied a FAPE. Id. If a 22 parent does not receive the relief they desire, they may appeal by filing for judicial review after 23 exhausting administrative procedures. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l). 24 While in some respects this appeal is similar to a summary judgment motion, the Court is 25 not bound by the same rules of summary judgment review found in Federal Rule of Civil 26 Procedure 56(c). See Ojai Unified Sch. Dist. v. Jackson, 4 F.3d 1467, 1472 (9th Cir. 1993). Nor 1 is the standard of review identical to the standard of review in other administrative cases. 2 Instead, it has been characterized as an “intermediate standard of review” between traditional 3 administrative review and de novo review. See Lenn v. Portland Sch. Comm., 998 F.2d 1083, 4 1086 (1st Cir. 1993). Accordingly, a trial to adjudicate issues of fact is not necessarily required 5 in an IDEA review, or “the work of the hearing officer would not receive ‘due weight,’ and 6 would be largely wasted.” Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist. v. Wartenberg, 59 F.3d 884, 891 (9th 7 Cir. 1995.) “The court, in recognition of the expertise of the administrative agency, must 8 consider the findings carefully and endeavor to respond to the hearing officer's resolution of each 9 material issue. After such consideration, the court is free to accept or reject the findings in part or 10 in whole.” Ash v. Lake Oswego Sch. Dist., 980 F.2d 585, 587–88 (9th Cir.1992). Finally, in an 11 appeal of the ALJ’s decision, the party challenging the decision bears the burden of proof. See 12 Clyde K. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist., No. 3, 35 F.3d 1396, 1399 (9th Cir. 1994). 13 B. IDEA 14 Under the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (“IDEA”), states receive federal 15 funding to provide disabled children with a FAPE. See Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 580 U.S. 16 154 (2017). Providing a FAPE requires adherence to an IEP. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9). And parents 17 have the right to place their child in an alternative educational setting and to seek reimbursement 18 for that placement if their local school district’s placement was not reasonably calculated to 19 provide a FAPE. See 34 C.F.R § 300.148. Parents who unilaterally place a child in private 20 school, after receiving an IEP, may seek reimbursement for the costs of special education and 21 related services from the state that the student resides in. Id. However the IDEA does not define 22 residency in its operative statute; it leaves the determination of residency to the states. See J.S. v. 23 Shoreline Sch. Dist., 220 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1191–92 (W.D. Wash. 2022) (applying Washington 24 law to determine residency of student); Union Sch. Dist. v. Smith, 15 F.3d 1519, 1525 (9th Cir. 25 1994) (impliedly applying California law). 26 In this case, the ALJ, applying Washington law, found that J.T. was “not a resident of 1 Tahoma School District,” because J.T. lived in Utah for over a year, and the record contains no 2 evidence that J.T. has ever set foot within Tahoma’s boundaries, let alone that she lives or has 3 lived within the boundaries of the Tahoma School District. (Dkt. No. 10-1 at 110–112.) 4 Accordingly, the ALJ ruled that Defendant “does not have a legal duty to develop an IEP for the 5 Student based on the Logan City School District’s evaluation.” (Id. at 112) 6 Plaintiffs urge the Court to reverse the ALJ’s decision and depart from clear precedent on 7 the grounds that applying Washington’s “unique” definition of student residence leads to an 8 “absurd” result. (Dkt. No. 12 at 9.) In Washington, a student’s residency under IDEA is 9 determined by WAC 392-137-115. See Ms. S. ex rel. G. v. Vashon Island Sch. Dist., 337 F.3d 10 1115, 1130 (9th Cir. 2003). Under this regulation, a student’s residence is “the physical location 11 of a student’s principal abode . . . where the student lives the majority of the time.” WAC 392- 12 137-115. The following factors may also be considered: (1) the student’s mailing address, (2) the 13 student’s principal abode may be different than their parents,’ (3) the lack of a mailing address 14 does not preclude residency, (4) and whether the student is expected to reside in the address for 15 20 consecutive days or more. Id. The second factors means that under Washington’s definition, a 16 student’s residency is not co-determined by the parents’ residency. (Id.) 17 Plaintiffs take issue with this definition, because they argue it would leave J.T. without 18 any residence and without any means of receiving an IEP. (Dkt. No. 12 at 8.) Instead of applying 19 Washington law, as the ALJ did, Plaintiffs urge the Court to adopt a definition that defines J.T.’s 20 residency based on either future intent or parent’s residence. (Id at 11–12.) This argument is 21 without merit. First, the ALJ did not deprive J.T. of the right to receive an IEP. Rather, the ALJ 22 correctly applied the law of the state where Plaintiffs reside, as required by the IDEA. See N.B. v. 23 Hellgate Elementary Sch. Dist., 541 F.3d 1202, 1208 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[A] school district must 24 comply not only with federal statutory and regulatory procedures, but with state regulations as 25 well”). Under Washington law, J.T. is not a Tahoma resident because she lives in Utah. Contrary 26 to Plaintiffs’ assertions otherwise, the Court may not rewrite, or selectively apply, Washington 1 law simply because the current situation inconveniences Plaintiffs.1 2 Moreover, the authority cited by Plaintiffs is unconvincing. As a threshold issue, 3 Plaintiffs’ reliance on the definition of residency in other contexts, (see Dkt. No. 12 at 10–13),2 4 is inapplicable, where the specific definition of residency that applies in the circumstances of 5 public-school enrollment is clear under Washington law. See WAC 392- 137-115; WAC 392- 6 172A-01160; see also Ms. S, 337 F.3d at 1130. In simple terms, under Washington law, J.T. is a 7 Utah resident because she currently resides there, has lived there for longer than 20 days, and she 8 receives mail there. (Dkt. No. 13 at 2.) This clear application of facts to the law renders 9 Plaintiffs’ references to legislative intent and the surveys of other state administrative codes 10 superfluous. Morales v. TWA, 503 U.S. 374, 385 (1992) (“it is commonplace of statutory 11 construction that the specific governs the general.”) 12 Lastly, Plaintiffs argue the IDEA preempts Washington law, at least on this issue. (Dkt. 13 No. 12 at 14–16.) But this is belied by the fact that the IDEA delegates the definition of a 14 resident to each state. See J.S., 220 F. Supp. 2d at 1192 (“In fact, the IDEA carefully avoids such 15 standards or uniformity, instead charging states with uniform procedural obligations, to be 16 fulfilled according to the individual state’s - and indeed the individual local district’s - particular 17 methods.”) Moreover, the “mere fact that there is tension between federal and state law is not 18 enough to establish conflict preemption.” CDK Global LLC v. Brnovich, 16 F.4th 1266, 1724 19 (9th Cir. 2021) (emphasis added) (citing MetroPCS Cal., LLC v. Picker, 970 F.3d 1106, 1118 20 (9th Cir. 2020)). “‘In the absence of irreconcilability’ between state and federal law, ‘there is no 21

22 1 Plaintiffs note that under Utah law, J.T. is also not a Utah resident. Because J.T. resides neither in Washington nor Utah, they argue that RCW 28A.225.215 applies. (Dkt. No. 12 at 18.) 23 It does not apply because J.T. has a legal residence as defined by WAC 392-137-115: the Logan 24 River Academy in Logan, Utah, where J.T. lives the majority of the time. 2 Citing Dumas v. Gagner, 137 Wash.2d 268, 283 (Wash. 1999) (political boundaries); 25 Kankelborg v. Kankelborg, 199 Wash. 259, 90 P.2d 1018 (Wash. 1939) (military recruitment); In 26 re Contested Election of Schoessler, 140 Wash.2d 368, 998 (Wash. 2000) (eligibility for public office). 1 conflict preemption.’” Id. (quoting United States v. California, 921 F.3d 865, 882 (9th Cir. 2 2019)). 3 Accordingly, the Court FINDS the ALJ did not err in its application of Washington’s 4 residency law to J.T. 5 III. CONCLUSION 6 For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the ALJ’s decision and DENIES 7 Plaintiffs’ federal claims appeal pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2). 8 DATED this 16th day of May 2023. A 9 10 11 John C. Coughenour 12 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26