Rel: April 10, 2026
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026 _________________________
CL-2025-0654 _________________________
D.S. and B.S.
v.
R.S. and Br.S. _________________________
CL-2025-0659 _________________________
R.S. and Br.S.
Appeals from Blount Circuit Court (JU-22-276.03) CL-2025-0654 and CL-2025-0659
EDWARDS, Judge.
In appeal number CL-2025-0654, D.S. and B.S. ("the paternal
grandparents") appeal from a judgment entered by the Blount Circuit
Court insofar as that judgment ordered R.S. ("the father") and Br.S. ("the
mother"), the parents of K.S. ("the child"), to pay to the paternal
grandparents child support in the amount of $300 per month. In appeal
number CL-2025-0659, the parents cross-appeal from that same
judgment insofar as it denied their petition to modify the custody of the
child.
The record indicates that the parties originally were neighbors and
that the child regularly visited the paternal grandparents. Sometime
before May 2023, the Blount County Department of Human Resources
("DHR") initiated in the Blount Juvenile Court a dependency action
against the mother and the father. In May 2023, the juvenile court
entered a judgment finding the child dependent,1 awarding custody of the
child to the paternal grandparents, and permitting the paternal
1It is not clear from the record what circumstances caused the child's dependency.
2 CL-2025-0654 and CL-2025-0659
grandparents to relocate with the child to Conway, South Carolina.2 The
May 2023 dependency judgment also directed that the parents would
have
"four hours of supervised visitation every other weekend in Conyers, GA[,] at the Chuck E. Cheese unless agreed upon otherwise by the parties. The parents shall provide at least 24-hours notice to the custodians of their intention to visit. Further the parents shall have reasonable phone and facetime visitation with the child at least three times per week on Monday, Wednesday[,] and Friday between 4:00 p.m. and 7:00 p.m. The parties may set up an[y] other visitation that they so choose as long as it remains supervised at this time."
The parents were also required to comply with DHR's reunification plan.3
The record indicates that, in July 2023, the parents filed a petition
in the juvenile court requesting that the child be returned to their custody
and that the paternal grandparents be held in contempt for failing to
abide by the visitation provisions in the May 2023 dependency judgment.
The paternal grandparents filed an answer and a counterclaim for child
support. Following a trial, the juvenile court entered a judgment on
2It appears that the paternal grandparents were not parties to the
dependency action.
3The May 2023 dependency judgment also provided that DHR was
permitted to "close [its] case" regarding the parents and the child. 3 CL-2025-0654 and CL-2025-0659
December 31, 2024, returning to the child to the parents' custody and
denying all other relief. The child subsequently returned to the parents'
residence in Alabama. The paternal grandparents appealed the juvenile
court's December 2024 modification judgment to this court. The juvenile
court subsequently entered an order determining that the record was not
adequate for purposes of appeal, and this court, in compliance with Rule
28(B) and (E), Ala. R. Juv. P., transferred the appeal to the Blount Circuit
Court for a trial de novo. See D.S. v. R.S. (No. CL-2025-0066, Feb. 20,
2025).
Before the trial de novo was conducted by the circuit court, the
paternal grandparents filed a motion requesting that the child be
returned to their custody pendente lite. The circuit court granted that
motion.
The circuit court held a trial on June 27, 2025, at which it received
ore tenus evidence. The parents asserted in their testimony that the
paternal grandparents had not permitted the parents to exercise their
court-ordered visitation with the child between May 2023 and the child's
return to their custody on December 31, 2024. According to the mother,
the paternal grandmother had consistently attempted to dictate
4 CL-2025-0654 and CL-2025-0659
visitation terms that differed from those contained in the juvenile court's
May 2023 dependency judgment. The mother also testified that she had
attempted to contact the paternal grandmother on numerous occasions
to confirm the parents' visitation with the child as required by the May
2023 dependency judgment and that the paternal grandmother had not
answered her telephone and had not returned the mother's calls.
The paternal grandmother conceded that the required visitations
had not occurred and stated that she had not believed that the paternal
grandparents were bound by the May 2023 dependency judgment
because, she said, they had not been parties to the dependency action.
She asserted that the parents had generally failed to give the paternal
grandparents sufficient notice or, at times, any notice that they wanted
to exercise their visitation with the child, and she disputed the mother's
testimony indicating that the mother had made numerous attempts to
contact the paternal grandmother regarding visitation with the child.
She also testified that she had not cooperated with the parents, in part,
because the mother would yell at her during telephone calls. The
paternal grandmother further testified that she had attempted to suggest
different days for the parents to visit the child but that the parents had
5 CL-2025-0654 and CL-2025-0659
sought to adhere strictly to the terms of the May 2023 dependency
judgment.4 The paternal grandmother testified that the paternal
grandparents would abide by whatever visitation terms the circuit court
determined were appropriate if they retained custody of the child.
The mother also testified that the paternal grandmother had
required the parents' telephone calls with the child to be conducted at
4:00 p.m. and that, as a result, the father had largely been unable to
speak to the child because he was at work. The parents indicated that
the paternal grandmother would not permit the parents to call later than
4:00 p.m. to accommodate the father's work schedule. The mother
testified that she believed that the paternal grandmother had permitted
her to speak with the child during her initial telephone calls 80% of the
time. The paternal grandmother generally denied requiring the parents'
telephone calls to occur exactly at 4:00 p.m. and explained that she had
refused several of the mother's telephone calls because the child had been
engaged in another activity or eating dinner when the mother had called.
The paternal grandmother also testified that she had not received any
4The paternal grandmother explained that the paternal grandparents had not been consulted regarding the visitation schedule during the dependency action. 6 CL-2025-0654 and CL-2025-0659
telephone calls from the father asking to speak to the child.5 The mother
conceded that the paternal grandmother and the child would usually
return her call at a later time if her initial call was not answered. The
mother also testified that the paternal grandmother had frequently
answered on the child's behalf during the telephone calls or would end
the telephone call after approximately two minutes. The paternal
grandmother testified that she would remind the child of things to talk
about or would offer discussion points if the child did not offer
conversation during the telephone calls. The paternal grandmother
testified that she had made two attempts to speak to the child during the
four months that he had resided with the parents after the entry of the
December 2024 modification judgment and that she had been denied both
times.
The mother expressed her concern that the paternal grandparents
had not properly cared for the child's medical needs when he was in their
custody. The mother explained that the child has an aortic-valve birth
5The record indicates that the majority of the communications between the parties concerning the child were between the mother and the paternal grandmother. The record reflects that the father and the paternal grandparents do not have a harmonious relationship. 7 CL-2025-0654 and CL-2025-0659
defect that requires yearly examination by a cardiologist. The parents
also stated that the child had returned from the paternal grandparents'
custody weighing approximately 30 pounds more than when he had left
the parents' custody and that he had become lethargic. The paternal
grandmother testified that she had regularly taken the child to the doctor
and the dentist and that the child had visited a cardiologist in South
Carolina. She explained that the child had been "very, very hyper" when
he had entered the paternal grandparents' custody and that, as a result,
the child had been prescribed Guanfacine, which appears to be a
medication prescribed to treat attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder.
Kaylie Wingo, a DHR social worker and investigator, testified that
she became involved with the parents and the child in January 2025 after
DHR received a report that an individual was concerned with the
suddenness of the child's reunification with the parents. Wingo testified
that she had visited the parents' residence within five days of the report
and noted that the residence had been "a little cluttered" but that she
had not had any concerns regarding the child's safety and well-being.
She stated that she did not have any concerns after conversations with
the parents or the child and that she had not developed any concerns
8 CL-2025-0654 and CL-2025-0659
after she had observed R.S., Jr., the parents' two-year-old son, in the
residence. Wingo also testified that the child's school had contacted DHR
about the child's sleeping in the classroom. Wingo stated that she had
contacted the parents and had requested that they take the child to a
doctor. Wingo reported that insomnia was a side-effect of the child's
medication and that the parents had, after consulting with a doctor,
provided the child with melatonin. According to Wingo, the school again
contacted DHR several months later with concerns that the child had
started sleeping in class again. Wingo again requested that the parents
consult a doctor, and it was determined that the child's dosage of
melatonin was too strong. Wingo explained that, after the melatonin
dosage was corrected, the child had not had any problems and that DHR
had closed its case. Wingo testified that she did not have a preference
regarding the award of the custody of the child and that she did not have
any concerns regarding the possibility that the child would be returned
to the parents' custody. The child's guardian ad litem offered a similar
opinion.
The record does not contain any documentary evidence or testimony
regarding the incomes of the parties. The mother testified that she was
9 CL-2025-0654 and CL-2025-0659
employed; her testimony does not indicate where she was employed, what
position she held, or how much income she earned. The father testified
that he was an assistant branch manager at an electrical-supply
distributor; his testimony also does not reveal his income. The parents
testified, however, that they would be able to financially support the
child. There is no testimony regarding the income of the paternal
grandparents.
The mother testified that, although the parents had not been
required to make child-support payments under the May 2023
dependency judgment, they had purchased items for the child before the
paternal grandparents relocated to South Carolina. The mother testified
that, after the child had relocated to South Carolina, the parents had sent
the child only a birthday gift and had sent the paternal grandparents
only one gift card for the paternal grandparents to use for the child's
expenses.6 The mother also testified that she had sent the child a pair of
shoes and some items of clothing; the paternal grandmother denied
receiving any shoes or clothing.
6Neither the amount of the gift card nor the store at which it could
be redeemed is contained in the record. 10 CL-2025-0654 and CL-2025-0659
Although it is not clear from the record, it appears that the mother's
brother ("the maternal uncle") had resided with the parents before the
entry of the May 2023 dependency judgment and that he had resided in
the child's bedroom. The mother explained that the maternal uncle had
left the residence and that the child would have his own room. The
parents also explained that they had made an effort to spend more time
with the child when he had been temporarily returned to their custody.
They testified that they would have sufficient time to adequately rear
him and that their residence was no longer "as clutter[ed]" as it had been
during the dependency proceedings. They also testified that they had
complied with DHR's requirements from the dependency action by
completing parenting classes and domestic-violence classes.7
On July 22, 2025, the circuit court entered a factually detailed
judgment holding the paternal grandparents in contempt but finding
that the parents had failed to demonstrate that a material change in
circumstances had occurred warranting a modification of the child's
7It appears that the parents had been required to complete those
classes by May 1, 2023. The parents acknowledged that they did not complete the classes by that deadline but testified that those classes had been completed at the time of the June 2025 trial. 11 CL-2025-0654 and CL-2025-0659
custody. See Ex parte McLendon, 455 So. 2d 863, 865 (Ala. 1984). The
circuit court's judgment also modified the parents' visitation with the
child by providing the parents expanded, unsupervised visitation with
the child at their residence; it also ordered the parents to pay the paternal
grandparents $300 each month in child support and noted, without
further explanation, that that amount was not calculated pursuant to the
guidelines found in Rule 32, Ala. R. Jud. Admin. As a sanction for the
paternal grandparents' contempt, the circuit court ordered that the
paternal grandparents would be responsible for transporting the child to
all required visitations, which were to occur at the parents' Blount
County residence. On July 31, 2025, the parents filed a postjudgment
motion contesting the circuit court's determination that they had not
satisfied their burden under Ex parte McLendon. That motion was
denied by operation of law on August 14, 2025. See Rule 1(B), Ala. R.
Juv. P., and Rule 59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P. See also W.C.R. v. D.A.L., 18 So.
3d 420, 422 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009) ("The Rules of Juvenile Procedure apply
in an appeal to the circuit court of a juvenile court's judgment. Rule 1(B),
Ala. R. Juv. P., specifies that the '[p]rocedure shall be uniform in all
juvenile courts, whether at the circuit or district court level or in the
12 CL-2025-0654 and CL-2025-0659
circuit court by trial de novo.' (Emphasis added)."). The paternal
grandparents filed their notice of appeal to this court on August 13, 2025.
The parents filed a cross-appeal on August 14, 2025. On August 19, 2025,
we consolidated the appeal and the cross-appeal, ex mero motu.
On appeal, the paternal grandparents argue that the circuit court's
judgment is erroneous insofar as it awarded the paternal grandparents
$300 each month in child support because, they contend, the circuit court
failed to apply Rule 32 and because the record does not contain a Form
CS-41 Child-Support-Obligation Income Statement/Affidavit for any of
the parties or a Form CS-42 Child-Support Guidelines form. In their
cross-appeal, the parents assert that the circuit court's judgment is not
supported by the evidence and that they met their burden to modify the
child's custody under the custody-modification standard set out in Ex
parte McLendon.
" 'When evidence in a child custody case has been presented ore tenus to the [juvenile] court, that court's findings of fact based on that evidence are presumed to be correct.' Ex parte Bryowsky, 676 So. 2d 1322, 1324 (Ala. 1996). As our supreme court explained in Bryowsky, '[t]he trial court is in the best position to make a custody determination -- it hears the evidence and observes the witnesses.' Id. An appellate court is not permitted to reweigh the evidence or to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. See Phillips v. Phillips, 622 So. 2d 410, 412 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993). On the other hand,
13 CL-2025-0654 and CL-2025-0659
the ore tenus presumption of correctness does not apply to a juvenile court's conclusions regarding questions of law, and an appellate court reviews those conclusions de novo. See R.K. v. R.J., 843 So. 2d 774, 776 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002)."
B.F. v. C.D., [Ms. CL-2025-0032, Aug. 22, 2025] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala.
Civ. App. 2025), rev'd on other grounds, Ex parte C.D., Ms. SC-2025-
0655, Mar. 27, 2026] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2026).
We first address the parents' cross-appeal concerning the circuit
court's denial of their petition to modify the child's custody. " 'When a
juvenile court has entered a judgment awarding custody of a dependent
child to a relative, a parent seeking to modify that custody judgment
must meet the Ex parte McLendon[, 455 So. 2d 863 (Ala. 1984)], standard
in order to regain custody of the child. ' " K.Y. v. J.S., 393 So. 3d 540, 541
(Ala. Civ. App. 2023) (quoting P.A. v. L.S., 78 So. 3d 979, 981 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2011)). The McLendon standard requires
"the parent seeking a custody change to demonstrate that a material change in circumstances has occurred since the previous judgment, that the child's best interests will be materially promoted by a change of custody, and that the benefits of the change will more than offset the inherently disruptive effect resulting from the change in custody. Ex parte McLendon, 455 So. 2d at 866."
Dean v. Dean, 998 So. 2d 1060, 1065 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008).
14 CL-2025-0654 and CL-2025-0659
The parents' argument rests solely on their assertion that the
paternal grandparents deliberately denied the parents visitation with
the child for nearly two years and prevented the child from speaking to
the parents on the telephone for longer than two minutes outside the
presence of the paternal grandmother. Generally, visitation issues are
not a material change in circumstances that warrant a modification of a
child's custody. Cochran v. Cochran, 5 So. 3d 1220, 1229 (Ala. 2008).
However, this court has recognized that a visitation issue can rise to the
level of parental alienation, which would be a potential material change
in circumstances warranting modification of a child's custody. See C.J.L.
v. M.W.B., 879 So. 2d 1169 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003).
In support of their argument, the parents rely on our decisions in
C.J.L. and in K.T.D. v. K.W.P., 119 So. 3d 418 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012). In
both C.J.L. and K.T.D., this court affirmed the modification a child-
custody judgment based on evidence indicating that the party appealing
the child-custody-modification judgment had withheld visitation from
the other party as part of a "campaign to undermine the [opposing party's
parental] role," C.J.L., 879 So. 2d at 1180, or had "engaged in behavior
designed to frustrate and thwart the [opposing party's] relationship with
15 CL-2025-0654 and CL-2025-0659
the child," K.T.D., 119 So. 3d at 428. Notably, in both of those cases the
fact that a party had prevented the opposing party from exercising his or
her visitation with the children at issue was the product of a larger effort
to deliberately alienate the children from the opposing party.
In this case, the circuit court determined that the paternal
grandparents had had "no intention" of following the visitation schedule
set forth in the May 2023 dependency judgment and that the paternal
grandparents "held an unfounded belief that the [May 2023 dependency
judgment] did not apply to them." The record supports that finding.
However, in denying the parents' child-custody-modification petition, the
circuit court implicitly found that the paternal grandparents had not
intended to entirely withhold the child from the parents and were not
engaged in a campaign aimed at alienating the child from the parents.
The record also supports that finding. The paternal grandmother
testified that she had permitted the child to speak to the mother on the
telephone and had allowed the child to call the parents if the child was
initially unavailable. She further testified that, although she had not
complied with the visitation provisions in the May 2023 dependency
judgment, she had communicated with the mother about alternative
16 CL-2025-0654 and CL-2025-0659
visitation venues and dates. The circuit court could have determined
from that testimony that the paternal grandparents, although not
compliant with the May 2023 dependency judgment, had not intended to
alienate the child from the parents. Thus, we affirm the circuit court's
judgment insofar as it denied the parents' petition to modify the child's
custody.
In the paternal grandparents' appeal, they argue that the circuit
court erred in its determination of child support because, they say, the
circuit court failed to apply Rule 32 and because the record does not
contain a Form CS-41 Child-Support-Obligation Income
Statement/Affidavit for any of the parties or a Form CS-42 Child-Support
Guidelines form. We agree.
As this court has held:
" 'A noncustodial parent's child-support obligation is governed by the mandatory application of Rule 32, Ala. R. Jud. Admin. Smith v. Smith, 587 So. 2d 1217 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991). Rule 32(E), Ala. R. Jud. Admin., states that "[a] standardized Child Support Guidelines form and a Child Support Obligation Income Statement/Affidavit form shall be filed in each action to establish or modify child support obligations and [that those forms] shall be of record and shall be deemed to be incorporated by reference in the court's child support order."
17 CL-2025-0654 and CL-2025-0659
(Emphasis added.) The filing of the child-support- guidelines forms required under Rule 32(E) is mandatory. Martin v. Martin, 637 So. 2d 901 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994). This court has consistently held that the failure to file the required child-support- guidelines forms in compliance with Rule 32(E) where child support is made an issue on appeal is reversible error. Holley v. Holley, 829 So. 2d 759 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002); Gordon v. Gordon, 804 So. 2d 241 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001); and Martin v. Martin, supra.'
"Wilkerson v. Waldrop, 895 So. 2d 347, 348-49 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004). See also Batain v. Batain, 912 So. 2d 283, 285 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005)(reversing child-support judgment because this court could not 'discern the basis for the trial court's child- support judgment')."
Morrow v. Dillard, 257 So. 3d 316, 325-26 (Ala. Civ. App. 2017).
The circuit court stated in its judgment that its award of child
support "[was] not calculated pursuant to ... Rule 32." Moreover, the
record contains neither the requisite child-support forms nor evidence of
the incomes of the parties. But see R.D.F. v. R.J.F., 271 So. 3d 831, 839
(Ala. Civ. App. 2018) (noting that this court need not reverse a child-
support award when the required forms are missing if it is clear from the
record that the child-support award comports with the evidence of the
parties' incomes). We further note that the parents concede that the
circuit court failed to apply Rule 32 in determining child support.
18 CL-2025-0654 and CL-2025-0659
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court insofar as it
ordered the parents to pay child support to the paternal grandparents in
the amount of $300 per month. We remand the case with instructions for
the circuit court (1) to order the parties to submit the forms required by
Rule 32(E), Ala. R. Jud. Admin., (2) to conduct an evidentiary hearing
regarding the incomes of the parties, and (3) based on the forms and
evidence presented, to enter a child-support judgment in compliance with
Rule 32.
CL-2025-0654 -- REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH
INSTRUCTIONS.
CL-2025-0659 -- AFFIRMED.
Moore, P.J., and Hanson, Fridy, and Bowden, JJ., concur.