Drummond Company, Inc. v. Moore

730 So. 2d 222, 1998 Ala. Civ. App. LEXIS 389, 1998 WL 257265
Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama·Decided May 22, 1998·No. 2970007·Published·Cited by 1 cases

Opinions

YATES, Judge.

William Ernie Moore sued his employer, Drummond Company, Inc, on December 21, 1995, seeking to recover workers’ compensation benefits for occupational pneumoconio-sis. Moore alleged that he had contracted the disease while working within the line and scope of his employment as an underground coal miner with Drummond. Following an ore tenus proceeding, the court, on August 22, 1997, entered an order, finding that Moore had contracted pneumoconiosis in the course of his employment and that he had suffered a 65% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. Drummond appeals.

Drummond contends that the “clear and convincing evidence” standard of proof is applicable to Moore’s claim and that Moore failed to satisfy this burden in proving his claim. Claims for occupational pneumoconio-sis are governed by Article IV of the Workers’ Compensation Act. Section 25-5-110(1), Ala.Code 1975 (1992 repl. vol.), provides this definition:

“OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE. A disease arising out of and in the course of employment, including occupational pneu-moconiosis and occupational exposure to radiation as defined in subdivisions (2) and (3), respectively, of this section, which is due to hazards in excess of those ordinarily incident to employment in general and is peculiar to the occupation in which the employee is engaged but without regard to negligence or fault, if any, of the employer.”

Section 25-5-110(2) defines “occupational pneumoconiosis” as “[a] disease of the lungs [224] caused by inhalation of minute particles of dust over a period of time, which dust is due to causes and conditions arising out of and in the course of the employment.” Section 25-5-81 (e) provides:

“Evidence. — The decision of the court shall be based on a preponderance of the evidence as contained in the record of the hearing, except in cases involving injuries which have resulted from gradual deterioration or cumulative physical stress disorders, which shall be deemed compensable only upon a finding of clear and convincing proof that those injuries arose out of and in the course of the employee’s employment.”

Because occupational pneumoconiosis results from inhalation of dust particles over a period of time, Drummond argues that it results from a “gradual deterioration” and, therefore, that Moore must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the disease arose out of and in the course of his employment. We disagree.

Section 25-5-111 provides:

“Right to compensation for death or disablement. — Where the employer and the employee are subject to this chapter, the disablement or death of an employee caused by the contraction of an occupational disease, as defined in Section 25-5-110, shall he treated as an injury by accident, and the employee or, in case of his death, his dependents shall be entitled to compensation as provided in this article. In no case, however, shall an employer be liable for compensation by reason of the contraction of an occupational disease, as defined in Section 25-5-110, or for disability or death resulting therefrom unless such disease arose out of and in the course of the employment and resulted from the nature of the employment in which the employee was engaged.”

(Emphasis added.) It is clear from § 25-5-111 that disablement from the contraction of an occupational disease, including occupational pneumoconiosis, is to be treated as an accidental injury rather than as an injury that results from gradual deterioration. Therefore, the “preponderance of the evidence” standard is applicable to this case rather than the “clear and convincing evidence” standard.

Drummond next contends that Moore failed to prove that he contracted occupational pneumoconiosis in the course of his employment with Drummond. Moore’s last day of employment with Drummond was December 31, 1993; thus, this case is governed by the new Workers’ Compensation Act. The new Act provides that on appeal the review of the proof and the consideration of other legal issues shall be without a presumption of correctness. § 25 — 5—81(e)(1), Ala.Code 1975. It further provides that when a court reviews a trial court’s findings of fact, those findings will not be reversed if they are supported by substantial evidence. § 25-5-81(e)(2), Ala. Code 1975. Our supreme “has defined the term ‘substantial evidence,’ as it is used in § 12-21-12(d), to mean ‘evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved.’ ” Ex parte Trinity Industries, Inc., 680 So.2d 262, 268 (Ala. 1996), quoting West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989). This court has also concluded: “The new Act did not alter the rule that this court does not weigh the evidence before the trial court.” Edwards v. Jesse Stutts, Inc., 655 So.2d 1012, 1014 (Ala.Civ.App.1995).

Before the 1992 amendments to the Act, claims for benefits that were predicated on occupational pneumoconiosis were governed by §§ 25-5-140 through -152. The claims based on pneumoconiosis of coal miners were governed by §§ 25-5-170 through -180. See Reynolds Metals Co. v. Stults, 532 So.2d 1035 (Ala.Civ.App.1988). The 1992 amendments to the Act repealed those sections. Presently, claims for benefits that are predicated on occupational pneumoconiosis, including pneu-moconiosis of coal miners, are governed by §§ 25-5-110 through -123.

Section 25-5-110 sets forth the conditions for recovery for occupational diseases, including pneumoconiosis. To be compensa-ble as an occupational disease, the disease must: (1) arise out of and in the course of the employee’s employment; (2) be due to [225] hazards in excess of those ordinarily incident to employment in general; and (3) be peculiar to the occupation in which the employee is engaged. Further, the disease must result from the nature of the employment in which the employee was engaged. § 25-5-111. To prove “nature of the employment” under the former provisions, one had to prove (1) a particular hazard of occupational pneumoco-niosis, (2) that the hazard distinguished the employment from the usual run of occupations, and (3) that the hazard was in excess of the hazards of occupational pneumoconiosis attending employment in general. Reynolds Metals Co., supra. See also Drummond Co. v. Key, 630 So.2d 473 (Ala.Civ.App.1993).

After considering the depositions and medical records of Moore’s treating physicians and after receiving ore tenus evidence, the court made the following findings:

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Drummond Company, Inc. v. Moore, 730 So. 2d 222, 1998 Ala. Civ. App. LEXIS 389, 1998 WL 257265 (Ala. Ct. App. 1998).

730 So. 2d 222 (Drummond Company, Inc. v. Moore) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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