Drouhard v. Thompson

2025 Ohio 5006

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: November 3, 2025
• Docket: 2025 CA 0031 & 2025 CA 0034
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as Drouhard v. Thompson, 2025-Ohio-5006.]

COURT OF APPEALS RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

KRISTI DROUHARD, et al., Case No. 2025 CA 0031 2025 CA 0034 Plaintiffs - Appellants Opinion And Judgment Entry -vs- Appeal from the Richland County Court of KARA M. THOMPSON, et al., Common Pleas, Probate Division, Case No. 20214007A Defendants - Appellees Judgment: Affirmed

Date of Judgment Entry: November 3, 2025

BEFORE: Craig R. Baldwin; William B. Hoffman; David M. Gormley, Appellate Judges

APPEARANCES: SAMUEL ZIMMERMAN, for Plaintiffs-Appellants; ANDREW P. LYCANS, for Defendants-Appellees.

Baldwin, P.J.

{¶1} The appellants, Kristi Drouhard, Dianna Drouhard, Richard Drouhard,

Karen Nolan, Carolyn Olivieri, Joe Drouhard, Jessica Brown, and Rebecca Daugherty,

appeal the trial court’s order denying their Motion for Leave to Amend Deemed

Admissions, the trial court’s judgment entry granting the appellees’ Motion for Summary

Judgment, and the trial court’s exclusion of supplemental evidence on summary

judgment. Appellees are Kara Thompson, both individually and in her capacity as Trustee

of The Elaine E. Baughman Trust Agreement, and Michael Thompson. For the reasons

that follow, we affirm the decisions of the trial court. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND THE CASE

{¶2} On July 1, 2021, appellants filed a Complaint to Construe Trust, and for

Declaratory Relief, Emergency Injunctive Relief, and Monetary Damages against the

appellees alleging that they unduly influenced and/or exercised duress upon Elaine

Baughman in the execution of the last two amendments to her Trust, and further alleged

that Ms. Baughman lacked the requisite mental capacity to execute said amendments.

The Complaint sought an order quieting title to real estate held by the Trust; a declaration

and construction of the Trust regarding the validity of the last two amendments due to an

alleged lack of capacity, undue influence, or duress; removal of appellee Kara Thompson

as Trustee pursuant to R.C. 2109.24 and 5807.06; and, breach of fiduciary duty and non-

compliance with Trust terms by appellee Kara Thompson. The appellees filed an Answer

and Counterclaim on July 28, 2021.

{¶3} On November 18, 2021, the appellees served discovery requests upon all

appellants, including Requests for Admissions. The discovery contained an initial section

entitled “Combined Discovery Requests” which were directed to all appellants. 1 Request

for Admission No. 1, which was the first item set forth in the Combined Discovery

Requests, asked the appellants to “[a]dmit that Elaine Baughman was competent when

she executed the Sixth Amendment to Trust [sic] Agreement on September 16, 2020.” It

was followed by Interrogatory No. 1 and Request for Production No. 1, both of which

asked that, if the answer to Request for Admission No. 1 was anything other than an

unqualified admission, the appellants identify the basis for the claim that Baughman was

1 The discovery contained further “Additional Requests for Admission,” “Additional Interrogatories,” and “Additional Requests for Production of Documents” sections which were specific to each individual appellant. not competent and produce any and all documents supporting said contention. Request

for Admission No. 2 asked the appellants to “[a]dmit that Elaine Baughman was not acting

under the undue influence of others when she executed the Sixth Amendment to Trust

[sic],” followed by Interrogatory No. 2 and Request for Production of Documents No. 2,

both of which asked that, if the answer to Request for Admission No. 2 was anything

other than an unqualified admission, the appellants identify the basis for the claim that

Baughman was not competent and produce any and all documents supporting said

contention. Request for Admission No. 3 asked the appellants to “[a]dmit that Elaine

Baughman was not acting under duress when she executed the Sixth Amendment to

Trust [sic],” followed by Interrogatory No. 3 and Request for Production of Documents No.

3, both of which asked that, if the answer to Request for Admission No. 3 was anything

other than an unqualified admission, the appellants identify the basis for the claim that

Baughman was not competent and produce any and all documents supporting said

contention. The discovery made identical requests for the Fifth Amendment to the Trust

at Request for Admission, Interrogatory, and Request or Production of Documents Nos.

4, 5, and 6.

{¶4} Based upon Civ.R. 36(A)(1), the appellants' responses to the discovery,

including the Requests for Admissions, were due on or before December 16, 2021. The

appellants failed to serve timely responses to the discovery, including the Requests for

Admissions, and did not request an extension of time to respond. The appellants

subsequently submitted that their failure to timely respond to the Requests for Admissions

was due to an oversight in which their counsel, who had taken a leave of absence in

November of 2021, did not "discover" the electronic service of the requests, and further failed to communicate with the attorney covering for him during his leave of absence,

resulting in the Requests not being seen or forwarded to the appellants.

{¶5} This oversight came to the attention of the attorney covering for appellants'

original counsel on January 31, 2022, during a telephone status conference with the trial

court and opposing counsel, during which appellants’ counsel conceded that the

appellants had failed to respond to the appellees’ discovery, including the Requests for

Admission. During the status conference it was agreed that appellants’ counsel would

submit a motion regarding the circumstances surrounding the appellants’ failure to timely

respond to the Requests for Admission, to which appellees’ counsel could then respond.

The trial court set another status conference for April 14, 2022.

{¶6} The appellants, however, did not submit a motion to set aside the deemed

admissions by the April 14, 2022, status conference, nor did they submit their proposed

discovery responses. Furthermore, the appellants had not submitted initial disclosures,

had not issued any discovery of their own to appellees, had made no attempt to obtain

the decedent’s medical records, and had not scheduled or taken a deposition. The

appellants moved to continue the April 2022 status conference, which the trial court

granted.

{¶7} On April 18, 2022, approximately five months after responses to the

Requests for Admissions were due, and approximately four months after the January 31,

2022, status conference at which the appellants’ new counsel was made aware of the

outstanding Requests for Admission, the appellees filed a Motion for Summary Judgment

based upon the deemed admissions, as well as affidavits from the Trustee and the

attorney who prepared the most recent amendments to the Trust. The admissions established that, inter alia, Elaine Baughman was competent, and was not acting under

undue influence or duress when she executed the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the

Trust.

{¶8} On May 6, 2022, three weeks after the appellees’ Motion for Summary

Judgment was filed, the appellants filed a "Motion for Leave to Respond to Requests for

Admissions Instanter and Motion to Amend Deemed Admissions.” The appellants argued

in their Motion for Leave to Respond and Motion to Amend that the civil rules were

“designed and should be construed as an aid and not an impediment in the search for

truth.” The appellants, citing a 1999 common pleas court case, argued further that “while

courts should generally require compelling circumstances, where justice would be

thwarted by strict adherence to that requirement, justice should be preferred.” The

appellees filed a brief opposing the Motions; the appellants did not file a reply brief.

{¶9} The appellants eventually served their proposed responses to the Requests

for Admission, which they sought to substitute for the deemed admissions, upon the

appellees on May 11 and 12, 2022. On August 19, 2022, the appellants filed a Motion to

Allow Additional Evidence In Defense Against Summary Judgment Instanter. The

appellees opposed the motion.

{¶10} The trial court denied both the appellants’ Motion for Leave to Respond and

Motion to Amend, and the appellants’ Motion to Allow Additional Evidence. With regard

to the appellants’ Motion for Leave and Motion to Amend, the trial court reasoned that the

appellants "failed to show a compelling circumstance that led to the failure to respond to

the requests for admissions." The trial court thereafter granted the appellees’ Motion for

Summary Judgment and denied the appellants’ Motion to Allow Additional Evidence. The court held that the deemed admissions conclusively established that Elaine Baughman

was competent and was not acting under undue influence or duress when she executed

the challenged Trust amendments. Based upon these admissions, the court found that

there were no genuine issues of material fact regarding the appellants’ claims concerning

undue influence, duress, or incompetence, nor regarding their requests for a Trust

declaration or removal of the Trustee based on those grounds, and granted the appellees’

Motion for Summary Judgment.

{¶11} The appellants filed timely appeals which have been consolidated, and in

which they set forth the following three assignments of error:

{¶12} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING

APPELLANTS' MOTION TO AMEND ADMISSIONS WHEN IT IMPROPERLY APPLIED

OHIO CIVIL RULE 36(B)'S TWO-PRONG TEST.”

{¶13} “II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

TO APPELLEES BECAUSE THAT JUDGMENT WAS PREDICATED UPON DEEMED

ADMISSIONS THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN PERMITTED TO BE WITHDRAWN OR

AMENDED.”

{¶14} “III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW

SUPPLEMENTAL EVIDENCE IN OPPOSITION TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE

THE JUDGMENT WAS PREDICATED UPON DEEMED ADMISSIONS THAT SHOULD

HAVE BEEN PERMITTED TO BE WITHDRAWN OR AMENDED.”

{¶15} For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the decision of the trial court. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1

{¶16} The appellants argue in their first assignment of error that the trial court

erred when it denied their motion to amend their responses to the requests for

admissions. We disagree.

Standard Of Review

{¶17} An appellate court reviews a trial court’s decisions regarding discovery

based upon an abuse of discretion standard:

A decision regarding the disposition of discovery issues is reviewed

under an abuse of discretion standard. Contini v. Ohio State Bd. of Edn.,

5th Dist. Licking No. 2007CA0136, 2008-Ohio-5710, 2008 WL 4801645, ¶

46 citing State ex rel. The v. Companies v. Marshall, 81 Ohio St.3d 467,

469, 692 N.E.2d 198 (1998). “Abuse of discretion” implies an unreasonable,

arbitrary, or unconscionable attitude on the part of the court. Blakemore v.

Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983).

Miller v. Milano, 2014-Ohio-5539, ¶ 15 (5th Dist.).

Analysis

{¶18} The appellants submit that the trial court abused its discretion when it

denied their Motion for Leave to Respond and Motion to Amend the deemed admissions.

Requests for Admission are governed by Civ.R. 36, which provides in pertinent part:

(A) Availability; Procedures for Use. A party may serve upon

any other party a written request for the admission, for purposes of the

pending action only, of the truth of any matters within the scope of Civ.R.

26(B) set forth in the request, that relate to statements or opinions of fact or of the application of law to fact, including the genuineness of any documents

described in the request. Copies of documents shall be served with the

request unless they have been or are otherwise furnished or made available

for inspection and copying. The request may, without leave of court, be

served upon the plaintiff after commencement of the action and upon any

other party after service of the summons and complaint upon that party.

Whenever feasible, the party serving the request for admission shall serve

the request pursuant to Civ.R. 5(B)(2)(f) or (B)(3) on a shareable medium

and in an editable format. If the party being served is unrepresented by

counsel, the serving party also shall provide a paper copy of the request to

the unrepresented party. A party who is unable to serve a request for

admission electronically may serve the request by other means permitted

under Civ.R. 5(B)(2).

(1) Each matter of which an admission is requested shall be

separately set forth. The party to whom the requests for admissions have

been directed shall quote each request for admission immediately

preceding the corresponding answer or objection. The matter is admitted

unless, within a period designated in the request, not less than twenty-eight

days after service of the request or within such shorter or longer time as the

court may allow, the party to whom the request is directed serves upon the

party requesting the admission a written answer or objection addressed to

the matter, signed by the party or by the party's attorney.

* * * (B) Effect of Admission. Any matter admitted under this rule is

conclusively established unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or

amendment of the admission. Subject to the provisions of Civ. R. 16

governing modification of a pretrial order, the court may permit withdrawal

or amendment when the presentation of the merits of the action will be

subserved thereby and the party who obtained the admission fails to satisfy

the court that withdrawal or amendment will prejudice the party in

maintaining his action or defense on the merits. Any admission made by a

party under this rule is for the purpose of the pending action only and is not

an admission by the party for any other purpose nor may it be used against

the party in any other proceeding.

The record herein clearly establishes that the appellees served Requests for Admission

on November 18, 2021, and that the appellants did not provide responses to said

discovery until May 11 and 12, 2022 – 146 days from the date they were originally served;

100 days from the date the appellants’ new counsel learned about them during the

January 31, 2022, status conference; and, after the appellees filed their Motion for

Summary Judgment based, in part, upon the admissions.

{¶19} This Court addressed the issue of the withdrawal or amendment of

admissions in Bush v. Eckman, 2008-Ohio-5080 (5th Dist.):

In making its determination of whether to permit a withdrawal or

amendment of the admissions, the trial court is required to consider the

elements of Civ.R. 36(B). Ohio courts have stylized this consideration into

a multi-pronged analysis. See Kutcscherousky v. Integrated Communications Solutions, LLC, 5th Dist. No.2004CA00338, 2005–Ohio–

4275; RKT Properties, LLC v. City of Northwood, 6th Dist. No. WD–05–009,

2005–Ohio–4178; Farmers Ins. Of Columbus, Inc. v. Lister, 5th Dist. No,

2005–CA–29, 2006–Ohio–142; B & T Distributors v. CSK Const., Inc., 6th

Dist. No. L–07–1362, 2008–Ohio–1855. First, there is the overreaching goal

that cases should be resolved on their merits. The court must determine

whether the amendment or withdrawal of the admissions will aid in

presenting the merits of the case. Cleveland Trust, 20 Ohio St.3d at 67. If

the court so determines, the burden then shifts to the party who obtained

the admissions to establish that the withdrawal or amendment will prejudice

the party in maintaining their action. Id.; Balson v. Dodds (1980), 62 Ohio

St.2d 287, 405 N.E.2d 293, paragraph two of the syllabus. “Against this

prejudice, the court must weigh the ‘compelling’ circumstances that led to

the failure to respond to the request for admissions.” RKT Properties, supra

at ¶ 12, citing Cleveland Trust, supra and Balson, supra.

Id. at ¶ 23. The defendant in Bush did not provide responses to the plaintiff’s requests for

admission until approximately seventy days after the due date, and only after the plaintiff

filed a motion for summary judgment based upon the admissions. The Court determined

that the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s request to withdraw admissions was not an

abuse of discretion.

{¶20} The withdrawal of admissions issue was addressed by this Court more

recently in Trammell v. Broner, 2023-Ohio-4143 (5th Dist.). The Trammell Court, citing Bush, held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it did not permit the

appellant to withdraw the admissions:

Appellants assert the trial court failed to undergo this [Bush] analysis.

Assuming, arguendo, the trial court did not undergo the analysis, we,

nonetheless find the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying

Appellants’ request to withdraw or amend the admissions. Appellants have

failed to set forth ANY reason, compelling or otherwise, for their failure to

respond at all to Trammell's request for admissions.

Id. at ¶19. In the case sub judice, the appellants did not argue application of the two-prong

analysis in their Motion for Leave to Respond and Motion to Amend; they simply argued

that the trial court should not strictly adhere to the civil rules and should instead “prefer

justice.”

{¶21} We cannot say that the trial court failed to consider the two-prong analysis

set forth in Bush, particularly since it cited Bush in its April 8, 2025, Order Denying

Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to Amend Deemed Admissions. Furthermore, just as in

Trammell, even if the trial court did not specifically delineate the analysis in its decision,

we nonetheless find the trial court did not act unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconscionably

when it denied the appellants’ request to withdraw or amend the admissions, and

therefore did not abuse its discretion. The appellants did not respond to the Requests for

Admission until 146 days after the original due date. Even if the trial court considered the

fact that the appellants’ initial counsel had to take a leave of absence for personal

reasons, the attorney who took over for the appellants’ initial counsel was made aware of

the outstanding Requests for Admission at the January 31, 2022, status conference, and did nothing to respond, or request an extension of time to respond, for 100 days. In fact,

the appellants did not respond or seek leave to amend until after the appellees filed their

{¶22} We find that the trial court did not act unreasonably, arbitrarily, or

unconscionably when it denied the appellant’s Motion for Leave to Respond and Motion

to Amend, and as a result did not abuse its discretion. Accordingly, we find the appellants’

first assignment of error to be without merit, and it is therefore overruled.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NOS. 2 & 3

{¶23} The appellants argue in their second assignment of error that the trial court

erred in granting summary judgment to the appellees because that judgment was

predicated upon deemed admissions that should have been permitted to be withdrawn or

amended. The appellants argue in their third assignment of error that the trial court erred

in refusing to allow supplemental evidence in opposition to summary judgment because

the judgment was predicated upon deemed admissions that should have been permitted

to be withdrawn or amended. Assignments of error numbers two and three are both based

upon the argument that the trial court should have permitted the deemed admissions to

be withdrawn or amended.

{¶24} Our decision on assignment of error number one, in which we found that

the trial court did not err in denying the appellants’ motion to withdraw or amend the

admissions, renders assignments of error numbers two and three moot. CONCLUSION

{¶25} Based upon the foregoing, we find appellants’ assignments of error

numbers one, two, and three to be without merit. Accordingly, the assignments of error

are overruled, and the decisions of the trial court are hereby affirmed.

{¶26} Costs to appellants.

By: Baldwin, P.J.

Hoffman, J. and

Gormley, J. concur.