Driggs v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

D. Arizona

Driggs v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

DecidedMay 27, 2020

Docket2:18-cv-03915

StatusUnknown

This text of Driggs v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration (Driggs v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Driggs v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, (D. Ariz. 2020).

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Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Joshua Patrick Driggs, No. CV-18-03915-PHX-DJH

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 13 14 Defendant.

15 16 At issue is Defendant Social Security Commissioner’s Motion to Transfer Pursuant 17 to Local Rule of Civil Procedure 42.1 or, in the alternative, to Stay All Proceedings Pending 18 Class-Certification Decision in a Related Case (Doc. 20). Defendant argues that transfer is 19 appropriate because Magistrate Judge Bruce G. Macdonald is currently handling a case 20 “raising essentially the same questions of law that Plaintiff” raises here. (Doc. 20 at 1.) Ely 21 v. Berryhill, No. 4:18-cv-00557-BGM (D. Ariz.). The Ely case before Magistrate Judge 22 Macdonald is awaiting a decision on the Ely plaintiffs’ motion for class certification and 23 Plaintiff here is a member of the putative class in Ely. In the alternative, Defendant argues 24 that the Court should stay this case pending resolution of the Ely plaintiffs’ motion for class 25 certification, and if that motion is granted, pending resolution of that entire case, including 26 any appeals. (Doc. 20 at 5.) Plaintiff opposes Defendant’s motion because he has not 27 consented to adjudication of his case by a magistrate judge. (Docs. 24, 26.) Plaintiff also 28 1 states that he will not consent in the future to adjudication of his case by a magistrate judge. 2 (Docs. 24, 26.) 3 When two or more cases are pending before different judges Local Rule of Civil 4 Procedure 42.1 permits transfer of a case to another judge when the cases: (1) arise from 5 substantially the same transaction or event; (2) involve substantially the same parties or 6 property; (3) involve the same patent, trademark, or copyright; (4) call for determination 7 of substantially the same questions of law; or (5) for any other reason would entail 8 substantial duplication of labor if heard by different Judges. When considering a motion to 9 transfer under Local Rule 42.1, the “principal factor is whether party economy or judicial 10 economy is substantially served by transfer to another judge.” Cagle v. Ryan, No. 11 CV1603912-PHX-JAT-JFM, 2018 WL 2688775, at *1 (D. Ariz. June 5, 2018) (citation 12 omitted). The Court considers these factors, but “has broad discretion in deciding 13 a motion to transfer under Local Rule 42.1(a).” Addington v. US Airline Pilots Ass’n, No. 14 CV-08-01633-PHX-NVW, 2010 WL 4117216, at *1 (D. Ariz. Oct. 19, 2010). 15 The Court will not transfer Plaintiff’s case to Magistrate Judge Macdonald because 16 transfer will “entail substantial duplication of labor” rather than avoid duplicative labor. 17 LRCiv 42.1(a). Plaintiff has unequivocally expressed an unwillingness to have his case 18 adjudicated by a magistrate judge. Plaintiff is within his rights to decline adjudication of his 19 case by a magistrate judge and Plaintiff’s consent is required before a magistrate judge may 20 properly exercise jurisdiction over his case. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1); see Columbia Record 21 Prods. v. Hot Wax Records, Inc., 966 F.2d 515, 516 (9th Cir. 1992). Therefore, even if the 22 Court transferred Plaintiff’s case, Magistrate Judge Macdonald likely would not hear the 23 case without Plaintiff’s consent. Indeed, he could not. Since Plaintiff has expressed that he 24 will not consent to Magistrate Judge Macdonald hearing his case, transfer would effectively 25 send this case to a third judge. Such a result would “entail substantial duplication of labor”, 26 which is what LRCiv 42.1(a) seeks to avoid. Thus, the Court will not transfer Plaintiff’s case 27 to Magistrate Judge Macdonald. 28 1 Similarly, the Court will not stay Plaintiffs case until resolution of the Ely plaintiffs’ 2|| motion for class certification, or until resolution of the entire Ely case. A district court has || broad discretion to stay proceedings as an incident to its power to control its own docket. 4|| Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d 1098, 1109 (9th Cir. 2005); Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. || 681, 706-07 (1997) (citing Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936)). Staying 6|| Plaintiff's case would have little practical effect besides inconveniencing Plaintiff and 7\|| delaying resolution of his case. Even if a class was certified in the Ely case, there is no 8 || indication that Plaintiff would join the class since the case would be adjudicated by a 9|| magistrate judge and Plaintiff has not consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction. Further, staying Plaintiff's case through the resolution of the Ely case, including through resolution 11 || of an appeal that is not guaranteed to occur, provides no tangible benefit to the administration ofjustice in Plaintiff's case or in any other case. For example, the Ely case could settle at any 13 || moment and render a stay in Plaintiff's case pointless. Accordingly, the Court will not stay Plaintiffs case. 15 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED denying Defendant’s Motion to Transfer || Pursuant to Local Rule of Civil Procedure 42.1 or, in the alternative, to Stay All Proceedings Pending Class-Certification Decision in Related Case (Doc. 20). 18 Dated this 27th day of May, 2020. 19 20 oC. . fo _ \Le 21 norable'Diang4. Hupfetewa 2 United States District Judge 23 24 25 26 27 28

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1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Joshua Patrick Driggs, No. CV-18-03915-PHX-DJH

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 13 14 Defendant.

15 16 At issue is Defendant Social Security Commissioner’s Motion to Transfer Pursuant 17 to Local Rule of Civil Procedure 42.1 or, in the alternative, to Stay All Proceedings Pending 18 Class-Certification Decision in a Related Case (Doc. 20). Defendant argues that transfer is 19 appropriate because Magistrate Judge Bruce G. Macdonald is currently handling a case 20 “raising essentially the same questions of law that Plaintiff” raises here. (Doc. 20 at 1.) Ely 21 v. Berryhill, No. 4:18-cv-00557-BGM (D. Ariz.). The Ely case before Magistrate Judge 22 Macdonald is awaiting a decision on the Ely plaintiffs’ motion for class certification and 23 Plaintiff here is a member of the putative class in Ely. In the alternative, Defendant argues 24 that the Court should stay this case pending resolution of the Ely plaintiffs’ motion for class 25 certification, and if that motion is granted, pending resolution of that entire case, including 26 any appeals. (Doc. 20 at 5.) Plaintiff opposes Defendant’s motion because he has not 27 consented to adjudication of his case by a magistrate judge. (Docs. 24, 26.) Plaintiff also 28 1 states that he will not consent in the future to adjudication of his case by a magistrate judge. 2 (Docs. 24, 26.) 3 When two or more cases are pending before different judges Local Rule of Civil 4 Procedure 42.1 permits transfer of a case to another judge when the cases: (1) arise from 5 substantially the same transaction or event; (2) involve substantially the same parties or 6 property; (3) involve the same patent, trademark, or copyright; (4) call for determination 7 of substantially the same questions of law; or (5) for any other reason would entail 8 substantial duplication of labor if heard by different Judges. When considering a motion to 9 transfer under Local Rule 42.1, the “principal factor is whether party economy or judicial 10 economy is substantially served by transfer to another judge.” Cagle v. Ryan, No. 11 CV1603912-PHX-JAT-JFM, 2018 WL 2688775, at *1 (D. Ariz. June 5, 2018) (citation 12 omitted). The Court considers these factors, but “has broad discretion in deciding 13 a motion to transfer under Local Rule 42.1(a).” Addington v. US Airline Pilots Ass’n, No. 14 CV-08-01633-PHX-NVW, 2010 WL 4117216, at *1 (D. Ariz. Oct. 19, 2010). 15 The Court will not transfer Plaintiff’s case to Magistrate Judge Macdonald because 16 transfer will “entail substantial duplication of labor” rather than avoid duplicative labor. 17 LRCiv 42.1(a). Plaintiff has unequivocally expressed an unwillingness to have his case 18 adjudicated by a magistrate judge. Plaintiff is within his rights to decline adjudication of his 19 case by a magistrate judge and Plaintiff’s consent is required before a magistrate judge may 20 properly exercise jurisdiction over his case. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1); see Columbia Record 21 Prods. v. Hot Wax Records, Inc., 966 F.2d 515, 516 (9th Cir. 1992). Therefore, even if the 22 Court transferred Plaintiff’s case, Magistrate Judge Macdonald likely would not hear the 23 case without Plaintiff’s consent. Indeed, he could not. Since Plaintiff has expressed that he 24 will not consent to Magistrate Judge Macdonald hearing his case, transfer would effectively 25 send this case to a third judge. Such a result would “entail substantial duplication of labor”, 26 which is what LRCiv 42.1(a) seeks to avoid. Thus, the Court will not transfer Plaintiff’s case 27 to Magistrate Judge Macdonald. 28 1 Similarly, the Court will not stay Plaintiffs case until resolution of the Ely plaintiffs’ 2|| motion for class certification, or until resolution of the entire Ely case. A district court has || broad discretion to stay proceedings as an incident to its power to control its own docket. 4|| Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d 1098, 1109 (9th Cir. 2005); Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. || 681, 706-07 (1997) (citing Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936)). Staying 6|| Plaintiff's case would have little practical effect besides inconveniencing Plaintiff and 7\|| delaying resolution of his case. Even if a class was certified in the Ely case, there is no 8 || indication that Plaintiff would join the class since the case would be adjudicated by a 9|| magistrate judge and Plaintiff has not consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction. Further, staying Plaintiff's case through the resolution of the Ely case, including through resolution 11 || of an appeal that is not guaranteed to occur, provides no tangible benefit to the administration ofjustice in Plaintiff's case or in any other case. For example, the Ely case could settle at any 13 || moment and render a stay in Plaintiff's case pointless. Accordingly, the Court will not stay Plaintiffs case. 15 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED denying Defendant’s Motion to Transfer || Pursuant to Local Rule of Civil Procedure 42.1 or, in the alternative, to Stay All Proceedings Pending Class-Certification Decision in Related Case (Doc. 20). 18 Dated this 27th day of May, 2020. 19 20 oC. . fo _ \Le 21 norable'Diang4. Hupfetewa 2 United States District Judge 23 24 25 26 27 28

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