Drexel v. New York State Thruway Authority

284 A.D.2d 907, 725 N.Y.S.2d 923, 2001 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5770
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedJune 8, 2001
DocketClaim No. 99431
StatusPublished

This text of 284 A.D.2d 907 (Drexel v. New York State Thruway Authority) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Drexel v. New York State Thruway Authority, 284 A.D.2d 907, 725 N.Y.S.2d 923, 2001 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5770 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2001).

Opinion

—Order unanimously affirmed without [908]*908costs. Memorandum: Claimants commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by Wayne Drexel (claimant) when he fell 70 feet from scaffolding during the course of blasting and repainting work on the North Grand Island Bridge. The Court of Claims properly granted claimants’ motion for partial summary judgment on liability under Labor Law § 240 (1), and properly denied defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing that claim. Claimants sustained their burden on the motion by demonstrating a causal connection between the statutory violation and claimant’s injuries (see, Felker v Corning Inc., 90 NY2d 219, 224-225; Gordon v Eastern Ry. Supply, 82 NY2d 555, 561-562; Zimmer v Chemung County Performing Arts, 65 NY2d 513, 518-519, 524, rearg denied 65 NY2d 1054). Defendant failed to raise a triable issue of fact on causation in opposition to claimants’ motion, and defendant failed to meet its burden on its cross motion of demonstrating that the conduct of claimant was the sole proximate cause of his injuries (see, Villeneuve v State of New York, 274 AD2d 958; cf., Weininger v Hagedorn & Co., 91 NY2d 958, 960, rearg denied 92 NY2d 875). Defendant further failed to establish as a matter of law that claimant was a recalcitrant worker, nor did defendant raise a triable question of fact on that issue (see, Gordon v Eastern Ry. Supply, supra, at 562-563; Hagins v State of New York, 81 NY2d 921, 922-923; Stolt v General Foods Corp., 81 NY2d 918, 920). (Appeal from Order of Court of Claims, NeMoyer, J. — Summary Judgment.) Present — Pigott, Jr., P. J., Wisner, Scudder, Kehoe and Burns, JJ.

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Related

Gordon v. Eastern Railway Supply, Inc.
626 N.E.2d 912 (New York Court of Appeals, 1993)
Weininger v. Hagedorn & Co.
695 N.E.2d 709 (New York Court of Appeals, 1998)
Felker v. Corning Inc.
682 N.E.2d 950 (New York Court of Appeals, 1997)
Zimmer v. Chemung County Performing Arts, Inc.
482 N.E.2d 898 (New York Court of Appeals, 1985)
Stolt v. General Foods Corp.
613 N.E.2d 556 (New York Court of Appeals, 1993)
Hagins v. State
613 N.E.2d 557 (New York Court of Appeals, 1993)
Villeneuve v. State
274 A.D.2d 958 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2000)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
284 A.D.2d 907, 725 N.Y.S.2d 923, 2001 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5770, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/drexel-v-new-york-state-thruway-authority-nyappdiv-2001.