Drewes v. Vatnsdal (In Re Vatnsdal)

139 B.R. 472, 1991 Bankr. LEXIS 2071, 1991 WL 332754
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. North Dakota
DecidedSeptember 27, 1991
Docket19-30101
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 139 B.R. 472 (Drewes v. Vatnsdal (In Re Vatnsdal)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. North Dakota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Drewes v. Vatnsdal (In Re Vatnsdal), 139 B.R. 472, 1991 Bankr. LEXIS 2071, 1991 WL 332754 (N.D. 1991).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

WILLIAM A. HILL, Bankruptcy Judge.

This adversary proceeding was commenced by the Trustee on May 28, 1991 seeking to avoid as a preferential transfer a mortgage given to the Defendant, E. Will Vatnsdal (Will) by the Plaintiff/Debtor, Theo J. Vatnsdal (Theo) pursuant to section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code. Trial was held on September 24, 1991. In addition to the evidence produced at trial, the parties stipulated to certain facts as uncontested.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Theo and Will are brothers and the parties agree Will is an insider as defined by 11 U.S.C. § 101(31)(A). Theo, over the years, has farmed the family farm situated in Pembina County, North Dakota, formerly consisting of five (5) quarters. Will resides in Omaha, Nebraska where, for the past ten (10) years he has engaged in insurance, real estate and financial planning.

In 1988, financial difficulties caused Theo to surrender a portion of his farm land back to Federal Land Bank, leaving him land upon which FmHA held a mortgage and which apparently continued to cause him financial difficulties. FmHA agreed to a cash buy-down on one of the quarters providing Theo could pay them in cash the agreed value of $68,535.00.

Theo was unable to come up with the money himself using conventional sources, but earnestly wished to retain his remaining land because it had been in his family for 100 years. The only option left him *474 was to approach his brother, Will, for the money.

He and Will had discussions in 1988 which led to Will lending him $69,000 on July 20, 1989. This loan was evidenced by a promissory note of even date payable on demand at the rate of 7% per annum. The cash was deposited in Theo’s attorneys trust account and from there a $68,535.00 disbursement was made to FmHA in satisfaction of the buy-down. The note to Will was secured by a mortgage executed on July 20, 1989 and covering the following described tracts, to wit:

The East Half of the Southeast Quarter (EV2 SEVí) of Section Fourteen (14), Township One Hundred Sixty (160), Range Fifty-six (56) and the West Half (W%) of Section Thirteen (13), Township One Hundred Sixty (160), Range Fifty-six (56), situated in the County of Pembina and State of North Dakota.

The mortgage, in the sum of $69,000.00, was not recorded until a year later when, on June 5, 1990, it was recorded in the Office of the Register of Deeds for Pembi-na County, North Dakota.

On October 31, 1990, Theo filed a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 7. The petition schedules reveal outstanding unsecured debt of $113,000.00, secured debt of $225,000.00 including Will’s mortgage and priority debts of $37,000.00. The Trustee testified that he presently has $2,200.00 in cash available for distribution and as matters presently stand, does not expect there to be anything available for distribution to the unsecured creditors.

Will concedes that Theo was insolvent from or before June 5, 1990 to the date of petition filing.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.

The Trustee instituted this action to invalidate the mortgage held by Will, contending that the act of its recordation constitutes a preferential transfer within the meaning of section 547.

Under section 547(b) a trustee may avoid the transfer to a creditor of an interest in property by the debtor that is made (1) on or within ninety (90) days before the date of the filing of the bankruptcy petition, (2) while the debtor was insolvent, (3) on account of an antecedent debt, and (4) which enables the creditor to receive more than it would have received in a bankruptcy liquidation.

The important dates here are July 20, 1989, the date the note and mortgage were executed, and June 5, 1990, the date when the mortgage itself was recorded.

Under section 547(e)(1)(A), a transfer of real property is perfected when a bona fide purchaser of the property cannot acquire an interest superior to that of the transferee. In North Dakota, perfection of a mortgage on real estate as against subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers is accomplished by recordation. NDCC § 35-03-07. Until recordation occurs, an unrecorded mortgage, while effective as between the parties themselves, is ineffective as against bona fide purchasers for value. NDCC § 47-10-08. Hence, under section 547(e)(1)(A), a transfer occurs only when the recording is complete pursuant to North Dakota law. Thus, it must be concluded that a transfer for purposes of section 547(b) occurred on the date of perfection — June 5, 1990. Because Will has conceded to be an insider, the preference period is one year rather than ninety (90) days and the transfer occurred within the statutory preference period. The element of insolvency is conceded.

Will executed the note on July 20, 1989, and on that date became obligated for its repayment. A “debt” is defined by section 101(12) as a liability on a claim-, while a “claim”, in turn, is defined by section 101(5)(A) as a right to payment whether liquidated or unliquidated. The note, as a demand note, constituted an immediate right to payment irrespective of the mortgage given as security and as such, must be regarded as an antecedent debt. Indeed, case law suggests that a debt is deemed antecedent if the transfer made contemporaneously with the incurring of the debt is not perfected within the ten (10) *475 day statutory grace period provided by section 547(e). In re Marston, 33 B.R. 597, 599 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1983).

Will, as a secured creditor, stands to recover all of the debt owing him since ultimately he would be able to foreclose on his mortgage. Theo’s total indebtedness is, according to his schedules, $375,000.00 and total assets are $181,000.00 including exemptions claimed of $16,000.00. Assets available for satisfaction of claims total at best $165,000.00 and priority and secured claims (including Will’s mortgage) total $219,000.00. Obviously, there will be nothing available for distribution to the unsecured creditors and Will, by virtue of having recorded the mortgage, stands to receive much more than if he had not received the transfer. 1

In sum, and based upon the foregoing analysis, the recording of the mortgage on June 5, 1990 was a preferential transfer avoidable under section 547.

2.

Will attempts to avoid this result by claiming to come within the “new value” exception of section 547(c)(1) and the “ordinary course of business” exception of section 547(c)(2).

Section 547(c)(1) provides that a transfer otherwise meeting the preference elements is not avoidable to the extent the transfer was:

(A) intended by the debtor and the creditor to or for whose benefit such transfer was made to be a contemporaneous exchange for new value given to the debt- or; and
(B) in fact a substantially contemporaneously exchange.

11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(1).

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Bluebook (online)
139 B.R. 472, 1991 Bankr. LEXIS 2071, 1991 WL 332754, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/drewes-v-vatnsdal-in-re-vatnsdal-ndb-1991.