Dressler v. City of Covington

158 S.E.2d 660, 208 Va. 520, 1968 Va. LEXIS 142
CourtSupreme Court of Virginia
DecidedJanuary 15, 1968
DocketRecord 6530
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 158 S.E.2d 660 (Dressler v. City of Covington) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dressler v. City of Covington, 158 S.E.2d 660, 208 Va. 520, 1968 Va. LEXIS 142 (Va. 1968).

Opinion

Eggleston, C. J.,

delivered the opinion of the court.

The City of Covington filed a petition in the court below seeking to condemn a part of the land of Ethel Frye Dressier and others for widening Alleghany Avenue, along which runs State Highway 220. *521 Commissioners were appointed and after they had heard the evidence and viewed the property they awarded the owners $10,550 for the value of the land taken and $150 for damages to the residue, or a total of $10,700. The lower court entered judgment on this award and the owners have appealed, claiming that the court erred in refusing to admit certain evidence offered by them and in refusing to grant an instruction requested by them.

The evidence shows that the Dresslers own a lot fronting about 116 feet on the eastern side of Alleghany Avenue, or State Highway 220, and running back between parallel lines to a depth of 219 feet along the northern line and 174 feet along the southern line. On this lot there was a two-story concrete block dwelling along the front of which ran a rock wall. In order to widen the street the city sought to condemn a strip of land about 40 feet wide across the front of the property. This necessitated that the dwelling and rock wall be torn down and a new dwelling erected in the rear of the site of the former dwelling and fronting on the newly improved street. Some trees and shrubs also had to be removed. The hearing with which we are concerned was held shortly after this new dwelling had been completed. The plans for the improvement show that a concrete sidewalk was to be constructed along the eastern side of the new street and in front of the property. The land between the front of the new dwelling and the sidewalk was to be graded and sodded.

The main controversy before the commissioners was whether the taking resulted in any damage to the residue of the property, and, if so, what amount should be awarded therefor. A witness for the city and three of the four witnesses for the property owners testified that the taking resulted in no damage to the residue. A single witness for the owners testified that there was a resulting damage.

Relative to the damage, if any, to the residue, one of the issues was whether it was necessary that a retaining wall be built across the front of the property between the new dwelling and the new sidewalk to replace the wall which was removed.

Joe Wingate, a witness for the city, and George Garten, one of the witnesses for the property owners, testified that the old wall was not in fact a retaining wall but was merely ornamental. The fair inference from their testimony is that a new retaining wall was not necessary. Wingate testified that a new retaining wall would not appreciably affect the fair market value of the property.

On the other hand, Calvin D. Dressier, a witness for the property *522 owners, testified that a new retaining wall was necessary and that unless it was constructed there would be a “steep incline” in front of the property and “you’d go right in the road.” He estimated that the difference in the value of the property with or without the wall “would be around $1500.”

O. E. Parker, a witness for the property owners, testified that unless the retaining wall were built there would be “quite a terrace” in front of the property. Garten testified that “possibly” such a new wall would affect the fair market value of the property.

During the examination of the witnesses Dressier and Parker, each was asked to state the cost of the erection of a retaining wall on the property. In each instance, the lower court sustained an objection to the question, because, it said, such an item was not recoverable in this proceeding; that the issue before the commissioners was the damage, if any, to the residue which should be measured by the difference in value, if any, between the property before and after the taking. 1 The refusal of the court to permit these witnesses to testify as to such cost is the subject of one of the main assignments of error.

[1] It is well settled that in determining the diminution of the market value of the land not taken or the damages thereto, it is proper to consider the expense made necessary by reason of the improvement in adjusting the property to the changed conditions brought about by the taking. 27 Am. Jur. 2d Eminent Domain § 314, p. 133; 29A C. J. S. Eminent Domain § 274, p. 1217; Long v. Shirley, 177 Va. 401, 415, 14 S. E. 2d 375, 381 (1941). However, such cost is not the measure of damages and cannot be recovered specifically. In other words, evidence of the actual cost of necessary improvements is admissible as a factor of evaluation, though not as a measure of damages. State v. Sanders, 128 W. Va. 321, 36 S. E. 2d 397, 400 (1945).

State v. Sanders, supra, involved a situation quite similar to that with which we are here concerned. It was there held that “the cost of a retaining wall, when necessary to protect the property from further damage and fit it for use and enjoyment, is a subordinate element of damages to be considered in applying the measure thereof,” but that such cost “is only an element tending to show damages, *523 is not the measure thereof, and cannot be recovered specifically.” 36 S. E. 2d at 400.

In the present case the issue of the necessity for the construction of the retaining wall was fully developed before and considered by the commissioners. They not only heard the conflicting evidence on the subject but went upon and viewed the property, and had the right to form their conclusions as the result of such view. Kornegay v. City of Richmond, 185 Va. 1013, 1024, 41 S. E. 2d 45, 50 (1947); Appalachian Elec. Power Co. v. Gorman, 191 Va. 344, 357, 358, 61 S. E. 2d 33, 40 (1950). In fixing the damages to the residue of the property at $150, the commissioners have manifestly rejected the testimony of Dressier that the retaining wall was necessary and that the difference in value of the property with or without the wall would be $1500. Apparently they were not impressed with the vague testimony of Parker as to the necessity for the wall. The commissioners have accepted the testimony of the witness for the city or concluded from their own view of the property that the retaining wall was not necessary or that failure to construct it would result in little damage to the residue.

Under the related circumstances we hold that the refusal of the lower court to permit the suggested evidence of the cost of constructing the wall was not prejudicial to the rights of the property owners. Viewed from their position such refusal, if error, was harmless. 2

[2] Complaint is next made of the refusal of the lower court to permit evidence as to the cost of cleaning up “the front yard of the property.” The record is silent as to why the necessity for cleaning up the property, the nature of the debris, whether it was left there as the result of the construction of the new dwelling or the improvement of the street, and who had the primary responsibility for removing it.

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Bluebook (online)
158 S.E.2d 660, 208 Va. 520, 1968 Va. LEXIS 142, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dressler-v-city-of-covington-va-1968.