Drake v. Onjukka

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedJuly 8, 2024
Docket2:24-cv-00249
StatusUnknown

This text of Drake v. Onjukka (Drake v. Onjukka) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Drake v. Onjukka, (E.D. Wis. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN ______________________________________________________________________________ VICTOR DRAKE, JR.,

Plaintiff, v. Case No. 24-cv-249-pp

TOMMY R. ONJUKKA,

Defendant. ______________________________________________________________________________

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING FILING FEE (DKT. NO. 6) AND SCREENING COMPLAINT UNDER 28 U.S.C. §1915A ______________________________________________________________________________

Plaintiff Victor Drake, Jr., who is incarcerated at Green Bay Correctional Institution and is representing himself, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that the defendant delayed necessary dental care. This decision resolves the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee, dkt. no. 6, and screens his complaint, dkt. no. 1. I. Motion for Leave to Proceed without Prepaying the Filing Fee (Dkt. No. 6)

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) applies to this case because the plaintiff was incarcerated when he filed his complaint. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(h). The PLRA lets the court allow an incarcerated plaintiff to proceed with without prepaying the civil case filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(2). When funds exist, the plaintiff must pay an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §1915(b)(1). He then must pay the balance of the $350 filing fee over time, through deductions from his prison trust account. Id. On May 21, 2024, the court ordered the plaintiff to pay an initial partial filing fee of $4.64. Dkt. No. 14. The court received that fee on June 11, 2024. The court will grant the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee and will require him to pay the remainder of the filing

fee over time in the manner explained at the end of this order. II. Screening the Complaint A. Federal Screening Standard Under the PLRA, the court must screen complaints brought by incarcerated persons seeking relief from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint if the incarcerated person raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b). In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the court applies the same standard that it applies when considering whether to dismiss a case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, 668 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2012)). To state a claim, a complaint must include

“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must contain enough facts, “accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and that whoever deprived him of this right was acting under the color of state law. D.S. v. E. Porter Cnty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. County of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). The court construes liberally complaints filed by plaintiffs who are representing themselves and holds such complaints to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cesal, 851 F.3d at 720

(citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015)). B. The Plaintiff’s Allegations The complaint names Tommy R. Onjukka as the only defendant. Dkt. No. 1 at 1. The complaint says that at the time of the events described in the complaint, Onjukka was an employee of the Wisconsin Department of Corrections, but it does not state his position. Id. at ¶7.1 The plaintiff sues him in his individual and official capacities. Id. at ¶8.

1 The plaintiff appears to have meant to explain what the defendant did for the DOC; the sentence says, “At all times relative to the claims made hereafter, the defendant was an employee of the WDOC and worked as the . . . .” Dkt. No. 1 at ¶7. The plaintiff appears to have neglected to complete the sentence. The complaint alleges that on August 11, 2023, the plaintiff filed a dental services request at Green Bay asking to be seen for a chipped and loose tooth that caused him pain and made it difficult to eat and sleep.2 Id. at ¶9. The dental services office responded that staff had scheduled an appointment, and

the plaintiff “was placed on an essential waiting list” on August 28, 2023. Id. at ¶¶10–11. The plaintiff says that “the max wait time” for those on the essential waiting list is eight weeks. Id. at ¶12. On January 2, 2024, the plaintiff “was seen by dental services and a tooth extraction was performed.” Id. ¶13. He says this was eighteen weeks after he was placed on the essential waiting list, ten weeks beyond the maximum waiting time. Id. at ¶¶13–14. He alleges that the extended wait caused him “prolonged excruciating and unbearable oral pain” and violated his rights

under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at ¶¶15, 19. The plaintiff asserts that he “has been and will continue to be irreparably injured by the acts and/or omissions of the defendant unless this court grants the relief sought.” Id. at ¶21. The plaintiff seeks declaratory judgment and a permanent injunction ordering the defendant “to implement procedures ensuring that persons placed on essential waiting lists for dental and other medical reasons are treated within the eight week timeframe set forth and mandated by WDOC policy.” Id.

at ¶22. He also seeks compensatory and punitive damages. Id.

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Drake v. Onjukka, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/drake-v-onjukka-wied-2024.