Drake v. Friedman
This text of 238 N.W.2d 210 (Drake v. Friedman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
The issue for decision is whether, as a matter of statutory construction, a court shall or shall not report to the commissioner of public safety a conviction for violation of Minn. St. 169.121, subd. 1, if the court stays imposition of sentence pursuant to § 169.121, subd. 6. Relevant parts of the statutes are stated below. 1 We hold that a conviction, where imposition of sentence is stayed, shall not be reported.
[3]*3Vicki Drake pled guilty in Hennepin County Municipal Court to two offenses of driving with more than .10 percent blood alcohol, and the court thereafter granted a stay of imposition of sentence. Drake thereupon brought this action in the Hennepin County District Court for declaratory and injunctive relief against defendant, administrator of the Hennepin County Municipal Court. The commissioner of public safety intervened in opposition. The district court granted the declaratory and in-junctive relief, prohibiting defendant administrator from making report to the commissioner of public safety. This appeal by the commissioner followed.
Minn. St. 169.95 and 171.16 require that within 10 days following a conviction of violating any law regulating the operation of motor vehicles, the court shall advise the commissioner of public safely of the conviction. 2 The last sentence of Minn. [4]*4St. 169.121, subd. 6, and Minn. St. 609.135, subd. 3, which were added by amendment, L. 1971, c. 244, provide that when the court grants a stay of execution of sentence the court shall also report such stay.3 No express provision is made with respect to reporting stays of imposition of sentence.
Read literally and without regard to any apparent legislative purpose, these statutes would do no more than require a report to the commissioner of all convictions and all stays of execution of sentence. But if this were true, L. 1971, c. 244, which did nothing except direct the court to report stays of execution of sentence to the commissioner, would have accomplished nothing. When the commissioner is notified of a driver’s conviction, it appears that he revokes the license of the convicted driver without regard to whether a stay of execution of sentence is granted. Minn. St. 171.17. Thus merely reporting the stay of execution to the commissioner would have no legal effect.
We are not prepared to hold that the legislature enacted this statute without any purpose. We think the legislative intent of L. 1971, c. 244, was to amend the reporting requirements to accomplish the following: (1) When a driver is convicted of violating Minn. St. 169.121 and sentence is imposed and executed, the court will of course report the conviction to the commissioner [5]*5of public safety; (2) when a driver is convicted and receives a stay of execution of sentence, the court shall report both the conviction and the stay of execution; but (3) when a driver is convicted and receives a stay of imposition of sentence, the court shall report neither the conviction nor the stay of imposition. Under this reporting scheme, the court may better tailor its disposition of each case to the particular situation presented.
We perceive a legislative purpose in these statutes, without expressing a judgment as to the wisdom of that purpose. On the one hand, as the district court observed, the conditional stay of imposition of sentences and the avoidance of the sanctions of a report to the commissioner of public safety may have the salutary effect of inducing the problem drinker or drug user to enlist in effective programs for correcting his or her underlying problems of alcohol or drug abuse. On the other hand, as the commissioner observes, it impairs the ability of his department to identify those who have repeated violations. Whether we misper-ceive the legislative intent or whether it is an experiment that may not live up to legislative expectations is, of course, for the legislature to decide.
Affirmed.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
238 N.W.2d 210, 307 Minn. 1, 1976 Minn. LEXIS 1392, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/drake-v-friedman-minn-1976.