Court of Appeals Tenth Appellate District of Texas
10-22-00282-CV
Dr. Leonard Bright, Appellant
v.
Texas A&M University, Appellee
On appeal from the 272nd District Court of Brazos County, Texas Judge John L. Brick, presiding Trial Court Cause No. 20-000811-CV-272
CHIEF JUSTICE JOHNSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Dr. Leonard Bright appeals from the trial court’s order granting Texas
A&M University’s plea to the jurisdiction. We will affirm.
I. Background
Dr. Bright is a tenured associate professor in the Department of Public
Service and Administration (PSAA) in the Bush School of Government and
Public Service at Texas A&M University (TAMU). In May 2018, Dr. Bright applied for promotion to full professor in the Bush School. His promotion
application was denied, and he filed suit against TAMU alleging causes of
action for racial discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment.
A. TAMU Promotion Process
TAMU University Rule 12.01.99.M2 University Statement on Academic
Freedom, Responsibility, Tenure, and Promotion sets out the policies for
promotion at TAMU. Section 4.4 of that Rule designates the categories of
performance as (1) teaching, (2) scholarship or research and its publication,
and (3) service. Section 4.4.2 of the Rule allows the faculty and administrators
of each college to develop written guidelines describing the evaluation criteria
employed in the unit consistent with TAMU criteria and procedures. Section
4.4.3.3 provides that in addition to criteria developed in the college, the
minimum requirements to be met by individuals being considered for
promotion to full professor are (1) continuing accomplishment in teaching,
(2) continuing accomplishment and some measure of national or international
recognition in research or another form of creative activity, and (3) evidence of
valuable professional service.
The Bush School at TAMU provided Submission Guidelines for those
seeking promotion. The Guidelines detail the required contents of the
candidate’s dossier as well as the multi-level review process. The dossier
includes documents submitted by the candidate, external peer-review letters,
Bright v. Texas A&M Univ. Page 2 and reports prepared by the various voting bodies—departmental promotion
and tenure committee, department head, college promotion and tenure
committee, and dean. The candidate submits a possible list of external
reviewers, and the P&T committee also provides a list of possible reviewers. A
group of at least seven external reviewers are selected. After receiving the
external reviews and the documents provided by the candidate, the review
process begins.
• The first level of review is the department P&T committee
recommendation. The department P&T committee reviews the
candidate’s dossier, creates a report, and then makes a
recommendation on whether or not to promote the candidate.
• The second level of review is by the department head who notifies
the candidate of the department P&T committee’s
recommendation. The department head reviews the dossier,
prepares a report, and then makes a recommendation. The
department head notifies the candidate upon submission of the
recommendation to the dean.
• The third level of review is by the college P&T committee. The
college P&T committee prepares a report and recommendation on
promotion. The college dean notifies the department head that the
Bright v. Texas A&M Univ. Page 3 college P&T committee has reached a decision, and the department
head notifies the candidate.
• The fourth level of review is by the dean of the college. The dean
reviews the dossier, prepares a report, and makes an independent
determination on the candidate’s promotion. The dean of the
college notifies the department head upon submission of the
recommendation to the Provost, and the department head notifies
the candidate.
• The fifth level of review is by the Provost. The Provost reviews the
dossier and makes a recommendation. The dean of faculties
notifies the department head who then notifies the candidate.
• The sixth level of review is by the President of TAMU who makes
the final determination on the candidate’s promotion. The
President notifies the Provost, who notifies the dean of faculties,
who notifies the college dean, who notifies the department head,
who then notifies the candidate.
B. Dr. Bright’s Promotion Process
Dr. Bright began working as a tenured associate professor at TAMU in
the PSAA Department at the Bush School of Government in 2011. In May
2018, he applied for promotion to full professor. The PSAA Department P&T
committee consisted of Dr. William Brown, Dr. Kent Portney, and Dr. William
Bright v. Texas A&M Univ. Page 4 West. According to Dr. Bright, his working relationship with Dr. West had
deteriorated years prior. Dr. Bright believed that Dr. West would recuse
himself from the PSAA P&T committee, but instead he was appointed to serve
as chair of the committee.
On December 20, 2018, Department Head Dr. Lori Taylor informed Dr.
Bright that the PSAA Department P&T committee unanimously voted against
promotion. When Dr. Bright asked the reason for the decision, Dr. Taylor
informed him that it was based upon his low research performance. The PSAA
Department P&T committee determined that Dr. Bright’s research record was
“thin” in comparison to others promoted to full professor. The committee noted
that Dr. Bright had fourteen peer-reviewed articles and only one had been
published in a journal targeted to the general field of public affairs. The
committee further stated that five of the seven articles Dr. Bright had
published since arriving at TAMU were not in important outlets for research.
According to Dr. Bright, Dr. Taylor suggested that he withdraw his application
for promotion. He declined to do so and perceived Dr. Taylor’s suggestion as a
threat.
On December 23, 2018, Dr. Bright complained to Dean Mark Welsh
about the recommendation to deny his promotion. Dr. Taylor conducted her
own review of Dr. Bright’s dossier and recommended against promotion to full
professor. Dr. Taylor noted that the criteria for promotion consisted of the
Bright v. Texas A&M Univ. Page 5 candidate’s performance in three areas: teaching, research, and service. Dr.
Taylor believed that research was the most determinative in qualifying for
promotion and that Dr. Bright’s performance in this category did not meet the
standard required for promotion to full professor. According to Dr. Taylor, Dr.
Bright’s early research and writing remains influential, but his work at the
Bush School was “neither similarly well-received nor particularly well-placed.”
On January 7, 2019, Dr. Bright filed a formal complaint of discrimination
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and on
January 17, 2019, he notified Dean Welsh of his EEOC complaint. Dr. Bright’s
complaint alleging discrimination was filed with TAMU’s Department of Civil
Rights and Equity Investigations which triggered an investigation into the
allegations and resulted in TAMU directing that Dr. Bright’s promotion
process be stopped pending the investigation. Following a five-month
investigation, TAMU’s Department of Civil Rights and Equity Investigations
found no evidence to support Dr. Bright’s allegations of discrimination, and the
promotion process resumed.
Dean Welsh recused himself from reviewing Dr. Bright’s promotion
application believing it was “the fairest thing to do.” Dean Welsh wanted to
have “someone with no exposure to the months of investigations, grievances,
and related communications” make a recommendation on Dr. Bright’s
promotion. The Bush College P&T committee reviewed Dr. Bright’s dossier,
Bright v. Texas A&M Univ. Page 6 and all four committee members determined that his research had not met the
standards for promotion to full professor. The interim dean appointed to serve
in place of Dean Welsh and the Provost also determined that Dr. Bright’s
research was not sufficient to qualify for promotion. The final determination
on Dr. Bright’s promotion to full professor was made by the President of TAMU
at the time, Dr. Michael Young. Dr. Young conducted his own independent
review of Dr. Bright’s promotion materials and decided against promotion. Dr.
Young concluded that “Dr. Bright’s scholarship did not yet merit promotion to
full professor.” Dr. Bright was informed on December 12, 2019, that Dr. Young
had denied his promotion application.
II. Procedural History
On March 18, 2020, Dr. Bright filed suit against TAMU alleging causes
of action for discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment in
violation of the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA). He alleged
that TAMU discriminated and retaliated against him based on his race,
retaliated against him for engaging in a protected activity of filing a
discrimination complaint, and put him in a hostile working environment.
TAMU filed a plea to the jurisdiction in which it argued that Dr. Bright (1) did
not exhaust his claims with the EEOC as required, (2) cannot make a prima
facia case for any of his claims, and (3) is seeking to challenge an academic
determination. Dr. Bright responded that he was not trying to undermine an
Bright v. Texas A&M Univ. Page 7 academic decision but rather challenging the process that was used by TAMU
in reviewing his application and applying the applicable standards. Dr. Bright
maintained that he was treated differently than his comparators and that the
different treatment was motivated by race. He further responded that there
were material issues of fact precluding TAMU’s plea to the jurisdiction. After
a hearing, the trial court granted TAMU’s plea to the jurisdiction. This appeal
followed.
III. Discussion
Dr. Bright argues in three issues that the trial court erred in granting
the plea to the jurisdiction because he administratively exhausted all of his
claims, satisfied his burden to make a prima facia case for discrimination,
retaliation, and hostile work environment, and that an evaluation of his claims
does not require the court to undermine an academic determination. In his
brief, Dr. Bright included Appendices A through P to support his arguments.
TAMU filed a Motion to Strike Appendices A through K because they were not
part of the appellate record. An appellate court may not consider matters
outside of the appellate record. In re Marriage of Roman and Gonzalez, No.
10-06-00023-CV, 2007 WL 1378493, at n.2 (Tex. App.—Waco May 9, 2007, no
pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Sabine Offshore Serv. v. Port Arthur, 595 S.W.2d 840,
841 (Tex.1979)). Attaching documents as exhibits or appendices to a brief is
not a formal inclusion in the record, and those documents cannot be considered.
Bright v. Texas A&M Univ. Page 8 Id. Therefore, because Appendices A through K were not included in the
appellate record, we grant TAMU’s motion and will not consider those
appendices in this appeal. See id.
A. Legal Principles
As a state university, TAMU is immune from suit absent an express
legislative waiver. See Tex. Tech Univ. Health Scis. Ctr. – El Paso v. Flores,
709 S.W.3d 500, 504 (Tex. 2024). Immunity from suit defeats a trial court’s
subject matter jurisdiction and is properly raised in a plea to the jurisdiction.
Tex. Dep’t of Parks and Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 225–26 (Tex.
2004). Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law
reviewed de novo. Id. at 226.
Customarily a plea to the jurisdiction challenges whether facts have
been alleged that affirmatively demonstrate the court’s jurisdiction to hear the
case. Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d 629, 635 (Tex.
2012). “When a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the pleadings, we determine
if the pleader has alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate the court’s
jurisdiction to hear the cause.” Ryder Integrated Logistics, Inc. v. Fayette
County, 453 S.W.3d 922, 927 (Tex. 2015) (per curiam). In conducting our
review, we construe the pleadings liberally in favor of the plaintiff and look to
the plaintiff's intent. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226. The plaintiff has the
burden to plead facts affirmatively showing the trial court has subject-matter
Bright v. Texas A&M Univ. Page 9 jurisdiction. Id. at 226. A court deciding a plea to the jurisdiction is not
required to look solely to the pleadings but may consider evidence and must do
so when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues raised. Bland Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 555 (Tex. 2000). If a plea to the jurisdiction
challenges jurisdictional facts, the court can consider evidence necessary to
resolve any dispute over those facts even though the facts implicate the merits
of the cause of action. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d at 635. In considering this evidence,
we “take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant” and “indulge every
reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor.”
Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228. If evidence does create a fact question on a
jurisdictional issue, the trial court cannot grant the plea to the jurisdiction. Id.
at 227–28. The fact issues will then need to be resolved by the finder of fact.
Id. at 228. However, if the relevant evidence is undisputed or fails to raise a
fact question on the jurisdictional issue, the trial court rules on the plea to the
jurisdiction as a matter of law. Id. If pleadings affirmatively negate the
existence of jurisdiction, then a plea may be granted without allowing an
opportunity to amend. Id. at 227.
Dr. Bright alleged causes of action for discrimination, retaliation, and
hostile work environment in violation of the TCHRA. Under the TCHRA, “an
employer commits an unlawful employment practice if because of race, color,
disability, religion, sex, national origin, or age the employer . . . discharges an
Bright v. Texas A&M Univ. Page 10 individual or discriminates in any other manner against an individual in
connection with compensation or the terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment.” Garcia, 372 S.W.3d at 633 (quoting TEX. LABOR CODE ANN.
§ 21.051). When a plaintiff fails to demonstrate a prima facia case of
discrimination under the TCHRA, the trial court has no jurisdiction, and the
claim should be dismissed. Id. at 637. Therefore, we must first determine
whether Dr. Bright demonstrated a prima facia case for his claims of
discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment.
B. Discrimination
To establish discrimination in violation of the TCHRA, Dr. Bright must
show that he was (1) a member of the class protected by the TCHRA,
(2) qualified for his employment position, (3) terminated by the employer, and
(4) treated less favorably than similarly situated members of the opposing
class. See AutoZone, Inc. v. Reyes, 272 S.W.3d 588, 592 (Tex. 2008). The
parties’ arguments focus on whether Dr. Bright was treated less favorably than
similarly situated comparators outside of his protected class.
Dr. Bright offered Dr. Taylor and Dr. Brown as comparators. The
question of whether Dr. Bright presented a prima facie case of racial
discrimination turns on whether either or both of them were similarly situated
to him. If Dr. Bright established this element of his prima facie discrimination
case, the burden shifts to TAMU to demonstrate that it had a legitimate
Bright v. Texas A&M Univ. Page 11 nondiscriminatory reason for denying Dr. Bright’s promotion. See Lee v.
Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 574 F.3d 253, 259 (5th Cir. 2009). Employees with
different supervisors, who work for different divisions of a company or who
were the subject of adverse employment actions too remote in time from that
taken against the plaintiff generally will not be deemed similarly situated. Id.
To prevail, Courts require that an employee who proffers a fellow employee as
a comparator demonstrate that the employment actions at issue were taken
“under nearly identical circumstances.” Id. at 260. The employment actions
being compared will be deemed to have been taken under nearly identical
circumstances when the employees being compared held the same job or
responsibilities, shared the same supervisor or had their employment status
determined by the same person, and have essentially comparable violation
histories. Id. TAMU argues that Dr. Bright is not similarly situated to Dr.
Taylor and Dr. Brown. We agree.
Dr. Taylor is an economist, and her field of study and expertise concerns
state and local public finance, especially education finance. In contrast, Dr.
Bright holds a Ph.D. and M.P.A. in Public Administration and a B.A. in
psychology. His field of study and expertise is public administration,
management, and public service motivation. It is generally accepted that
professors who work in different academic disciplines are not similarly
situated employees. See Chatha v. Prairie View A&M Univ., No. 4:14-CV-3234,
Bright v. Texas A&M Univ. Page 12 2016 WL 4543887, at *8 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 2016), report and recommendation
adopted sub. nom. Chatha v. Prairie View A&M Univ., No. 4:14-CV-3234 2016
WL 4557504 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 2016). Working in different academic
disciplines within a university typically requires distinctive skills, and so any
comparison for racial discrimination is inappropriate. Niemann v. University
of N. Tex., No. 4:17-CV-00206, 2018 WL 588273, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 29, 2018).
Dr. Bright argues on appeal that he and Dr. Taylor should have been subjected
to the same standards during their promotion reviews, but he offers no
evidence to show that they are similarly situated. He further offers no evidence
that he was subjected to different promotion standards than Dr. Taylor.
Dr. Brown is an organizational psychologist. His field of study concerns
serving, consulting, and studying nonprofit operations and management.
Although Dr. Bright and Dr. Brown are both in the Bush School of Government
and Public Service, they are in different academic disciplines. See Chatha,
2016 WL 4543887, at *8. In addition, the Bush School had a different dean
when Dr. Brown applied for promotion. Thus, Dr. Bright and Dr. Brown were
not similarly situated because they did not have the same supervisor at the
time they sought promotion. See Lee, 574 F.3d 253 at 260.
Dr. Bright maintains that he and Dr. Brown are similarly situated
because they research similar topics. He contends that Dr. Brown was not
subjected to the same standards during his promotion review because Dr.
Bright v. Texas A&M Univ. Page 13 Brown published less articles than he did while employed at TAMU. However,
Dr. Brown’s promotion records indicate that he had three papers in press or
draft form when he joined the Bush School in 2006. Since then, he has
published three joint articles. In addition, he published three other pieces. In
2010, he wrote a chapter in Handbook of Nonprofit Management & Leadership.
In 2014, the textbook he wrote, Strategic Management in Nonprofit
Organizations, was published. He also had a number of conference
presentations that sometimes get converted into published manuscripts. Dr.
Bright has not shown that Dr. Brown was deficient in research and scholarship
or that he was subjected to different standards in the promotion process.
The PSAA Department P&T committee determined that Dr. Bright’s
research record was “thin” in comparison to others promoted to full professor.
The PSAA Department P&T committee also determined that Dr. Bright’s
articles published since arriving at TAMU were not in important outlets for
research. Courts are ill equipped to evaluate the academic judgment of
professors and universities. Tex. S. Univ. v. Villereal, 620 S.W.3d 899, 907
(Tex. 2021). Therefore, we will not evaluate what constitutes an important
outlet for research. Dr. Bright states that he is not asking the Court to compare
the quality of his research to that of Dr. Brown’s, nor is he asking the Court to
determine what journals are more valuable. Rather, he contends that he is
claiming TAMU followed the Department’s bylaws when determining whether
Bright v. Texas A&M Univ. Page 14 to promote Dr. Brown but deviated from the bylaws when evaluating his
promotion dossier. The only evidence Dr. Bright offered in support of this
argument is a comparison of his and Dr. Brown’s publications. The parties
agree that the bylaws do not require a minimum number of citations, but state
that quality should be valued above sheer number.
The record shows that Dr. Bright’s promotion application was measured
against the PSAA Department Bylaws and that his research did not meet the
standard required for promotion to full professor. The record does not support
Dr. Bright’s argument that Dr. Taylor and Dr. Brown were similarly situated
comparators or that Dr. Bright was treated less favorably than Dr. Taylor and
Dr. Brown. We conclude that Dr. Bright did not demonstrate a prima facia
case for his claim of discrimination.
C. Retaliation
To establish a prima facia case for retaliation, Dr. Bright must show that
(1) he engaged in an activity protected by the Texas Commission on Human
Rights Act, (2) an adverse employment action occurred, and (3) there exists a
causal link between the protected activity and the adverse action. Exxon
Mobile Corp. v. Rincones, 520 S.W.3d 572, 585 (Tex. 2017). Dr. Bright contends
that TAMU has taken several adverse employment actions against him
including (1) allowing Dr. West to remain chair of his promotion review
committee, (2) Dean Welsh recusing himself from the promotion process,
Bright v. Texas A&M Univ. Page 15 (3) Dr. Taylor giving him an unfavorable performance review, and (4) denying
his promotion application.
For purposes of discrimination, the TCHRA only addresses ultimate
employment decisions; it does not address every decision made by employers
that arguably might have some tangential effect upon employment decisions.
Navy v. Coll. Of Mainland, 407 S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist. 2013, no pet.) Generally, ultimate employment actions involve hiring,
granting leave, discharging, promoting, and compensation, but not “events
such as disciplinary filings, supervisor’s reprimands, and even poor
performance by the employee—anything which might jeopardize employment
in the future.” Id. (quoting Mattern v. Eastman Kodak, Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707–
08 (5th Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by Burlington Ne. & Sante Fe
Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006)). Dr.
Bright’s complaints that Dr. West remained on the PSAA Department P&T
Committee, that Dean Welsh recused himself, and that Dr. Taylor gave him a
poor performance review are not ultimate employment decisions. See Navy,
407 S.W.3d at 899. Dr. Bright argues that “courts are not supposed to address
each action independently, but in the larger context of the plaintiff’s
employment as a whole.” However, he does not provide any authority for this
argument.
Bright v. Texas A&M Univ. Page 16 Moreover, there is nothing in the record to support Dr. Bright’s
argument that TAMU retaliated against him by allowing Dr. West to remain
chair of his promotion review committee or by Dean Welsh recusing himself.
While Dr. Bright explained that he did not have a good working relationship
with Dr. West, there is nothing to show that Dr. West remaining on the
promotion review committee was in retaliation for Dr. Bright filing a
discrimination complaint.
Dr. Bright stated that Dr. Welsh’s decision to recuse himself from the
promotion process intentionally harmed his promotion application and caused
him humiliation. Dean Welsh explained that he was disappointed in Dr.
Bright’s communication with TAMU staff and administrators about his
allegations of discrimination and the processes to consider them. Dean Welsh
believed the “fairest thing to do was to give Dr. Bright the benefit of the doubt,
recuse [himself] and have someone with no exposure to the months of
investigations, grievances, and related communications focus solely on the
material in the promotion portfolio” make a recommendation on Dr. Bright’s
promotion. While the record supports a finding that Dean Welsh’s recusal was
in response to Dr. Bright’s discrimination complaints, it does not support a
finding that it was in retaliation for the discrimination complaint.
Dr. Taylor’s performance evaluation noted that his research was “less
than is expected” from an associate professor. Dr. Taylor gave Dr. Bright a
Bright v. Texas A&M Univ. Page 17 favorable review on his teaching and service. There is no evidence that Dr.
Taylor’s performance review was in retaliation for his discrimination
complaint. Rather, it is consistent with multiple reviews of his research during
the promotion process.
As to Dr. Bright’s claim that his promotion was denied in retaliation for
filing a discrimination complaint, he filed a complaint with Dean Welsh and
the EEOC after the PSAA Department P&T committee recommended against
his promotion. Therefore, there was no retaliation by the PSAA Department
P&T committee. Dr. Bright maintains that it is misleading to state that he
made his EEOC complaint after his promotion was recommended to be denied
because TAMU uses a multi-level decision making process in conducting
promotion reviews.
Dr. Bright’s promotion application followed the TAMU promotion
process of a multi-level review. There is nothing in the record to affirmatively
show that any of the reviewers were aware of Dr. Bright’s EEOC complaint.
The decision on promotion ultimately rested with Dr. Young, the President of
TAMU. In order to establish the causation prong of a retaliation claim, the
employee should demonstrate that the employer knew about the employee’s
protected activity. Manning v. Chevron Chem. Co.., LLC, 332 F.3d 874, 883
(5th Cir. 2003). There is nothing in the record to show that Dr. Young was
aware of Dr. Bright’s EEOC complaint. In addition, each level of independent
Bright v. Texas A&M Univ. Page 18 review reached the same conclusion—Dr. Bright’s research did not meet the
standard required for a full professor. We conclude that Dr. Bright did not
demonstrate a prima facia case for his claim of retaliation.
D. Hostile Work Environment
TAMU argues that Dr. Bright failed to preserve this claim because he
did not include it in his EEOC charge. We agree.
Before a plaintiff can maintain a suit for employment discrimination
under the TCHRA, the plaintiff first must file a charge of employment
discrimination with the TWC or EEOC. Alief Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Brantley, 558
S.W.3d 747, 755 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist. 2018, pet. denied). The Texas
Labor Code requires that a plaintiff file an EEOC complaint within 180 days
of the alleged discriminatory act. See TEX. LABOR CODE ANN. §§21.201–02. A
lawsuit under the TCHRA is limited to claims made in the EEOC charge and
factually related claims that can reasonably be expected to grow out of the
investigation. Alief Indep. Sch. Dist., 558 S.W.3d at 756.
Dr. Bright responds that he preserved this complaint because he checked
the box on the EEOC charge of discrimination form indicating that the
discrimination was ongoing. In Alief Indep. Sch. Dist., the plaintiff alleged for
the first time in his amended petition acts that contributed to a hostile work
environment. Id. The Court reasoned that even though the plaintiff did not
mention the specific acts in his EEOC charge, the charge included an adequate
Bright v. Texas A&M Univ. Page 19 factual basis to put the school district on notice that the plaintiff was
complaining of discrimination based upon his race and gender resulting in a
hostile work environment. Id. However, unlike the plaintiff in Alief Indep.
Sch. Dist., Dr. Bright did not allege any factual basis concerning a hostile work
environment. Dr. Bright only asserted allegations that TAMU denied his
promotion based upon his race and that he was retaliated against for engaging
in a protected activity. He made no allegation of a hostile work environment.
While he checked the box indicating ongoing discrimination, he did not allege
any facts to show a hostile work environment. Because he did not include a
hostile work environment allegation in his EEOC charge, Dr. Bright did not
exhaust his administrative remedy for this complaint and has not preserved
this complaint for review. See id.
Moreover, even if he had preserved his complaint for review, he did not
establish a prima facia case of a hostile work environment. A hostile work
environment claim “entails ongoing harassment, based on the plaintiff’s
protected characteristic, so sufficiently severe or pervasive that it has altered
the conditions of employment and created an abusive working environment.”
Donaldson v. Tex. Dep’t of Aging and Disability Servs., 495 S.W.3d 421, 445
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied) (quoting Bartosh v. Sam
Houston State Univ., 259 S.W.3d 317, 324 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 2008, pet.
denied)). To demonstrate a prima facie case of hostile work environment, a
Bright v. Texas A&M Univ. Page 20 plaintiff must show that: “(1) he belongs to a protected group; (2) he was
subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment complained of was
based on the protected characteristic; (4) the harassment complained of
affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment; and (5) the employer
knew or should have known of the harassment in question and failed to take
prompt remedial action.” Id. To satisfy the fourth element of a hostile
environment claim, a plaintiff must show that the workplace was permeated
with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult sufficiently severe or
pervasive to create a hostile or abusive working environment. Id.
Dr. Bright contends that several instances of discriminatory and
retaliatory behavior made his work environment at TAMU hostile including
allowing Dr. West to chair the promotion committee, Dean Welsh recusing
himself from the promotion review process, and the denial of his promotion.
However, he does not identify any acts that show his workplace was
“permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult sufficiently
severe” so as to create a hostile or abusive working environment. See id.
Accordingly, Dr. Bright has not demonstrated a prima facie case for his claim
of a hostile work environment.
Bright v. Texas A&M Univ. Page 21 IV. Conclusion
Having considered all of Dr. Bright’s complaints on appeal, we overrule
each of his three issues. We affirm the trial court’s order granting TAMU’s plea
to the jurisdiction.
MATT JOHNSON Chief Justice
OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: June 26, 2025 Before Chief Justice Johnson, Justice Smith, and Justice Harris Affirmed; motion granted CV06
Bright v. Texas A&M Univ. Page 22