RENDERED: JUNE 20, 2025; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2024-CA-0631-MR
DR. ELIZABETH L. ROGERS APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE LUCY A. VANMETER, JUDGE ACTION NO. 24-CI-00996
LEXINGTON-FAYETTE URBAN COUNTY BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT AND ITS MEMBERS, BOB J. STURDIVANT; CAROLYN J. PLUMLEE; CHAD T. WALKER; LINDA TUCKER; P. BRANDEN GROSS; RAQUEL E. CARTER; AND W. HARRY CLARKE, IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES APPELLEES
OPINION AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CALDWELL, CETRULO, AND ECKERLE, JUDGES.
CETRULO, JUDGE: Dr. Elizabeth Rogers (“Rogers”) appeals from an order of
the Fayette Circuit Court dismissing her complaint/appeal regarding a zoning
decision made by the Lexington-Fayette Urban County Board of Adjustment (the “Board”). After review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the circuit
court’s order.
BACKGROUND
The relevant facts of this case are not in dispute. Rogers owns the
subject property with her husband, Kenneth Rogers (“Kenneth”), in Lexington,
Fayette County, Kentucky. In January 2024, Rogers applied for a conditional use
permit to operate an unhosted short-term rental at the subject property. On
February 12, 2024, the Board denied Rogers’s application.
Subsequently, Rogers filed a complaint/appeal against the Board
pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statute (“KRS”) 100.347, in the Fayette County
Circuit Court. On March 26, 2024, the Board moved to dismiss the complaint/
appeal due to Rogers’s failure to make Kenneth a party pursuant to KRS
100.347(4), which resulted in a failure to timely perfect the statutory appeal and
deprived the circuit court of jurisdiction. The circuit court agreed with the Board
and entered an order dismissing Rogers’s complaint/appeal. Rogers appealed to
this Court.
ANALYSIS
“The question of jurisdiction is ordinarily one of law, meaning that the
standard of review to be applied is de novo.” Harrison v. Park Hills Bd. of
Adjustment, 330 S.W.3d 89, 93 (Ky. App. 2011) (quoting Appalachian Reg’l
-2- Healthcare, Inc. v. Coleman, 239 S.W.3d 49, 53-54 (Ky. 2007)) (emphasis added).
Kentucky courts “acknowledge the authority of the General Assembly to prescribe
by statute the procedures for seeking and securing judicial review of an
administrative ruling. Out of deference to that authority, we require strict
compliance with the statutory procedures.” Isaacs v. Caldwell, 530 S.W.3d 449,
453 (Ky. 2017) (citing Triad Dev./Alta Glyne, Inc. v. Gellhaus, 150 S.W.3d 43, 47
(Ky. 2004)). “The right to appeal the decision of an administrative agency to a
court is a matter of legislative grace.” Kenton Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment v. Meitzen,
607 S.W.3d 586, 593 (Ky. 2020) (quoting Nickell v. Diversicare Mgmt. Servs., 336
S.W.3d 454, 456 (Ky. 2011)). “Consequently, the failure to follow the statutory
guidelines for such an appeal is fatal.” Id. (quoting Gellhaus, 150 S.W.3d at 47)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Likewise, statutory interpretation “is a matter of law” that we review
de novo. Monumental Life Ins. Co. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 294 S.W.3d 10, 19 (Ky.
App. 2008) (citing Commonwealth v. Garnett, 8 S.W.3d 573, 575-76 (Ky. App.
1999)). “[T]he plain meaning of the statutory language is presumed to be what the
legislature intended, and if the meaning is plain, then the court cannot base its
interpretation on any other method or source.” Maysey v. Express Servs., Inc., 620
S.W.3d 63, 71 (Ky. 2021) (quoting Univ. of Louisville v. Rothstein, 532 S.W.3d
644, 648 (Ky. 2017)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
-3- Rogers argues that the circuit court erred in dismissing her
complaint/appeal because, while Kenneth is an owner of the subject property, KRS
100.347(4) only required an owner to “be made part[y] to the appeal.”
Conversely, the Board argues that KRS 100.347(4) required Rogers to make
Kenneth a party in the complaint, and her failure to strictly comply with this
provision deprived the circuit court of jurisdiction. We agree with the Board.
Failure to “strictly comply with a statute in taking an administrative
appeal” deprives a court of particular-case jurisdiction. Louisville Hist. League,
Inc. v. Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov’t, 709 S.W.3d 213, 223-24 (Ky. 2025)
(citations omitted).1 A party must perfect an appeal from a “final action of a board
of adjustment” within 30 days. KRS 100.347(1). Further, the statute mandates
that “the owner of the subject property and applicants who initiated the proceeding
shall be made parties to the appeal.” KRS 100.347(4) (emphasis added).
Here, there is no dispute that the Board filed its motion, and the circuit
court entered its order after the 30-day window for Rogers to perfect her appeal
elapsed. Thus, the only question before us is whether KRS 100.347(4) requires
Kenneth, also a recorded owner of the subject property, to be named as an
1 We note that the circuit court’s order stated it was deprived of subject matter jurisdiction. In its recent analysis of KRS 100.347(1), our Supreme Court made clear that, when a party does not strictly comply with the procedures in the statute enabling the administrative appeal, the “errors in the procedural invocation of a court’s jurisdiction [] relate to particular-case jurisdiction, not general subject-matter jurisdiction.” Id. at 224 (citations omitted).
-4- indispensable party in the action. While we can find no authority directly on point,
we find Harrison v. Park Hills Bd. of Adjustment, instructive.
In Harrison, the appellants failed to name all the “applicants who
initiated the proceeding” in their KRS 100.347 action. 330 S.W.3d at 92-95. The
appellees filed a motion to dismiss based “on the appellants’ failure to name” all
the initiating applicants and, thus, their failure to strictly comply with KRS
100.347(4). Id. at 92. This failure, the appellees argued, deprived the circuit court
of jurisdiction. Id. The circuit court agreed and dismissed the complaint/appeal.
Id. at 92-93. On appeal, this Court held that the appellants’ failure to make all the
initiating applicants parties to the complaint/appeal constituted a failure to strictly
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RENDERED: JUNE 20, 2025; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2024-CA-0631-MR
DR. ELIZABETH L. ROGERS APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE LUCY A. VANMETER, JUDGE ACTION NO. 24-CI-00996
LEXINGTON-FAYETTE URBAN COUNTY BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT AND ITS MEMBERS, BOB J. STURDIVANT; CAROLYN J. PLUMLEE; CHAD T. WALKER; LINDA TUCKER; P. BRANDEN GROSS; RAQUEL E. CARTER; AND W. HARRY CLARKE, IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES APPELLEES
OPINION AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CALDWELL, CETRULO, AND ECKERLE, JUDGES.
CETRULO, JUDGE: Dr. Elizabeth Rogers (“Rogers”) appeals from an order of
the Fayette Circuit Court dismissing her complaint/appeal regarding a zoning
decision made by the Lexington-Fayette Urban County Board of Adjustment (the “Board”). After review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the circuit
court’s order.
BACKGROUND
The relevant facts of this case are not in dispute. Rogers owns the
subject property with her husband, Kenneth Rogers (“Kenneth”), in Lexington,
Fayette County, Kentucky. In January 2024, Rogers applied for a conditional use
permit to operate an unhosted short-term rental at the subject property. On
February 12, 2024, the Board denied Rogers’s application.
Subsequently, Rogers filed a complaint/appeal against the Board
pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statute (“KRS”) 100.347, in the Fayette County
Circuit Court. On March 26, 2024, the Board moved to dismiss the complaint/
appeal due to Rogers’s failure to make Kenneth a party pursuant to KRS
100.347(4), which resulted in a failure to timely perfect the statutory appeal and
deprived the circuit court of jurisdiction. The circuit court agreed with the Board
and entered an order dismissing Rogers’s complaint/appeal. Rogers appealed to
this Court.
ANALYSIS
“The question of jurisdiction is ordinarily one of law, meaning that the
standard of review to be applied is de novo.” Harrison v. Park Hills Bd. of
Adjustment, 330 S.W.3d 89, 93 (Ky. App. 2011) (quoting Appalachian Reg’l
-2- Healthcare, Inc. v. Coleman, 239 S.W.3d 49, 53-54 (Ky. 2007)) (emphasis added).
Kentucky courts “acknowledge the authority of the General Assembly to prescribe
by statute the procedures for seeking and securing judicial review of an
administrative ruling. Out of deference to that authority, we require strict
compliance with the statutory procedures.” Isaacs v. Caldwell, 530 S.W.3d 449,
453 (Ky. 2017) (citing Triad Dev./Alta Glyne, Inc. v. Gellhaus, 150 S.W.3d 43, 47
(Ky. 2004)). “The right to appeal the decision of an administrative agency to a
court is a matter of legislative grace.” Kenton Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment v. Meitzen,
607 S.W.3d 586, 593 (Ky. 2020) (quoting Nickell v. Diversicare Mgmt. Servs., 336
S.W.3d 454, 456 (Ky. 2011)). “Consequently, the failure to follow the statutory
guidelines for such an appeal is fatal.” Id. (quoting Gellhaus, 150 S.W.3d at 47)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Likewise, statutory interpretation “is a matter of law” that we review
de novo. Monumental Life Ins. Co. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 294 S.W.3d 10, 19 (Ky.
App. 2008) (citing Commonwealth v. Garnett, 8 S.W.3d 573, 575-76 (Ky. App.
1999)). “[T]he plain meaning of the statutory language is presumed to be what the
legislature intended, and if the meaning is plain, then the court cannot base its
interpretation on any other method or source.” Maysey v. Express Servs., Inc., 620
S.W.3d 63, 71 (Ky. 2021) (quoting Univ. of Louisville v. Rothstein, 532 S.W.3d
644, 648 (Ky. 2017)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
-3- Rogers argues that the circuit court erred in dismissing her
complaint/appeal because, while Kenneth is an owner of the subject property, KRS
100.347(4) only required an owner to “be made part[y] to the appeal.”
Conversely, the Board argues that KRS 100.347(4) required Rogers to make
Kenneth a party in the complaint, and her failure to strictly comply with this
provision deprived the circuit court of jurisdiction. We agree with the Board.
Failure to “strictly comply with a statute in taking an administrative
appeal” deprives a court of particular-case jurisdiction. Louisville Hist. League,
Inc. v. Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov’t, 709 S.W.3d 213, 223-24 (Ky. 2025)
(citations omitted).1 A party must perfect an appeal from a “final action of a board
of adjustment” within 30 days. KRS 100.347(1). Further, the statute mandates
that “the owner of the subject property and applicants who initiated the proceeding
shall be made parties to the appeal.” KRS 100.347(4) (emphasis added).
Here, there is no dispute that the Board filed its motion, and the circuit
court entered its order after the 30-day window for Rogers to perfect her appeal
elapsed. Thus, the only question before us is whether KRS 100.347(4) requires
Kenneth, also a recorded owner of the subject property, to be named as an
1 We note that the circuit court’s order stated it was deprived of subject matter jurisdiction. In its recent analysis of KRS 100.347(1), our Supreme Court made clear that, when a party does not strictly comply with the procedures in the statute enabling the administrative appeal, the “errors in the procedural invocation of a court’s jurisdiction [] relate to particular-case jurisdiction, not general subject-matter jurisdiction.” Id. at 224 (citations omitted).
-4- indispensable party in the action. While we can find no authority directly on point,
we find Harrison v. Park Hills Bd. of Adjustment, instructive.
In Harrison, the appellants failed to name all the “applicants who
initiated the proceeding” in their KRS 100.347 action. 330 S.W.3d at 92-95. The
appellees filed a motion to dismiss based “on the appellants’ failure to name” all
the initiating applicants and, thus, their failure to strictly comply with KRS
100.347(4). Id. at 92. This failure, the appellees argued, deprived the circuit court
of jurisdiction. Id. The circuit court agreed and dismissed the complaint/appeal.
Id. at 92-93. On appeal, this Court held that the appellants’ failure to make all the
initiating applicants parties to the complaint/appeal constituted a failure to strictly
comply with the mandatory procedures of KRS 100.347(4), and we affirmed the
circuit court’s dismissal of that complaint/appeal. Id. at 95-97.
Here, both Rogers and the Board point us to KRS 446.020(1) for the
proposition that “[a] word importing the singular number only may extend and be
applied to several persons or things, as well as to one (1) person or thing[.]”
Rogers argues that because KRS 100.347(4) uses the phrase “the owner,” KRS
446.020(1) supports her position that only a singular owner party was required to
strictly comply with KRS 100.347(4). However, she does not point us to, and we
have not found, any authority that would persuade us to interpret the provisions of
KRS 100.347 in this manner. To the contrary, Rogers’s brief asserts that “[t]he
-5- legislature’s intent behind KRS § 100.347 is clear: the applicant, property owner,
and board of adjustment must all receive notice of administrative appeals.” We
agree with this statement, but point out that because Kenneth also owned the
subject property, the intent was that he would receive notice of an administrative
appeal involving his property, and thus, this statement cuts against Rogers’s
argument.2
The Board argues that KRS 446.020(1) enables the phrase “the
owner” to encompass all owners of property subject to a KRS 100.347 action. In
light of this Court’s decision in Harrison and the plain language of the statute, we
agree.
If the legislature intended to limit the requirements of KRS
100.347(4) to only necessitate one owner, then surely it would have elected to use
a word akin to an, rather than the. Here, Rogers was an owner of the subject
property, and Kenneth was also an owner of the subject property; thus, the owners
were Rogers and Kenneth. As such, the plain language of KRS 100.347(4)
mandated that Kenneth be made a party to Rogers’s complaint/appeal. See
Maysey, 620 S.W.3d at 71 (citation omitted). Although KRS 100.347(4) imports
2 We also note that not all joint property owners are married couples, and not all married couples that jointly own property live together or regularly communicate with each other. Therefore, Rogers’s desire for us to treat her and “her husband as a single legal unit for the purposes of this case” asks us to create spousal carveout for KRS 100.347(4) that would cut against the legislature’s intent, and for which she has provided no authoritative support.
-6- the singular phrase “the owner,” that singular phrase may apply to several owners.
See KRS 446.020(1). Rogers failed to timely make Kenneth a party to the
complaint/appeal and, thus, failed to strictly comply with KRS 100.347(4). This
was fatal to her appeal to the circuit court. See Harrison, 330 S.W.3d at 96.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the order of the Fayette Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Patrick T. Eavenson Brittany Griffin Smith Lexington, Kentucky Lexington, Kentucky
-7-