DR. DAVID M. SABATINI v. DR. KRISTIN A. KNOUSE, & Others

CourtMassachusetts Superior Court
DecidedApril 21, 2023
Docket22-1449-BLS1
StatusPublished

This text of DR. DAVID M. SABATINI v. DR. KRISTIN A. KNOUSE, & Others (DR. DAVID M. SABATINI v. DR. KRISTIN A. KNOUSE, & Others) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
DR. DAVID M. SABATINI v. DR. KRISTIN A. KNOUSE, & Others, (Mass. Ct. App. 2023).

Opinion

SUPERIOR COURT

DR. DAVID M. SABATINI Plaintiff vs. DR. KRISTIN A. KNOUSE, & others[1] Defendants

Docket: 22-1449-BLS1
Dates: February 17, 2023
Present: Peter B. Krupp Justice of the Superior Court
County: SUFFOLK, ss.
Keywords: MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON MOTION FOR IMPOUNDMENT OF CONFIDENTIAL INVESTIGATION REPORT

            Dr. David M. Sabatini (“Sabatini”) brings claims for defamation and tortious interference with employment and other advantageous relationships against Dr. Kristin A. Knouse (“Knouse”), the Whitehead Institute for Biomedical Research (“the Whitehead”), and its director, Dr. Ruth Lehmann (“Lehmann”).2 The case follows a 2021 investigation of Sabatini and his laboratory at the Whitehead by an outside law firm, Hinkley, Allen & Snyder, LLP (“HAS”).

            The HAS report to the Whitehead dated August 13, 2021 (“the HAS Report”) allegedly led to Sabatini losing his laboratory at the Whitehead, his tenured position at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (“MIT”), his position with the Howard Hughes Medical Institute (“HHMI”), and a variety of other professional affiliations.

            The case is before me on the Whitehead Defendants’ motion to impound the HAS Report, which the Whitehead Defendants submitted in support of their motion to dismiss under

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            [1]Whitehead Institute for Biomedical Research and Dr. Ruth Lehmann.

[2]The Whitehead and Lehmann are together referred to herein as “the Whitehead Defendants.”

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the Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute, G.L. c. 231, § 59H. The Whitehead Defendants’ motion asserts (at page 2), without citation to authority, that HAS conducted a “privileged and confidential workplace investigation,” and (at page 3) urges impoundment of the HAS Report “to protect the identities of those who participated in the [workplace] investigation” conducted by HAS “and the private and sensitive information they shared.” For the following reasons, the motion to impound is denied.

DISCUSSION

            Under Rule 7(a) of the Massachusetts Uniform Rules of Impoundment Procedure, a court “may enter an order of impoundment for good cause shown.” To assess “good cause,” the court is directed to “consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, (i) the nature of the parties and the controversy, (ii) the type of information and the privacy interests involved, (iii) the extent of community interest, (iv) constitutional rights, and (v) the reason(s) for the request.” Unif. R. Impound. P. 7(b). Accord New England Internet Café, LLC v. Clerk of the Superior Court for Criminal Business in Suffolk County, 462 Mass. 76, 83 (2012). Massachusetts overwhelmingly favors a right of access to case records. Id. at 82-83. Therefore, “impoundment is always the exception to the rule, and the power to deny public access to judicial records is to be ‘strictly construed in favor of the general principle of publicity.’” Republican Co. v. Appeals Court, 442 Mass. 218, 223 (2004), quoting Commonwealth v. Blondin, 324 Mass. 564, 571 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 984 (1950).

            The Whitehead Defendants do not contend that the HAS Report is covered by any statutory or common law privilege. They do not cite any statute or other authority under which the HAS Report could be construed as privileged, nor have I found any such citation in the HAS Report itself. Although they describe the HAS Report as the fruits of the Whitehead’s workplace

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investigation, they do not allege that the investigatory privilege, which applies to government or criminal investigations, applies in this context. See District Attorney for Norfolk Dist. v. Flatley, 419 Mass. 507, 512-513 (1995); Bougas v. Chief of Police of Lexington, 371 Mass. 59, 62 (1976).

            While the HAS Report’s cover page states it is “ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED CONFIDENTIAL,” it is unclear if the attorney-client privilege ever covered all or some of the HAS Report. The HAS Report largely collects reports by various witnesses, no differently than if the Whitehead had conducted the investigation in-house or had hired a private investigation firm to do the investigation. Assuming, however, that the report was, at least initially, covered by the attorney-client privilege (HAS was hired by the Whitehead, synthesized information it gathered, and reported to the Whitehead), that privilege was forfeited or waived when the Whitehead purposefully disseminated the HAS Report beyond its institution. See Comm’r of Revenue v. Comcast Corp., 453 Mass. 293, 306 (2009) (“Disclosing attorney-client communications to a third party . . . generally undermines the privilege.”). See also, e.g., Brauner v. Valley, 101 Mass. App. Ct. 61, 72 (2022) (attorney-client privilege waived when shared with person not protected under common interest doctrine).[3]

            Further, although the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination has promulgated guidelines for certain workplace investigations, even its guidelines, upon which the Whitehead Defendants rely, suggests only that an investigation should be conducted in a way to

[3]The Whitehead also does not and could not contend that its disclosures of the HAS Report were all covered by the “derivative attorney-client privilege,” which is “sharply limited in scope” and applies only when the disclosure was “nearly indispensable” or served “some specialized purpose” in furthering the attorney-client privilege. DaRosa v. New Bedford, 471 Mass. 446, 463 (2015) (internal citations omitted).

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maintain confidentiality “to the extent practicable under the circumstances.” Strict confidentiality cannot be assured.

            Here, the Whitehead has already taken steps to protect the identity of the individuals who spoke to the HAS investigators. In the anonymized form of the HAS Report that is before me, the names of the individuals who were interviewed by HAS have been replaced with anonymous role descriptors (e.g. “Postdoc 6,” “Whitehead Faculty 2,” or “MIT Graduate Student 19”). The Whitehead does not explain how the anonymized form of the HAS Report would not adequately protect the identities of the individuals who spoke to the HAS investigators.

            More importantly in this situation, to protect confidentiality the party in possession of the information must take steps to make sure the information remains confidential. As the Supreme Judicial Court has held, “whether the information sought to be protected is . . . confidential . . . depends on the conduct of the parties and the nature of the information.” Jet Spray Cooler, Inc. v. Crampton, 361 Mass. 835, 840 (1972) (in trade secrets context, one factor bearing on whether information should be protected as confidential by court is “the extent of measures taken by the employer to guard the secrecy of the information”).

            The Whitehead did not adequately guard the confidentiality of the HAS Report.

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DR. DAVID M. SABATINI v. DR. KRISTIN A. KNOUSE, & Others, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dr-david-m-sabatini-v-dr-kristin-a-knouse-others-masssuperct-2023.