Doyle v. Kaar Construction, No. Cv99-0497202s (Apr. 1, 2002)

2002 Conn. Super. Ct. 4827
CourtConnecticut Superior Court
DecidedApril 1, 2002
DocketNo. CV99-0497202S
StatusUnpublished

This text of 2002 Conn. Super. Ct. 4827 (Doyle v. Kaar Construction, No. Cv99-0497202s (Apr. 1, 2002)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Doyle v. Kaar Construction, No. Cv99-0497202s (Apr. 1, 2002), 2002 Conn. Super. Ct. 4827 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002).

Opinion

[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.]

RULING ON DEFENDANT MFA STONE MASON CONTRACTING, INC.'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
I
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The plaintiff, Thomas Doyle, filed a three count revised complaint sounding in negligence against the defendants, Kaar Construction Management Services, LLC, d/b/a Operation Safe Site, Marko Karr d/b/a Operation Safe Site, The Cleaning Connection, Inc., Michael Farrell d/b/a The Cleaning Connection, Inc., and MFA Stone Mason Contracting, Inc. (MFA), on December 14, 1999, seeking recovery for the injuries he suffered when a wooden plank, used as part of a scaffolding, snapped while he was working on it. The third count of the complaint, which is the subject of this opinion, is directed against MFA. The plaintiff alleges that on or about August 4, 1997, MFA erected scaffolding, consisting of a wooden plank placed between the ladder and sill to be used for hanging sheet rock at a construction site at the Anglebrook Clubhouse Project in Somers, New York. The plaintiff also alleges that MFA owned, controlled, supplied and maintained the wooden plank and scaffolding and supplied the plank and used it as part of scaffolding for hanging sheet rock. (Revised Complaint, Count Three, ¶ 16.) The plaintiff further alleges that MFA was negligent in that it caused the wooden plank to be used as part of scaffolding when it knew or should have known that the plank was defective and was not strong enough to support workers and the plaintiff CT Page 4828

On April 23, 2001, MFA filed a motion for summary judgment as to count three of the plaintiff's complaint and has attached a memorandum of support. MFA argues that it did not owe the plaintiff a duty of care, nor did it control the premises and provides the affidavit of Michael Acocella refuting the plaintiff's allegations. The affidavit states that: (1) the MFA masons were not the primary masons at the work site and that they were hired by Hobbs, Inc. only to install a patio at ground level; (2) all of their work was completed prior to July 31, 1997, and that they did not work at the project site on August 4, 1997, the date of the injury; and (3) MIFA's work did not involve any activity where staging was utilized. No memorandum in opposition has been filed by the plaintiff.1

II
DISCUSSION
Summary judgment "is appropriate only if a fair and reasonable person could conclude only one way." Miller v. United Technologies Corp.,233 Conn. 732, 751, 660 A.2d 810 (1995). "In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Appleton v. Board of Education, 254 Conn. 205, 209, 757 A.2d 1059 (2000). "In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court's function is not to decide issues of material fact, but rather to determine whether any such issues exist." Nolan v. Borkowski, 206 Conn. 495, 500,538 A.2d 1031 (1988). "Although the party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any material fact . . . a party opposing summary judgment must substantiate its adverse claim by showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact together with the evidence disclosing the existence of such an issue. . . . It is not enough, however, for the opposing party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed issue. Mere assertions of fact . . . are insufficient to establish the existence of a material fact and, therefore, cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court [in support of a motion for summary judgment]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Maffucci v. RoyalPark Ltd. Partnership, 243 Conn. 552, 554-55, 707 A.2d 15 (1998).

"The existence of the genuine issue of material fact must be demonstrated by counteraffidavits and concrete evidence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pion v. Southern New England Telephone Co.,44 Conn. App. 657, 663, 691 A.2d 1107 (1997). "if the affidavits and the other supporting documents are inadequate, then the court is justified in granting the summary judgment, assuming that the movant has met his burden of proof" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 2830 Whitney AvenueCT Page 4829Corp. v. Heritage Canal Development Associates, Inc., 33 Conn. App. 563,569, 636 A.2d 1377 (1994). When a party moves for summary judgment "and there [are] no contradictory affidavits, the court properly [decides] the motion by looking only to the sufficiency of the [movant's] affidavits and other proof" Heyman Associates No. 1 v. Ins. Co. of Pennsylvania,231 Conn. 756, 795, 653 A.2d 122 (1995). "Issues of negligence are ordinarily not susceptible of summary adjudication but should be resolved by trial in the ordinary manner." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)Fogarty v. Rashaw, 193 Conn. 442, 446, 476 A.2d 582 (1984). "The issue of whether a defendant owes a duty of care is an appropriate matter for summary judgment [however] because the question is one of law." Pion v.Southern New England Telephone Co., supra, 44 Conn. App. 660.

"The existence of a duty of care is a prerequisite to a finding of negligence. . . . [T]he essential elements of a cause of action in negligence are well established: duty; breach of that duty; causation; and actual injury. . . . The existence of a duty-is a question of law and only if such a duty is found to exist does the trier of fact then determine whether the defendant [breached] that duty in the particular situation at hand. . . . if a court determines, as a matter of law, that a defendant owes no duty to a plaintiff, the plaintiff cannot recover in negligence from the defendant." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gomes v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 258 Conn. 603,614-15,

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Related

Fogarty v. Rashaw
476 A.2d 582 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1984)
Nolan v. Borkowski
538 A.2d 1031 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1988)
Heyman Associates No. 1 v. Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania
653 A.2d 122 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1995)
Miller v. United Technologies Corp.
660 A.2d 810 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1995)
Maffucci v. Royal Park Ltd. Partnership
707 A.2d 15 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1998)
Appleton v. Board of Education
757 A.2d 1059 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 2000)
Gomes v. Commercial Union Insurance
783 A.2d 462 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 2001)
2830 Whitney Avenue Corp. v. Heritage Canal Development Associates, Inc.
636 A.2d 1377 (Connecticut Appellate Court, 1994)
Pion v. Southern New England Telephone Co.
691 A.2d 1107 (Connecticut Appellate Court, 1997)

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Bluebook (online)
2002 Conn. Super. Ct. 4827, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/doyle-v-kaar-construction-no-cv99-0497202s-apr-1-2002-connsuperct-2002.