Doyle v. Duquette

• Court: Superior Court of Maine
• Decided: August 4, 2008
• Docket: LINre-06-044
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

51ATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT f\ r A, . , ...! . ., l .\ /.fvl\ ~'. \- .t' . , i ; ,'. ...... , . Lincoln, ss.

EILEEN DOYLE

Plaintiff

v. Docket No. LIN-RE-06-044

EDWIN DUQUETIE and ANNA DUQUETIE

Defendants

ORDER ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This matter comes before the court on the plaintiff's motion for partial summary

judgment on Counts II and VII of her complaint, the claims for violations of the

Improvident Transfers of Title Act and the Home Construction Contracts Act. Doyle

also seeks partial summary judgment on the defendants' counterclaims for breach of

contract and defamation.

Background And Procedural History

Except as noted below, the following facts are not in dispute:

The plaintiff, Eileen Doyle (Doyle), is an elderly woman who was living alone in

Waldoboro when she entered into a contract with the defendants, Edwin and Anna

Duquette (the Duquettes), whereby she would give them 1.8 acres of land in exchange

for various repairs and construction work on her home. Although the characterization

of the relationship between Doyle and the Duquettes is disputed, both parties agree that

the Duquettes provided daily meals to Doyle for a period of five months, and

performed various small tasks at her request. On August 10, 2006, Doyle executed a

deed prepared by Anna Duquette, which mistakenly transferred 3.67 acres of land to the Duquettes, instead of the 1.8 acres agreed to by the parties. The Duquettes recorded

this deed.

When Doyle realized the mistake, she notified the Duquettes, and the parties

agreed to correct the deed. A second deed was executed on August 23,2006, describing

an entirely different 1.8 acres ofland, which the Duquettes also recorded.

There is a dispute about what the second deed represented. Doyle claims that

the Duquettes presented this second deed to her as a "corrective deed" to rectify the

erroneous first transfer, but the Duquettes argue that the second deed actually reflected

a separate second contract between the parties for additional work by the Duquettes.

According to the Duquettes, the first transfer was never corrected, even though the

parties all agreed to do so. Doyle also paid $12,385.73 to the Duquettes, which the

Duquettes claim was for reimbursement of costs paid out of pocket by them.

According to the Duquettes, they were prevented from completing the work

pursuant to both contracts by Doyle's nephew. On December 15, 2006, the Duquettes

entered into a purchase and sale agreement to sell both pieces of land for $29,000, and

accepted $500.00 in earnest money from the potential buyer. However, five days later,

Anna Duquette wrote a letter to Doyle offering to reconvey the land to Doyle, and

demanding $29,582.06 for the work done by her and her husband. Doyle instead filed

suit in this court on December 22, 2006, asserting the following claims: violation of the

Improvident Transfers of Title Act; abuse of a confidential relationship; constructive

fraud; actual fraud; unjust enrichment; violations of the Home Construction Contracts

Act and the Unfair Trade Practices Act; and breach of contract.

The Duquettes filed their answer on January 17, 2007, denying the allegations

and asserting counterclaims for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. Both parties

have since amended their pleadings, and the Duquettes have added a counterclaim for

2 defamation. The present motion for partial summary judgment was filed by Doyle on

March 17, 2008, and opposed by the Duquettes on April 3.

Analysis

I. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is proper where there exist no genuine issues of material fact

such that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. M.R. Civ. P. 56(c);

see also Levine v. R.B.K. Caly Corp., 2001 ME 77, <]I 4, 770 A.2d 653,655. A genuine issue is

raised "when sufficient evidence requires a fact-finder to choose between competing

versions of the truth at trial." Parrish v. Wright, 2003 ME 90, <]I 8, 828 A.2d 778, 781. A

material fact is a fact that has "the potential to affect the outcome of the suit." Burdzel v.

Sobus, 2000 ME 84, <]I 6, 750 A.2d 573, 575. "If material facts are disputed, the dispute

must be resolved through fact-finding." Curtis v. Porter, 2001 ME 158, <]I 7, 784 A.2d 18,

22. A party wishing to avoid summary judgment must present a prima facie case for

the claim or defense that is asserted. Reliance Natl. Indem. v. Knowles Industrial Services,

2005 ME 29, <]I 9, 868 A.2d 220, 224-25. At this stage, the facts are reviewed "in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party." Lightfoot v. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 35, 2003 ME

24, <]I 6, 816 A.2d 63, 65.

Doyle's Improvident Transfers of Title Act Claim

The ImproVident Transfers of Title Act, 33 M.R.S. §§ 1021-25 (2008), allows the

court to grant appropriate relief when an elderly person who is dependent on others

transfers property or money as a result of undue influence. If the elderly person did not

have the benefit of independent counsel for the transaction, section 1022 creates a

rebuttable presumption of undue influence when there is "any transfer of real estate or

major transfer of personal property or money for less than full consideration... to a

person with whom the elderly dependent person has a confidential or fiduciary

3 relationship." Thus, for the presumption to arise, a plaintiff must prove each of the

following: (1) that he or she is an elderly person who is dependent on others; (2) who

transferred real estate or transferred a major amount of personal property or money; (3)

for less than full consideration; (4) without the representation of independent counsel;

(5) to someone with whom he or she shared a confidential relationship. If the transferee

is not able to rebut the presumption, .the plaintiff is entitled to appropriate relief

"including the rescission or reformation of a deed or other instrument, the imposition of

a constructive trust on property or an order enjoining use of or entry on property or

commanding the return of property." Id. at §§ 1022-23.

Because it is the plaintiff here who is moving for summary judgment, Doyle not

onl y must show that there is an absence of disputed facts as to all of the cri teria

required for the statutory presumption to arise, but she must also show that there are

no disputed facts concerning the claims the Duquettes have raised to rebut the

presumption.

Although there is no dispute that the first deed required correction, the

Duquettes have generated a factual issue as to whether the two deeds were based on

two separate contracts between Doyle and them. Additionally, the Duquettes claim

that all of the money that Doyle paid to them was for materials and supplies associated

with the second contract. Therefore, it is unnecessary for the court to decide whether

Doyle has proved everything necessary to create the presumption of undue influence,

because the Duquettes have clearly raised genuine issues of material fact about whether

they can rebut the presumption. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on Count II

is denied.

Doyle's Home Construction Contract Claim

4 There is no dispute that Mr. Duquette did not satisfy the requirements for home

construction contracts under the Home Construction Contracts Act (HCCA), 10 M.R.S.

§§ 1486-90 (2008), because he has stipulated as much. l However, Duquette argues that

there is a genuine issue of material fact concerning his liability under the HCCA.

Duquette asserts that Doyle is not entitled to summary judgment because his failure to

comply with the statute was unintentional and a bona fide error.

Section 1490 of the HCCA specifies two penalties for violating the statute. The

first simply indicates that a violation of the HCCA is prima facie evidence of a violation

of the Unfair Trade Practices Act (UTPA), 5 M.R.S. §§ 205-A to 214 (2008). Id. at §

1490(1). The second penalty treats the violation of the statute as a civil violation and

allows the court to assess a fine"of not less than $100 nor more than $1,000." Id. at §

1490(2). However, there is no liability for a civil violation "if the contractor shows by a

preponderance of the evidence that the violation was unintentional and a bona fide

error, notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adopted to avoid

such error." Id.

Mr. Duquette has generated an issue of fact as to whether his admitted violation

of the HCCA was unintentional. Moreover, Doyle does not dispute his assertion that he

reads at only a third grade level. However, :l\1r. Duquette has presented nothing to

indicate that, at the time of the work, he maintained procedures adopted to avoid

unintentional violations. To avoid summary judgment, he had to generate an issue as

to whether such procedures were adopted and maintained, and he has not done so.

1 See 10 M.R.S. §§ 1487-1488 (2008) for the details of what a home construction contract must contain. In this case, the two deeds are the only evidence of the home construction contract between Doyle and the Duquettes. Without specifying each way in which those deeds are deficient as home construction contracts under the HCCA, it is clear that Duquette did not comply with the statute.

5 Although Duquette is entitled to summary judgment on her HCCA claim, it

amounts only to a declaration that the statute has been violated, which in turn can serve

as prima facie evidence of a violation of the UTPA. 2

The amount and availability of statutory penalties and attorney fees are not

within the scope of Doyle's motion, and therefore are not addressed in this order.

Because there is no dispute that Duquette did in fact violate the HCCA, Doyle is

entitled to summary judgment on Count VII. However, to support any claim for

penalties or attorneys fees, it may nonetheless be necessary for her to present evidence

as to the extent and willfulness of violations and their connection to the amount of

attorney fees incurred by her in the course of her dispute with the Duquettes, including

in the present action.

Duquettes' Breach of Contract Counterclaim

Doyle argues that she is entitled to summary judgment on the Duquettes'

counterclaim for breach of contract because the Improvident Transfers of Title Act

allows the court to order rescission or reformation of a contract resulting from undue

influence. See 33 M.R.S. §§ 1022-23 (2008). Because a factual dispute exists concerning

whether the Duquettes actually violated the statute, summary judgment is not

appropriate.

Alternatively, Doyle argues that the Duquettes should be estopped from

asserting breach of contract because there is no dispute that the contract(s) at issue

violated the HCCA. However, a contractor who violates the HCCA is not thereby

precluded from any recovery under such theories as quantum meruit for work actually

performed at the request of the owner. See William Mushero, Inc. v. Hull, 667 A.2d 853,

855 (Me. 1995). It will be for the fact-finder to decide whether a second contract did in

2 Doyle has not requested summary judgment on her claim under the UTPA.

6 2. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on Count VII of the complaint is

£ranted. to the extent of a declaration that Defendant Edwin Duquette violated the

fact exist and whether Doyle breached that contract by preventing the Duquettes from

performing under it. Doyle's motion for summary judgment on Count I of the

Duquettes' counterclaim is therefore denied.

Duquette Counterclaim for Defamation

To support their claim for defamation, the Duquettes must make a prima facie

showing that Doyle made an unprivileged publication to a third party of a false and

defamatory statement about them. See Morgan v. Kooistra, 2008 ME 26,

447,455 (citations omitted). The false statement must be one of fact, not of opinion.

Caron v. Bangor Publg. Co., 470 A.2d 782, 784-85. Although the Duquettes claim that

Doyle told her sister that the Duquettes had taken advantage of an elderly woman, the

only evidence offered to support such a claim is the sister's deposition testimony. The

portion of that testimony cited by the Duquettes indicates that the sister was merely

expressing her own conclusion about what had occurred, not repeating Doyle's words. 3

Doyle is hereby granted summary judgment on the Duquettes' counterclaim for

defamation.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:

1. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on Count I of the complaint is

denied.

3 The most relevant portion of the cited testimony reads as follows:

Q And you feel that they did something that they shouldn't have done?

A. This is what it appears to me.

Q. And what is that?

A. Taking advantage of an elderly woman.

Depo. Juliet Dorland 51:4-51:8.