Doyle v. Dukakis

699 F. Supp. 357, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12782, 1988 WL 122179
Procedural entryThis page is a short order in Doyle v. Dukakis. Read the opinion of the Court — 634 F. Supp. 1441
District Court, D. Massachusetts·Decided November 4, 1988·No. Civ. A. 85-100-Y·Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

YOUNG, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court upon the renewed motion of The Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency (“the Agency”), Marvin Siflinger (“Siflinger”), Bernard Singer (“Singer”), and Amy Anthony (“Anthony”) for summary judgment. 1 These defendants had already raised the defense of qualified immunity in a prior motion for summary judgment. The Court denied that motion on the record as it then existed. See Doyle v. Dukakis, 634 F.Supp. 1441, 1447 (D.Mass.1986). 2 While the factual record has not changed since the earlier denial, these defendants have moved to renew their motion in light of the virtual explosion of political discharge case law emanating from the First Circuit in the wake of the 1984 Puerto Rican gubernatorial election. The more complete explication of the law in this area by the recent First Circuit decisions makes clear, the defendants argue, that they are immune from liability in the present case. After careful reflection, this Court agrees.

*358 A. First Amendment Protection.

It is now relatively clear in this Circuit that when one claims the protection of the First Amendment right of free association against a politically-motivated discharge, a court must engage in a two-step analysis. The first step is:

A threshold inquiry, which derives from Branti [v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 100 S.Ct. 1287, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980)], [and] involves examining whether the position at issue, ... relates to “partisan political interests ... [or] concerns.” 445 U.S. at 519; 100 S.Ct. at 1295. That is, does the position involve government decisionmak-ing on issues where there is room for political disagreement on goals or implementation?

Jimenez Fuentes v. Torres Gaztambide, 807 F.2d 236, 241-42 (1st Cir.1986) cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1014, 107 S.Ct. 1888, 95 L.Ed.2d 496 (1987). If the position itself appears to fall within the scope of the First Amendment’s protection,

the next step is to examine the particular responsibilities of the position to determine whether it resembles a policymaker, a privy to confidential information, a communicator, or some other office holder whose function is such that party affiliation is an equally appropriate requirement.
‘Among the indicia that locate a job along the spectrum between policymaker and clerk are: relative pay, technical competence, power to control others, authority to speak in the name of policymakers, public perception, influence on programs, contact with elected officials and responsiveness to partisan policies and political leaders.’

Id. at 242 (quoting in part from Ecker v. Cohalan, 542 F.Supp. 896, 901 [E.D.N.Y.1982] [Weinstein, C.J.]). Implementing this analysis, the First Circuit has acknowledged that the following positions are constitutionally protected: city court bailiff, road grader, bookkeeper, deputy court clerk, deputy sheriff, supervisor of a branch of an auditor’s office, waiters, cleaning people, and a director of domestic services. Further, it has recognized that the following positions are beyond the scope of the First Amendment’s constitutional protections as of 1985: a county’s assistant director of public information, the first deputy commissioner of the department of water, superintendent of employment for the Chicago Park District, an assistant state’s attorney, and assistant district attorney, fee agents, the city solicitor and assistant solicitor, and the deputy park commissioner. See Juarbe-Angueira v. Arias, 831 F.2d 11, 16 (1st Cir.1987) cert. denied, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 1222, 99 L.Ed.2d 423 (1988) and cases cited therein. 3 In the present case, the plaintiff Doylé, as • the Special Assistant to the Executive Director on Loan to the Financial Department, had the following responsibilities:

1) to serve as liaison with other governmental agencies in both the federal and state governments;

2) to participate in negotiations with investment bankers for debt issues of the Agency;

3) to coordinate the Agency’s investor relations program;

4) to serve as the Executive Director’s liaison with the Commonwealth’s Congressional delegation; and,

5) to perform special assignments as directed by the Executive Director.

See Affidavit of Wade M. Welch, Exhibit 2. Edward Hanley, Secretary of Administration and Finance during the administration of Governor Edward King, hired the plaintiff Doyle for the purpose of improving the *359 image of the Agency’s bonds in the various financial markets in which they were traded. In accomplishing this goal, Doyle spoke with Hanley approximately once every two to three weeks while working at the Agency. Further, on occasion he arranged breakfast meetings with the Commonwealth’s Congressional delegation and sought to discharge that liaison function. Therefore, on the basis of these undisputed facts, 4 even if the position itself is within the scope of the First Amendment protection — i.e., political affiliation and loyalty is not a proper aspect of Doyle’s job qualifications, — the particular fulfillment of the position’s rather amorphous duties by the plaintiff Doyle would seem necessarily to partake of a political dimension.

B. Qualified Immunity.

The Court need not rest its decision on such a broad determination, however, in light of the qualified immunity from suit available to these defendants. In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982), the Supreme Court defined the scope of immunity available to government officials performing discretionary functions and adopted an objective standard that the Supreme Court hoped could permit the resolution of many claims through summary judgment. The Supreme Court held that such officials “generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Id. at 818, 102 S.Ct. at 2738. The Supreme Court wrote that if a judge, on summary judgment, determines that “the law was clearly established at the time an action occurred, the immunity defense ordinarily should fail since a reasonably competent public official should know the law governing his conduct.” Id. at 818-19, 102 S.Ct. at 2738. In Doyle v. Dukakis, 634 F.Supp.

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Doyle v. Dukakis, 699 F. Supp. 357, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12782, 1988 WL 122179 (D. Mass. 1988).

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