Downs v. United States

833 F. Supp. 2d 1361, 2011 WL 2416049, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64020
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Florida
DecidedJune 13, 2011
DocketCase No. 06-20861-CIV
StatusPublished

This text of 833 F. Supp. 2d 1361 (Downs v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Downs v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 1361, 2011 WL 2416049, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64020 (S.D. Fla. 2011).

Opinion

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

PAUL C. HUCK, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court for ruling following the bench trial held May 9, 10 and 11, 2011. At this trial, the Court heard evidence on the United States of America’s liability to Plaintiff under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”).1 Plaintiff contends that the government2 negligently included large rocks in the beach fill for a Miami Beach renourishment project and that he was injured and paralyzed when he dove into the water and hit his head on one of these large rocks. [1363]*1363At issue is whether the government breached its duty to plaintiff in connection with this project, whether the government’s negligence was a proximate cause of plaintiffs injury and, in the event the government is found liable, how its liability should be apportioned among Plaintiff and the other entities involved in the renourishment project. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds as follows.

I. Background and Procedural History3

Plaintiff Dwight Johannes Downs fourth cervical vertebra burst, rendering him a quadriplegic, on Miami Beach in the early morning hours of April 8, 2003. The accident occurred on the stretch of beach between 72nd and 73rd Streets. This portion of Miami Beach has been part of a large beach renourishment project called the Dade County Beach Erosion Control and Hurricane Protection Project (“the Project”). The Project involves dredging fill material from offshore and adding it to approximately 10.5 miles of Miami Beach in the process of erosion.

In 1968, Congress authorized the Project for a period of fifty years substantially in accordance with the design recommendations of the United States Army Corps of Engineers (“the Corps”).4 In 1972, the United States and Miami Dade County entered into a Local Cooperation Agreement (“LCA”) for the Project that sets forth their respective responsibilities on the Project. Importantly, the LCA states that the “parties mutually agree that only suitable material will be used for project beach fill, such suitable material being defined as non-rocky, sandy material similar to that of the existing beach.”

Initial construction on the Project occurred in five phases over the course of the late 1970s and early 1980s, and the Corps awarded dredge and fill contracts for each phase to private contractors. The area between 72nd and 73rd Streets was included as part of the Project’s Phase 2, or Contract 2. The Corps awarded Contract 2 to Construction Aggregates Corporation (“CAC”) in 1978. Under Contract 2 and its modifications, it was expected that approximately five percent of rock by volume ranging in size from two to ten inches in diameter would be interspersed in the top twelve inches of the fill material deposited on the beach. The contract modifications required CAC to remove all rocks larger than two inches in diameter to a depth of 12 inches below the finished surface. CAC was to design the method of rock removal, and the Corps eventually permitted CAC to bury the rock below a depth of 12 inches instead of removing it to off-site areas as originally contemplated. CAC completed Phase 2 in 1980. Initial construction on all five phases of the Project ended in 1982. However, throughout the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, the Corps and Miami-Dade County have participated in numerous maintenance efforts on the Project across the length of the covered shoreline.

[1364]*1364Downs brought this suit against the United States for negligence under the Federal Tort Claims Act in 2006.5 Downs alleges that the Corps negligently designed and constructed the Project by allowing rocks as large as basketballs to be included in the fill material used to renourish the beach. He also alleges that the Corps negligently maintained the Project by failing to ensure that rocks from the fill material would not become exposed in the beach’s surf zone as erosion occurred.6 Downs alleges that the Corps’ negligence was the proximate cause of his injuries because he broke his neck by hitting a large rock that was in the beach surf zone due to the Project.

In 2007, the Court granted the government summary judgment holding, in relevant part, that the discretionary function exception to the FTCA excluded Downs’ claims. The Court found that the language of the LCA regarding “non-roeky, sandy material similar to that of the existing beach,” was ambiguous and not a fixed or readily ascertainable standard, and, therefore, that the government was immune from suit under the discretionary function exception. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit also found the contract language ambiguous but concluded that extrinsic evidence should be used to construe this LCA term and determine whether it was sufficiently specific to subject the government to suit. On remand, the Court held an evidentiary hearing on the meaning of “non-rocky, sandy material similar to that of the existing beach” following which it concluded that the term means “a material consisting almost exclusively of sand, with only a small percentage of interspersed gravel no larger than one or two inches in diameter.” Downs v. United States, 2010 WL 3222140, at *2 (S.D.Fla. Aug. 16, 2010). This construction of the contract term was sufficiently mandatory and, hence, the government was found not immune from suit.

On November 22, 2010, the government again moved for summary judgment and, alternatively, for judgment on the pleadings arguing that the Florida statute of repose for actions founded on the design, planning or construction of an improvement to real property, Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(c), bars Downs’ cause of action and, alternatively, that the government does not owe Downs the alleged duty to maintain or warn.7 On February 7, 2011, the Court held a partial trial limited to the statute of repose issue. After considering the testimony and evidence submitted at that partial trial, the Court found that, assuming the statute of repose applies, it does not bar Downs’ action since the LCA was not completed or terminated fifteen years before Downs filed suit. See Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(e) (“In any event, the action must be commenced within 15 years after ... the date of completion or termination of the contract between the professional engineer, registered architect, or licensed contractor and his or her employer.”) 8 In a separate order, the Court [1365]*1365rejected the government’s alternative argument that it does not owe Downs the alleged duty to maintain or warn because it does not own the premises upon which his accident occurred. The Court found that under Florida law control, not ownership, of the premises determines liability and that so long as construction on a premises is unfinished, contractors are subject to the same liability as the possessor of the land for harm resulting from their work. See Downs v. United States, Docket No. 208, at 2 (S.D.Fla. Feb. 28, 2011). Accordingly, the Court denied the government’s motion in its entirety. The Court notes that its two February 2011 rulings in this case as well as all of its previous orders are hereby incorporated by reference in this opinion.9

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Downs v. United States Army Corps of Engineers
333 F. App'x 403 (Eleventh Circuit, 2009)
Ray B. Woodbury v. United States
313 F.2d 291 (Ninth Circuit, 1963)
Bill E. Davis v. United States
961 F.2d 53 (Fifth Circuit, 1991)
Crislip v. Holland
401 So. 2d 1115 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1981)
US SEC. Services Corp. v. Ramada Inn, Inc.
665 So. 2d 268 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1996)
Stahl v. Metropolitan Dade County
438 So. 2d 14 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1983)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
833 F. Supp. 2d 1361, 2011 WL 2416049, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64020, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/downs-v-united-states-flsd-2011.