Douthit v. United States

299 F. Supp. 397, 23 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 1651, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12721
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Tennessee
DecidedApril 24, 1969
DocketNos. Civ. 68-25, Civ. 68-26
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 299 F. Supp. 397 (Douthit v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Douthit v. United States, 299 F. Supp. 397, 23 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 1651, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12721 (W.D. Tenn. 1969).

Opinion

OPINION

ROBERT M. McRAE, Jr., District Judge.

This suit is one for a refund of income taxes paid by Troy and Mildred Douthit and Cecil and Treba Carroll for the calendar year 1961. The following facts are the basis of the action.

Plaintiffs are partners in the Douthit-Carroll-Sanchez Company, an automobile dealership (hereinafter referred to as the partnership). The partnership generally maintained its books on the accrual method of accounting for a fiscal year beginning February 1 and ending January 31 of the following year. One item of income, however, was accounted for on a cash rather than accrual basis. This item was labeled “finance income” on the partnership books, but since it is referred to as “dealer reserve income” in the applicable cases, statutes and regulations, it will be referred to by that title hereinafter.

The partnership sold many of its cars on a deferred payment basis. The partnership sold or discounted promissory notes received from its customers to various finance companies on either a full or limited recourse basis. The finance companies would withhold from the sums payable to the partnership an amount representing security against default on the note by the customer. As the notes were repaid, the finance companies would release to the partnership the amounts withheld as security.

The sums withheld from those notes discounted bn a full recourse basis have consistently been reported by the partnership on the accrual basis, that is, this sum was reported as income when the car giving rise to the note was sold. This amount was not included in the dealer reserve account and is not connected with the alleged overpayment of taxes in this case.

The dealer reserve account reflected the amount withheld from those notes discounted on a limited recourse basis. This amount was accounted for on the cash basis. Thus, the money in the dealer reserve account was not reported by the partnership as income until the year it was paid to the partnership by the finance companies.

On June 22, 1959, the Supreme Court decided the case of Hansen v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 360 U.S. 446, 79 S.Ct. 1270, 3 L.Ed.2d 1360 (1959). Resolving a conflict among the Circuits, the Court held that a dealer who generally maintained his books on the accrual system of accounting must report dealer reserve income on the accrual rather than the cash basis. The result of this decision was to place dealers, like the plaintiffs, in the position of having deficiencies assessed on their income tax returns for the years in which such dealer reserves were accrued but not reported as income.

In response to Hansen, Congress enacted the Dealer Reserve Adjustment Act of 1960, PL 86-459, on May 13, 1960, 74 Stat. 124 (hereinafter referred to as the Dealer Reserve Act). This Act authorized two alternatives for taxpayers who were generally on the accrual basis but who had reported dealer reserve income on the cash basis.

The first alternative provided that a change in accounting for dealer reserve income from the cash to the accrual method should be treated as a required change in accounting under Section 481 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. If this election were made, Section 481 would require that all dealer reserve income, which had accrued during years to which the 1954 Revenue Code applied, but which had not been reported as income, be reported as income (subject to certain throwback provisions) in the year that the taxpayer changed from the cash to the accrual basis. Thus, the taxpayer’s income would be increased in the [400]*400year of the change by the amount outstanding in the dealer reserve account at the beginning of the year (assuming none of this amount had accrued prior to the enactment of the 1954 Code). This figure would represent the amount of dealer reserve still being withheld by the finance companies. Since this first alternative merely provided that the change should be treated in accordance with Section 481, the result is the same as it would be if the Dealer Reserve Act had not been passed.

The second alternative allowed the taxpayer not to have the change from cash accrual treated as a change in accounting to which Section 481 would apply. “If the taxpayer decides to follow the second alternative he must recompute his tax in each of the prior years which was open on June 21, 1959, determining what his tax should have been in each of these years as distinct from the manner in which he reported it because of his erroneous method for reporting dealer reserve income.” Dealer Reserve Act, Senate Report No. 1045, 2 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, pp. 1974, 1978 (1960).

On August 23, 1960, the partnership filed an election under the second alternative, Section 4(a) of the Dealer Reserve Act. In its letter of election the partnership stated that the election would apply to the partnership returns for the fiscal years ending January 31, 1957, January 31, 1958 and January 31, 1959, because these were all of the partnership’s taxable years that were open on June 21, 1959. On October 19, 1960, the Internal Revenue Service advised the partnership that the election had been received, but that the amended returns had to be filed by November 30, 1960, for the election to be valid.1

On November 15, 1960, the partnership filed amended returns reflecting dealer reserve income on the accrual method of accounting for its fiscal years ending January 31, 1957, through January 31, 1960. The method which the partnership used to adjust its income for the amended returns was to report an increase or decrease based upon offsetting the total items accrued for each year against the cash received from the finance company in each of the years, regardless of when the account, which was the basis of the finance company payment had been set up on the partnership books. None of the amended returns transferred the entire unreported balance of the dealer reserve account from the preceding years into the current year. Increased or (decreased) income was shown on these returns as follows:

Year Ending Amount
January 31 1957 ($36,774.13)
January 31, 1958 ( 17,723.45)
January 31, 1959 ( 31,733.73)
January 31, 1960 14,895.89

Plaintiffs filed amended individual returns on November 22, 1960, for their individual calendar years 1957, 1958, and 1959, reducing their taxable income by their proportionate share of the amended partnership income. Plaintiffs’ original 1960 returns were not due until April 15, 1961, therefore, plaintiffs’ share of the partnership’s amended income for the year ending January 31, 1960, was reflected on their original 1960 returns.

On August 1, 1961, the Government notified plaintiffs of the disallowance of the refunds sought for the years 1957, 1958 and 1959. The following explanation was given in an audit report sent to the plaintiffs:

“The partnership of Douthit-CarrollSanchez Co. filed amended returns for the partnership fiscal years 1-31-57, ’58, ’59, ’60, based upon the Dealer’s Reserve Act of 1960. The partnership elected to have Sec. 481 of "the Act not apply. This proved to be an improper election, which was the cause of the [401]*401disallowance of the amounts claimed for refund.”

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Summit Sheet Metal Co. v. Commissioner
1996 T.C. Memo. 563 (U.S. Tax Court, 1996)
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75 T.C. 497 (U.S. Tax Court, 1980)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
299 F. Supp. 397, 23 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 1651, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12721, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/douthit-v-united-states-tnwd-1969.