[Cite as Douglass v. Raymond, 2025-Ohio-4549.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF SUMMIT )
ELLEN DOUGLASS C.A. No. 31207
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE JEFFREY RAYMOND COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO Appellant CASE No. DR 2019-12-3309
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: September 30, 2025
CARR, Judge.
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant Jeffrey Raymond (“Father”) appeals the judgment of the
Summit County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division. This Court affirms.
I.
{¶2} Father and Plaintiff-Appellee Ellen Douglass (“Mother”) married in 2015. The
parties have two children, a daughter born in 2014 and a son born in 2018. Father and Mother,
acting pro se, dissolved their marriage in January 2020. The judgment included a separation
agreement and shared parenting plan. In lieu of child support, the parties agreed to a children’s
checkbook, whereby expenses for the children would be divided equally between the parties.
Following the dissolution, the parties continued to litigate issues that arose concerning the children.
{¶3} In September 2020, the trial court issued an entry which eliminated the children’s
checkbook provision from the shared parenting plan and ordered Father to pay $917.43 per month 2
in child support and $40.03 per month in cash medical support; the total with the processing fee
was $976.61 per month.
{¶4} In May 2021, the parties entered into a revised shared parenting plan, which was
adopted by the trial court as an agreed judgment entry. Therein, each party agreed to each pay half
of the work-related childcare expenses the parties incurred. Mother was also named the residential
parent for school purposes.
{¶5} In October 2021, Mother filed a motion seeking to hold Father in contempt for
failure to pay his half of the work-related childcare costs. Father was subsequently found to be in
contempt. Father ultimately paid the sum that had been due but failed to continue paying his share
of the childcare costs; thus, the purge period was extended. By October 2022, Father had purged
the contempt.
{¶6} In October 2022, Father filed a motion to terminate or modify the shared parenting
plan and to reallocate parental rights and responsibilities and child support. Father sought to be
named the residential parent of the children. In February 2023, Mother filed a motion seeking to
terminate the shared parenting plan and have her named the residential parent. In September 2023,
Mother filed another motion seeking to hold Father in contempt for his failure to pay his portion
of the childcare costs.
{¶7} The matter proceeded to a hearing before a magistrate in October 2023. On January
29, 2024, the magistrate issued a decision. The trial court adopted the magistrate’s decision and
entered judgment accordingly that same day. Father filed objections and supplemental objections
to the magistrate’s decision. The trial court overruled Father’s objections.
{¶8} Father has appealed, raising four assignments of error for our review, some of
which will be consolidated to facilitate our analysis. 3
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY MODIFYING THE SHARED PARENTING PLAN, REDUCING APPELLANT/FATHER’S MIDWEEK PARENTING TIME FROM TWO DESIGNATED DAYS AND TIMES EACH WEEK TO ONE DAY A WEEK, AND FURTHER MANDATING THE MIDWEEK VISIT TAKE PLACE IN SUMMIT COUNTY OR THIRTY (30) MINUTES FROM APPELLEE- MOTHER’S RESIDENCE, WHICH IS CONTRARY TO BOTH WHAT THE COURT EVALUATOR RECOMMENDED AND THE APPELLANT/FATHER REQUESTED, AND INAPPOSITE TO THE CHILDREN’S EXPRESSED INTEREST IN SPENDING MORE TIME WITH APPELLANT-FATHER.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY MODIFYING THE SHARED PARENTING PLAN, MANDATING APPELLANT/FATHER TO PROVIDE ALL TRANSPORTATION FOR THE THREE “BANKING” HOLIDAYS AWARDED TO APPELLANT/FATHER, BEGINNING AFTER SCHOOL UNTIL 8:00 P.M., NOTWITHSTANDING THE APPELLEE/MOTHER WAS RARELY PROVIDING TRANSPORTATION FOR THE CHILDREN’S VISITATION WHICH IS CONTRARY TO THE MAY 2021 SHARED PARENTING PLAN.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY NOT DESIGNATING THE APPELLANT/FATHER AS RESIDENTIAL PARENT FOR SCHOOL PURPOSES AND KEEPING THE APPELLEE/MOTHER AS THE RESIDENTIAL PARENT FOR SCHOOL PURPOSES, PARTICULARLY SINCE THE CHILDREN DO NOT ATTEND SCHOOL IN THE MOTHER’S SCHOOL DISTRICT.
{¶9} Father argues in his first assignment of error that the trial court abused its discretion
in making changes to Father’s midweek parenting time. Father argues in his second assignment
of error that the trial court abused its discretion in its determination of the specific details of
Father’s parenting time on Martin Luther King Day, President’s Day, and Veteran’s Day. Father
argues in his third assignment of error that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to name 4
him the residential parent for school purposes. As all three assignments of error relate to the
parties’ shared parenting plan, they will be addressed together.
{¶10} “This Court generally reviews a trial court’s action with respect to a magistrate’s
decision for an abuse of discretion. In so doing, we consider the trial court’s action with reference
to the nature of the underlying matter.” (Internal quotations and citations omitted.) Herron v.
Herron, 2021-Ohio-2223, ¶ 8 (9th Dist.). “Trial courts are generally afforded broad discretion in
determining whether a modification of parenting rights and responsibilities is necessary.” Id.,
quoting Bohannon v. Bohannon, 2020-Ohio-1255, ¶ 26 (9th Dist.). “A trial court’s decision
modifying the parties’ parenting time in a shared parenting plan is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion.” Herron at ¶ 8. An abuse of discretion indicates that the trial court’s decision is
unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219
(1983).
{¶11} “This Court has held that a motion to modify parenting time under a shared
parenting plan is reviewed under R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a) because the motion seeks to reallocate the
parental rights and responsibilities set forth in a prior decree.” Herron at ¶ 9. R.C.
3109.04(E)(1)(a) states that “[t]he court shall not modify a prior decree allocating parental rights
and responsibilities for the care of children unless it finds, based on facts that have arisen since the
prior decree or that were unknown to the court at the time of the prior decree, that a change has
occurred in the circumstances of the child, the child’s residential parent, or either of the parents
subject to a shared parenting decree, and that the modification is necessary to serve the best interest
of the child.” “In applying these standards, the court shall retain the residential parent designated
by the prior decree or the prior shared parenting decree, unless a modification is in the best interest 5
of the child and . . . [t]he harm likely to be caused by a change of environment is outweighed by
the advantages of the change of environment to the child.” R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a)(iii).
In determining the best interest of a child pursuant to [R.C. 3109.04], whether on an original decree allocating parental rights and responsibilities for the care of children or a modification of a decree allocating those rights and responsibilities, the court shall consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to:
(a) The wishes of the child’s parents regarding the child’s care;
(b) If the court has interviewed the child in chambers pursuant to division (B) of this section regarding the child’s wishes and concerns as to the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities concerning the child, the wishes and concerns of the child, as expressed to the court;
(c) The child’s interaction and interrelationship with the child’s parents, siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child’s best interest;
(d) The child’s adjustment to the child’s home, school, and community;
(e) The mental and physical health of all persons involved in the situation;
(f) The parent more likely to honor and facilitate court-approved parenting time rights or visitation and companionship rights;
(g) Whether either parent has failed to make all child support payments, including all arrearages, that are required of that parent pursuant to a child support order under which that parent is an obligor;
(h) Whether either parent or any member of the household of either parent previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to any criminal offense involving any act that resulted in a child being an abused child or a neglected child; whether either parent, in a case in which a child has been adjudicated an abused child or a neglected child, previously has been determined to be the perpetrator of the abusive or neglectful act that is the basis of an adjudication; whether either parent or any member of the household of either parent previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a violation of section 2919.25 of the Revised Code or a sexually oriented offense involving a victim who at the time of the commission of the offense was a member of the family or household that is the subject of the current proceeding; whether either parent or any member of the household of either parent previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to any offense involving a victim who at the time of the commission of the offense was a member of the family or household that is the subject of the current proceeding and caused physical harm to the victim in the commission of the offense; and whether there is reason to believe that either parent has acted in a manner resulting in a child being an abused child or a neglected child; 6
(i) Whether the residential parent or one of the parents subject to a shared parenting decree has continuously and willfully denied the other parent’s right to parenting time in accordance with an order of the court;
(j) Whether either parent has established a residence, or is planning to establish a residence, outside this state.
R.C. 3109.04(F)(1).
{¶12} The Family Court Services Evaluator testified at the hearing and provided her
recommendations. She recommended that the parties should continue in the shared parenting plan
with Mother being the residential parent for school purposes and they should continue with the
twice a week evening parenting time for Father along with alternating weekends. The evaluator
thought Father was a great parent but made her recommendation in light of the distance between
the parties and the family support that was present in and around Summit County. With respect to
transportation, the evaluator recommended that the parent receiving the children should be
responsible for the transportation. When the trial court asked about her recommendation
concerning midweek parenting time in light of what she had heard at the hearing thus far, the
evaluator indicated that another option would be to have Father have extended weekends when the
children did not have school, such as on federal holidays. The evaluator did not interview the
children, in part, due to their age, and, in part, because the evaluator did not feel it was necessary
for her to reach her decision.
{¶13} At the time of the dissolution, Father lived in Oakdale, Pennsylvania and worked
in Pennsylvania. Father is an airplane mechanic for C-130 planes which are used by the military.
In 2021, Father moved to Boardman, Ohio, near Youngstown, as it was a halfway point between
his work and where the children were. At some point, Father transferred work locations and began
working in Vienna, Ohio. Father indicated that he worked from 6:30 am to 3:00 pm Monday
through Friday and had all federal holidays off, unless extenuating circumstances required him to 7
go into work. Father testified that he has looked for jobs closer to where the children are but
maintained that taking a job outside of the military base would result in a large pay cut and decrease
in benefits. At the time of the hearing, Father made $35.76 per hour. Father stated that, in addition
to the required monthly drills that took place one weekend a month, when it was available, Father
would participate in additional training at the base to pay down his debts. Paternal grandmother
testified that over the two years prior to the hearing she provided Father with over $12,000, which
included money for car maintenance, food, clothing for the children, gifts for the children, gas
money, and childcare expenses.
{¶14} Around the time of the dissolution, Mother lived in the marital home in Cuyahoga
Falls and worked in Youngstown. However, when Mother was able to find a job closer to home
she took the opportunity. At the time of the hearing, Mother was working in Canton. Mother
works from 7:00 am to 3:30 pm four days a week and one day she works from 10:30 am to 6:30
or 7:00 pm. In addition, Mother works one weekend a month. Mother is an ultrasound technician
and earns $32.85 per hour. Mother is responsible for carrying medical, dental, and vision insurance
for the children. Mother’s boyfriend also lives in the home and helps out with childcare and some
expenses.
{¶15} Father testified that he wished to be the residential parent for school purposes and
have the children attend school in Boardman. Father asserted that he had located inexpensive
childcare and that he would not need any physical or financial help to raise the children. Father
maintained that the school near him was better rated, and it was minutes from his house. He also
explained that there were sidewalks and lots of children in the neighborhood unlike where Mother
lived. In addition, there was a swim club in the summer that the daughter wished to attend. Father
did not submit any evidence in support of his claims that his school district was better than the 8
district the children currently attend. Mother acknowledged that the children have “[p]robably”
indicated to her that they would like to spend more time with Father but also expressed concern
that Father had a history of telling the children about court proceedings.
{¶16} Father also expressed concern with respect to the health of the children and the
amount of time they spent in maternal grandmother’s care. Father asserted that both children had
been frequently sick with various illnesses, although there was no testimony that any health
professional found the children’s illnesses out of the ordinary. Father’s mother also observed that
the children were frequently ill. Father indicated that he and Mother have different parenting
styles, with Mother taking more of a watch and wait approach and Father being more proactive
about health concerns. Paternal grandmother also knew maternal grandmother, as paternal
grandmother would frequently pick up the children from maternal grandmother’s home to facilitate
Father’s parenting time. Maternal grandmother takes the children to school and picks them up.
Paternal grandmother indicated that maternal grandmother appeared upset and seemed tired from
taking care of the children. Paternal grandmother testified that maternal grandmother provided
extensive childcare for the children. Mother testified that her mother lives about 5 minutes away
and watches both children before and after school. Maternal grandmother drives the children to
school from her house and watches them after school for about 15 to 20 minutes until Mother can
pick them up. At the time of the hearing, both children were in school all day, so Mother was no
longer utilizing daycare for the children during the school year.
{¶17} Both children went to school in Stow but attended different schools. The children
attend Stow schools through open enrollment. The parties’ daughter began attending school in
Stow while the parties were still married. The daughter initially struggled in school after the
dissolution but was described as doing better at the time of the hearing. At the time of the hearing, 9
she was in fourth grade. Mother testified that the daughter had been diagnosed with ADHD;
however, Father did not believe that she had been diagnosed and believed the symptoms she was
experiencing were due to stress. Mother testified that the daughter is on a 504B plan in which the
school implements the pediatrician’s recommendations concerning the daughter’s ADHD. These
include giving the daughter breaks, taking tests by herself, and sitting at the front of the classroom.
{¶18} The son seemed to be doing well in school and had started kindergarten at the time
of the hearing. The son has been diagnosed with asthma; however, Father believes that Mother
has not adequately informed the school and daycare providers about the son’s condition.
{¶19} Under the shared parenting plan, Father had two midweek evenings of parenting
time. Father testified that he provided all the transportation for them. Initially, Father would take
the children to paternal grandmother’s house in Akron as not many places were open or available
due to COVID. However, paternal grandmother moved to Brimfield in 2023 to a smaller
residence, making it difficult for Father to exercise his parenting time there. He then began
temporarily going to paternal great-grandmother’s house for parenting time, which was further
away than paternal grandmother’s house. Father acknowledged that there was no other family in
the Youngstown area and multiple members of extended family in the Summit County area.
Nevertheless, Father argued it was more important for Father to see more of the children than for
the extended family to see the children. Father maintained that once he started having to do
midweek parenting time at paternal great-grandmother’s house, it became really difficult to have
time to do homework with the children. Father objected to having to spend the majority of his
time with the children helping with homework and felt it should be done before he picks them up.
Father also felt that he should not be responsible for taking the children to extracurricular activities
in Summit County which fall during his parenting time and that he did not sign the children up for. 10
Mother testified that there have been disputes about the children’s homework and that it poses a
problem when the daughter would come home and not have finished her homework and it was
almost time for bed.
{¶20} Transportation related to parenting time has also been an issue for the parties since
the dissolution. For much of the time, Father provided all of the transportation for the weekday
evening parenting time. According to Father, a few weeks before the hearing Mother began
picking the children up during the week following Father’s parenting time. Shortly after that,
Father decided that, during the week, Father would pick the children up, drive them back to his
home in Boardman, and then require Mother to pick the children up there and take them home.
Mother did not agree with this decision and thought it would amount to the children spending a lot
of time in the car and not a lot of time actually at Father’s residence. Both Father and Mother
indicated that they would be accepting of a more even sharing of transportation. Father preferred
that they meet halfway all the time, while Mother preferred that the receiving parent do the driving.
Mother also indicated that occasionally her boyfriend could help with transportation.
{¶21} Father took issue with having to pay both child support and half of the daycare
expenses. He asserted that this went against the intent of the original shared parenting plan which
utilized a children’s checkbook and required neither side to pay child support. However, months
after the original decree, the trial court issued an entry ordering Father to pay child support and
eliminating the children’s checkbook provision from the shared parenting plan. In 2021, a revised
shared parenting plan was adopted by the parties and made an agreed judgment entry of the court.
That shared parenting plan named Mother the residential parent for school purposes and included
a provision requiring the parties to split the costs of work-related childcare expenses. Father
claimed at the hearing that he signed the 2021 shared parenting plan under duress. 11
{¶22} In addition to the testimony, the parties submitted several exhibits, including pay
stubs, tax information, and details concerning childcare expenses.
{¶23} Father has not demonstrated that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling
Father’s objections to the magistrate’s decision as they related to shared parenting. Father
challenges the trial court’s decision retaining Mother as the residential parent for school purposes.
Father does not appear to contest that a change of circumstances was present. See R.C.
3109.04(E)(1)(a). However, Father has not argued or demonstrated that the provisions of R.C.
3109.04(E)(1)(a)(iii) were satisfied. As noted above, R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a)(iii) states that “the
court shall retain the residential parent designated by the prior decree or the prior shared parenting
decree, unless a modification is in the best interest of the child and . . . [t]he harm likely to be
caused by a change of environment is outweighed by the advantages of the change of environment
to the child.” Here, the children are doing well in Stow Schools. There was testimony that the
daughter was initially struggling following the dissolution but has been improving. The daughter’s
ADHD is also being managed by a 504B plan in the school. Father seems unwilling to
acknowledge that the daughter has ADHD and instead attributes her symptoms to stress. Notably,
both parents opted to send the daughter to school in Stow while they were still married despite
living in Cuyahoga Falls. Further, Father did not submit any evidence to verify his claim that his
schools were better than those in Stow. While Father expressed concern about the children’s
ability to socialize with other children in Mother’s area, the children are both in school now and
have extracurricular activities available to them. Moreover, the evaluator also recommended
Mother remain as the residential parent for school purposes, particularly in light of the distance
between Father and Mother and Father and the extended family. Mother’s location also provides
options for family members, such as maternal grandmother, to provide childcare for the children 12
before and after school. Overall, Father has not demonstrated that the trial court abused its
discretion. Father’s third assignment of error is overruled.
{¶24} Father’s first and second assignments of error challenge the changes that the trial
court made to Father’s parenting time.
{¶25} Father challenges the decrease in his midweek parenting time from two evenings a
week to one in his first assignment of error. While the text of the assignment of error asserts the
location of the midweek parenting time is problematic, no argument relative to that issue is
developed within the text of the brief and it will not be further addressed. Father has not
demonstrated that the trial court abused its discretion in decreasing Father’s midweek parenting
time to one evening per week. While it is true that the evaluator recommended continuing with
Father’s two midweek sessions of parenting time, the evaluator also noted there may be other
options such as granting Father parenting time on certain banking holidays, which is what in fact
the trial court did. Here, it is apparent that the trial court took to heart the concerns of both parties
and the best interests of the children. Both parties raised the issue of the quality of Father’s
midweek parenting time in light of the distance between the parties. Father expressed frustration
with having to help the children with homework during his midweek parenting time as he wanted
to be able to engage with them in more enjoyable ways. Mother also expressed concern about the
quality of the midweek parenting time in light of Father’s recent preference to take the children
back to his home for midweek parenting time. It is apparent that the trial court attempted to address
these issues by providing Father with three extra days of parenting time, i.e. the federal holidays,
which arguably would provide Father with more quality time given that, assuming the children
were off school, they could spend the day with him. This is especially so, in light of Father’s own
testimony that he had federal holidays off from work except under exceptional circumstances. 13
Father has not demonstrated that the trial court abused its discretion. Father’s first assignment of
error is overruled.
{¶26} Father asserts in his second assignment of error that the details that the trial court
imposed on Father’s parenting time on the three federal holidays were unreasonable. Specifically,
Father asserts that it was an abuse of discretion for Father to be required to provide all the
transportation for the three holidays and the trial court’s use of the phrase “after school” is
ambiguous and problematic in light of Father’s work schedule.
{¶27} The trial court’s judgment states as follows: “[Father] shall have the following
holidays: . . . Martin Luther King Day, President’s Day, and Veterans Day (Veterans Day only –
if there is no school, it shall be from 8 a.m. until 7:00 p.m.; if there is school, [Father] shall have
from after school until 8:00 p.m. This visit can be held out of Summit county, but [Father] will be
responsible for all of the transportation for this Holiday)[.]” Thus, the only holiday of the three
that specifically mentions transportation is Veterans Day. A separate provision of the judgment
entry indicates that, “[u]nless specifically outlined in this Order, the receiving parent (or an agent
of that parent) shall do the transportation.” Accordingly, Father is mistaken that the judgment
requires Father to provide all the transportation for the three holidays. Moreover, even if that is
what the entry provided, we cannot say that Father has demonstrated that the trial court abused its
discretion. Father does not generally work on federal holidays and thus transporting the children
on those three days and at any specific time on those days should not pose an undue burden. Father
has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion. Father’s second assignment of error is
overruled.
{¶28} Father’s first three assignments of error are overruled. 14
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION INCREASING THE APPELLANT/FATHER’S CHILD SUPPORT AND BY FINDING APPELLANT/FATHER IN CONTEMPT FOR NOT PAYING DAYCARE COSTS AND ORDERING HIM TO PAY $3,010.50, INCLUSIVE OF $2,010.50 IN DAYCARE EXPENSES AND $1,000.00 FOR LEGAL FEES.
{¶29} Father asserts in his fourth assignment of error that the trial court abused its
discretion in increasing Father’s child support and by finding Father in contempt for failing to pay
daycare expenses.
{¶30} While Father mentions contempt in the text of this assignment of error, in his brief
on this issue, Father has not argued how the trial court abused its discretion in finding him in
contempt. Accordingly, Father has not demonstrated that the trial court abused its discretion in
finding Father in contempt.
{¶31} “A decision regarding the modification of child support will not be disturbed absent
an abuse of discretion by the trial court.” (Internal quotations and citations omitted.) Bettinger v.
Bettinger, 2005-Ohio-5389, ¶ 7 (9th Dist.).
{¶32} On appeal, Father argues that there was not a more than ten percent difference
between the prior support order and the current deviated support amount, and thus there was not a
substantial change of circumstances. See R.C. 3119.79(A). We note that Father did not make this
argument in his objections. While Father mentioned the law surrounding substantial changes of
circumstance in his objections, he did not argue that the standard was not met. Thus, Father has
forfeited this argument and not argued plain error on appeal. See Herron, 2021-Ohio-2223, at ¶
15-16 (9th Dist.). Accordingly, we will not address it. See id. at ¶ 16.
{¶33} Father also contends that the trial court abused its discretion in increasing his child
support and in failing to deviate the child support downward more than it already did. Father has 15
not challenged the figures in the child support worksheet or argued that the downward deviations
made by the trial court were inappropriate or failed to comply with statutory mandates. The
judgment entry set forth that Father’s previous child support payment was $917.43 per month for
both children and the newly calculated amount was $1,119.45 prior to the deviation. The trial
court allotted Father a deviation of $1,754.12, based on Father’s testimony that that portion of his
pay was from taking additional training and he undertook that training in order to pay off his debts.
In addition, the trial court applied the additional statutorily mandated 10% deviation due to the
extent of Father’s parenting time. The deviated amount was $989.80 per month for both children,
which was a slight increase from the prior award.
{¶34} While Father did testify concerning his financial struggles, submitted an affidavit
of his income and expenses, and provided evidence that paternal grandmother paid $12,000 of his
expenses over the last two years, as mentioned above, Father’s financial circumstances were
considered in the trial court’s calculation of the child support award. The trial court did apply a
downward deviation in light of Father’s debt and need to pay it down and also applied a downward
deviation in light of the extent of Father’s parenting time. Further, the trial court deviated Father’s
cash medical support down to zero. Moreover, it is evident from considering other provisions of
the trial court’s judgment that the trial court took Father’s financial circumstances into
consideration. Notably, Father’s expenses, at least with respect to daycare, should decrease going
forward as both children were in school and the judgment entry provided that the parties would be
responsible for paying for their own daycare expenses. Accordingly, Father will no longer be
required to pay for half of the daycare expenses that Mother incurs. In addition, the transportation
duties will now be more evenly shared between the parties, which should also save Father some
money. Finally, the trial court could have disbelieved the extent of Father’s financial issues in 16
light of his claim that, if he was made the residential parent, he would not require any financial
support. Considering the totality of the record in light of Father’s arguments, we cannot say that
Father has shown that the trial court abused its discretion in modifying the child support award as
it did.
{¶35} Father’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.
III.
{¶36} Father’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Summit County
Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy
of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period
for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to
mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the
docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
DONNA J. CARR FOR THE COURT 17
FLAGG LANZINGER, P. J. SUTTON, J. CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
SUSAN J. LAX, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
LESLIE S. GRASKE, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.