Douglas Woo v. Scottsdale Insurance Company

Ninth Circuit

Douglas Woo v. Scottsdale Insurance Company

690 F. App'x 496

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedApril 28, 2017

Docket14-56992

StatusUnpublished

This text of 690 F. App'x 496 (Douglas Woo v. Scottsdale Insurance Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Douglas Woo v. Scottsdale Insurance Company, 690 F. App'x 496 (9th Cir. 2017).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

Plaintiffs-Appellants Douglas Woo, Arthur Moore, Benson Lin, Juan Salcedo, and John Araki (“Insureds”) sought declaratory relief and alleged breaches of contract and the implied covenant of good *497 faith and fair dealing after Defendant-Ap-pellee Scottsdale Insurance Company (“Insurance Company”) declined to defend against and provide coverage for a lawsuit brought against Insureds. The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted summary judgment in favor of the Insurance Company, and denied summary judgment in favor of Insureds. Insureds now appeal.

We review de novo. Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc); Moran v. Washington, 147 F.3d 839, 844 (9th Cir. 1998). “We determine, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law.” Oswalt v. Resolute Indus., Inc., 642 F.3d 856, 860 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Wallis v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 306 F.3d 827, 832 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

The district court correctly granted the Insurance Company’s motion for summary judgment and denied Insureds’ motion for summary judgment. At least two clauses included in the parties’ insurance contract namely the exclusions for prior knowledge and prior litigation expressly preclude coverage for the entirety of the Tatung lawsuit. The prior knowledge exclusion precludes coverage for the Tatung suit because an insured, albeit not necessarily the Insureds here seeking coverage, knew of the facts and circumstances from which the Tatung suit derived. Similarly, the pri- or litigation exclusion precludes coverage for the Tatung suit because the suit arose out of a demand letter issued before April 2010. Because these exclusions render coverage impossible for any of the claims raised in the Tatung lawsuit, Insurer has no duty to defend Insureds therein. See Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Super. Ct., 6 Cal.4th 287, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 467, 861 P.2d 1153, 1157-59 (1993).

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM **

Plaintiffs-Appellants Douglas Woo, Arthur Moore, Benson Lin, Juan Salcedo, and John Araki (“Insureds”) sought declaratory relief and alleged breaches of contract and the implied covenant of good *497 faith and fair dealing after Defendant-Ap-pellee Scottsdale Insurance Company (“Insurance Company”) declined to defend against and provide coverage for a lawsuit brought against Insureds. The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted summary judgment in favor of the Insurance Company, and denied summary judgment in favor of Insureds. Insureds now appeal.

We review de novo. Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc); Moran v. Washington, 147 F.3d 839, 844 (9th Cir. 1998). “We determine, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law.” Oswalt v. Resolute Indus., Inc., 642 F.3d 856, 860 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Wallis v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 306 F.3d 827, 832 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

The district court correctly granted the Insurance Company’s motion for summary judgment and denied Insureds’ motion for summary judgment. At least two clauses included in the parties’ insurance contract namely the exclusions for prior knowledge and prior litigation expressly preclude coverage for the entirety of the Tatung lawsuit. The prior knowledge exclusion precludes coverage for the Tatung suit because an insured, albeit not necessarily the Insureds here seeking coverage, knew of the facts and circumstances from which the Tatung suit derived. Similarly, the pri- or litigation exclusion precludes coverage for the Tatung suit because the suit arose out of a demand letter issued before April 2010. Because these exclusions render coverage impossible for any of the claims raised in the Tatung lawsuit, Insurer has no duty to defend Insureds therein. See Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Super. Ct., 6 Cal.4th 287, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 467, 861 P.2d 1153, 1157-59 (1993).

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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