Douglas v. US Bank Nat’l Assoc.

2013 DNH 071

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: May 6, 2013
• Docket: 13-cv-101-LM
• Status: Published

Opinion

Douglas v . US Bank Nat’l Assoc. 13-cv-101-LM 5/6/13

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Willard Douglas and Diane Douglas

v. Civil N o . 13-cv-101-LM Opinion N o . 2013 DNH 071 U.S. Bank National Association and Wells Fargo Home Mortgage

O R D E R

In a case that has been removed from the New Hampshire

Superior Court, Willard and Diane Douglas (“the Douglases” or

“petitioners”) petitioned the court to enjoin a foreclosure sale

that was scheduled for February 1 1 , 2013. Petitioners claimed

that if respondents held the sale without considering their

request for a loan modification, they would breach the implied

covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Before the court is

respondents’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted. Petitioners object. For the

reasons that follow, respondents’ motion to dismiss is granted.

The Legal Standard

Ruling on a motion to dismiss for “failure to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6),

requires the court to conduct a limited inquiry, focusing not on

1 “whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the

claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.”

Scheuer v . Rhodes, 416 U.S. 2 3 2 , 236 (1974). When considering

such a motion, a trial court “accept[s] as true all well-pled

facts in the complaint and draw[s] all reasonable inferences in

favor of plaintiffs.” Plumbers’ Union Local N o . 12 Pension Fund

v . Nomura Asset Acceptance Corp., 632 F.3d 7 6 2 , 771 (1st Cir.

2011) (quoting SEC v . Tambone, 597 F.3d 436, 441 (1st Cir.

2010)). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint “must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” González-

Maldonado v . MMM Healthcare, Inc., 693 F.3d 2 4 4 , 247 (1st Cir.

2012) (quoting Ashcroft v . Iqbal, 556 U.S. 6 6 2 , 678 (2009);

citing Bell Atl. Corp. v . Twombly, 550 U.S. 5 4 4 , 570 (2007)).

Background

The facts in this section are drawn from the petition that

initiated this case, augmented by documents appropriately

incorporated therein. See Rivera v . Centro Médico de Turabo,

Inc., 575 F.3d 1 0 , 15 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing Trans-Spec Truck

Serv., Inc. v . Caterpillar, Inc., 524 F.3d 315, 321 (1st Cir.

2008)); see also Banco Santander de P.R. v . Lopez-Stubbe (In re

Colonial Mortg. Bankers Corp.), 324 F.3d 1 2 , 19 (1st Cir. 2003)

(“matters of public record are fair game in adjudicating Rule 12(b)(6) motions, and a court’s reference to such matters does

not convert a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary

judgment”) (citing Boateng v . InterAmerican Univ., Inc., 210

F.3d 5 6 , 60 (1st Cir. 2000)).

In 2006, the Douglases received a home loan from Mortgage

Lenders Network USA, Inc. (“MLN”). They gave a mortgage to

secure their promise to repay the loan to Mortgage Electronic

Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”). MERS assigned the mortgage

to U.S. Bank National Association (“U.S. Bank”). Wells Fargo

Home Mortgage services the Douglases’ loan. The parties appear

to agree that the Douglases fell behind on their payments.

At some point, the petition does not say when, U.S. Bank

scheduled a foreclosure sale of the property the Douglases

mortgaged. In December of 2012, the Douglases applied for a

loan modification. About a month later, one of the respondents

(the petition does not say which o n e ) , told the Douglases that

their application had been prequalified for review and asked

them to provide updated financial information. On February 6,

2013, the Douglases provided respondent with the information it

requested.

The next day, upon learning that the foreclosure sale was

still scheduled to go o n , the Douglases filed a petition in the

New Hampshire Superior Court seeking “a Preliminary, Temporary,

and Permanent Injunction preventing the sale on February 1 1 ,

3 2013 to allow the Petitioner an opportunity to resolve this

issue with the Respondent in a timely manner.” Notice of

Removal, Attach. 1 (doc. n o . 1 - 1 ) , at 3 . They base their

petition on the following legal theory:

Because Respondent represented that Petitioner has been pre-qualified to be reviewed for a loan modification application, and that Respondent would in fact review Petitioner’s loan modification application, and because Petitioner has submitted a complete loan modification application, Respondent has breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by not postponing or cancelling the foreclosure sale date scheduled for Monday, February 1 1 , 2013 so that Petitioner’s loan modification application may be processed and Petitioner may be given either an acceptance or denial of his application.

Id. at 2 . The same day the Douglases filed their petition, the

Superior Court granted them a temporary injunction, see Resp’t’s

Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. 4 (doc. n o . 7 - 4 ) , and issued an order of

notice indicating that a hearing on the petition would be held

on March 7 , 2013, see State C t . Rec. (doc. n o . 6 ) 9. On March

5 , 2013, respondents removed the case to this court. The record

here includes no further information on the current status of

either the foreclosure or the Douglases’ application for a loan

modification.

Discussion

Respondents move to dismiss. They argue that the implied

covenant of good faith and fair dealing did not require them t o :

(1) modify the terms of the Douglases’ loan; or (2) consider the

4 Douglases’ application for a loan modification. Petitioners

respond by: (1) disavowing any argument that the implied

covenant required respondents to modify their loan; and (2)

contending that the covenant did require respondents to consider

their application for a loan modification. Respondents have the

better argument.

In New Hampshire, “every agreement [includes] an implied

covenant that the parties will act in good faith and fairly with

one another.” Birch Broad., Inc. v . Capitol Broad. Corp., 161

N.H. 1 9 2 , 198 (2010) (citing Livingston v . 18 Mile Point Drive,

Ltd., 158 N.H. 619, 624 (2009)). As the New Hampshire Supreme

Court recently observed:

there is not merely one rule of implied good-faith duty, but a series of doctrines, each of which serves a different function. The various implied good-faith obligations fall into three general categories: (1) contract formation; (2) termination of at-will employment agreements; and (3) limitation of discretion in contractual performance.

Birch, 161 N.H. at 198 (citations omitted). The court went on

to describe the third category this way: “While the third

category is comparatively narrow, its broader function is to

prohibit behavior inconsistent with the parties’ agreed-upon

common purpose and justified expectations as well as ‘with

common standards of decency, fairness and reasonableness.’” Id.

(quoting Livingston, 158 N.H. at 6 2 4 ) .

5 In its seminal case on the implied covenant of good faith

and fair dealing, the New Hampshire Supreme Court explained that

within the narrower confines of the third category of cases . . . the obligation of good faith performance is better understood simply as excluding behavior inconsistent with common standards of decency, fairness, and reasonableness, and with the parties’ agreed-upon common purposes and justified expectations.

Centronics Corp. v . Genicom Corp., 132 N.H. 133, 140 (1989)

(citing Robert S . Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith – Its

Recognition and Conceptualization, 67 Cornell L . Rev. 8 1 0 , 8 2 0 ,

826 (1982); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 cmt. a ) .

After surveying a number of its own cases, the court concluded:

Despite the variety of their fact patterns, these cases illustrate a common rule: under an agreement that appears by word or silence to invest one party with a degree of discretion in performance sufficient to deprive another party of a substantial proportion of the agreement’s value, the parties’ intent to be bound by an enforceable contract raises an implied obligation of good faith to observe reasonable limits in exercising that discretion, consistent with the parties’ purpose or purposes in contracting.

Centronics, 132 N.H. at 143.

The court then set out four questions that are raised by a

claim that a contracting party has breached the covenant of good

faith in contract performance. See Centronics, 132 N.H. at 144.

The first question is this: “Does the agreement ostensibly allow

to or confer upon the defendant a degree of discretion in

performance tantamount to a power to deprive the plaintiff of a

6 substantial proportion of the agreement’s value?” Id. If the

agreement does not confer such discretion, then no claim for

breach of the covenant of good faith in contract performance can

lie. See id. at 144-45.

Since the start of 2012, three different judges of this

court have been faced with claims similar to the one petitioners

make here, and all three have dismissed those claims. In Moore

v . Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., 848 F. Supp.

2d 107 (D.N.H. 2012), Judge Laplante dismissed a claim for

breach of the implied covenant of good fair dealing and

explained his decision in the following way:

The Moores also suggest that the defendants breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by refusing to modify the mortgage, or to engage in good-faith negotiations regarding modification. Courts have generally concluded, however, that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in a loan agreement cannot be used to require the lender to modify or restructure the loan. See, e.g., FAMM Steel, Inc. v . Sovereign Bank, 571 F.3d 9 3 , 100–01 (1st Cir. 2009) (applying Massachusetts l a w ) ; Rosemont Gardens Funeral Chapel–Cemetary, Inc. v . Trustmark Nat’l Bank, 330 F. Supp. 2d 8 0 1 , 810–11 (S.D. Miss. 2004) (collecting cases). These decisions are consistent with New Hampshire law that the [implied] covenant cannot be used to rewrite a contract to avoid harsh results. See Olbres [v. Hampton Co-op. Bank], 142 N.H. [227,] 233 [(1997)]. The court sees no reason to believe that the New Hampshire Supreme Court would nevertheless allow the implied covenant to be used to require the parties here to rewrite their contract.

Moore, 848 F. Supp. 2d at 129-30 (parallel citations omitted,

emphasis added).

7 In Schaefer v . IndyMac Mortgage Services, the plaintiff

“concede[d] that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing

cannot be used to require a lender to modify or restructure a

loan,” N o . 12-cv-159-JD, 2012 WL 4929094, at *6 (D.N.H. Oct. 1 6 ,

2012), but argued “that he was entitled to a full and fair

consideration of his application for a modification, and that

the defendants[’] failure to consider his application breached

the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,” id. After

explaining that Moore “addressed allegations that a lender

refused to . . . engage in good-faith negotiations regarding

modification,” Schaefer, 2012 WL 4929094, at *6 (internal

quotation marks omitted), Judge DiClerico rejected the

plaintiff’s argument that he was entitled by the covenant of

good faith and fair dealing to a full pre-foreclosure

consideration of his application for a modification, see id.

Judge Barbadoro’s decision in Ruivo v . Wells Fargo Bank,

N.A., N o . 11-cv-466-PB, 2012 WL 5845452 (D.N.H. Nov. 1 9 , 2012),

is to similar effect. Judge Barbadoro first explained that

“[t]he duty of good faith and fair dealing applies . . . only

when the agreement grants a contracting party discretion in

performing his duties under the agreement and an unreasonable

exercise of that party’s discretion causes harm to the other

contracting party.” Id. at *3 (citing Scott v . First Am. Title

Ins. Co., N o . 06-cv-286-JD, 2007 WL 135909, at *5 (D.N.H. Jan.

8 1 7 , 2007); Ahrendt v . Granite Bank, 144 N.H. 3 0 8 , 312-313

(1999)). He then noted that the plaintiff in the case before

him “appear[ed] to argue that Wells Fargo [was] liable because

it abused the discretion that a party to a contract always has

to agree to another party’s request to modify the contract.”

Ruivo, 2012 WL 5845452, at * 3 . In reliance upon Moore, Judge

Barbadoro rejected that argument and dismissed the plaintiff’s

claim. See Ruivo, 2012 WL 5845452, at * 3 - 4 .

Moore, Schaefer, and Ruivo are all on point and persuasive.

Those decisions strongly counsel in favor of dismissing the

Douglases’ petition. Petitioners attempt to avoid Moore and its

progeny by arguing that their petition

alleges facts sufficient to state the claim that [respondents] have breached the covenant because [they] did not consider the [petitioners’] loan modification application after [they] exercised their discretion within the terms of the mortgage contract to hold off on foreclosure for the common purpose of deciding whether to continue the mortgage contract by considering whether or not the [petitioner] qualified for a loan modification.

Pet’r’s Mem. (doc. n o . 9-1) 2 (emphasis in the original). In

petitioners’ view,

because [respondents] exercised their discretion within the mortgage contract to hold off on foreclosure for the common purpose of continuing the mortgage contract by determining whether the [petitioners] qualified for modification, but then proceeded to foreclose before considering said application, [respondents’] behavior breached the covenant because it was “inconsistent with the

9 parties’ agreed-upon common purpose and justified expectations.”

Id. (quoting Galvin v . EMC Mortg. Corp., N o . 12-cv-320-JL, 2013

WL 1386614, at *11 (D.N.H. Apr. 4 , 2013)). Petitioners conclude

by arguing:

[T]he [petitioners’] ex parte injunction does articulate how the [respondents’] discretion was unreasonably exercised. The ex parte in[j]unction implies that [respondents] unjustly exercised the discretion conferred by the mortgage when [respondent] offered [petitioners] the option to pursue a loan modification, and then neglected to follow through with the offer. . . . The [petition] references the loan modification, the common purpose of which is to allow the borrowers to continue to pay the bank money owed, potentially at a lower interest rate and over a longer period of time than the original terms of the agreement, so that the bank can get its return on its investment and so that the borrowers can stay in their home. Because the lender offered a loan modification to the [petitioners], [petitioners] had a justified expectation, not to necessarily be granted a loan modification, but to be reviewed for one based on whether it made financial sense for the bank and for the borrower. If the [petitioners] had been reviewed and accepted for a loan modification, the foreclosure would not have proceeded.

Pet’r’s Mem. (doc. n o . 9-1) 5 (citation to the record omitted,

emphasis in the original).

Petitioners appear to be arguing that once a respondent

broached the possibility of a loan modification with them, and

they applied for a modification, the respondent was precluded by

the covenant of good-faith contract performance from foreclosing

until after it fully considered the application. But, Judge

10 DiClerico has rejected a substantially similar argument in

Schaefer. As he explained,

because the defendants were not required to consider Schaefer’s loan modification application, they similarly cannot be held liable for preparing to foreclose on Schaefer’s home while simultaneously considering his loan modification application.

2012 WL 4929094, at * 6 . Judge DiClerico’s reasoning applies

with equal force to the argument petitioners appear to be making

in this case.

In addition, petitioners’ argument focuses on the common

purpose of a loan modification and the expectations they

developed as a result of respondents’ alleged representations

concerning such relief, but there is no allegation that the

parties ever agreed to a loan modification. Thus, the only

agreement in this case is the one under which MLN promised to

loan the Douglases $234,000 and the Douglases promised to repay

that loan and to secure that promise by giving a mortgage on the

property they purchased with the money they were loaned. The

common purposes of that agreement were t o : (1) provide the

Douglases with the money they needed to buy a house; and (2)

provide for MLN’s repayment. The Douglases’ justified

expectation was that MLN would loan them $234,000, which it did.

MLN’s justified expectations, and U.S. Bank’s, were that: (1)

the Douglases would repay their loan, which they have not; and

(2) if the Douglases defaulted, the mortgagee would be able to

11 recover what it was owed by foreclosing on the mortgage securing

the Douglases’ promise to repay the loan.

Perhaps most importantly, this is not a case involving an

agreement that gave respondents discretion in performance such

that they could deprive the Douglases of a substantial

proportion of the agreement’s value. Like the borrower in

Moore, petitioners “do not identify any particular grant of

discretion in the mortgage that they believe was exercised

unreasonably.” 848 F. Supp. 2d at 129; see also Ruivo, 2012 WL

5845452, at *3 (noting that borrower did “not point to any

specific provision in the agreement to support her claim”).

Rather, their reference to respondents’ “discretion within the

mortgage contract to hold off on foreclosure,” Pet’r’s Mem.

(doc. n o . 9-1) 2 , makes their claim identical to the one Judge

Barbadoro dismissed in Ruivo. See 2012 WL 5845452, at *3

(describing borrower’s argument that lender was “liable because

it abused the discretion that a party to a contract always has

to agree to another party’s request to modify the contract”).

Beyond that, it is undisputed that the Douglases got their loan,

which means, necessarily, that they received the full value of

their agreement. That the Douglases later found themselves

unable to repay their loan, and may have benefitted from a loan

modification, does nothing to undermine the fact that, in the

12 first instance, they received the loan they bargained for, which

was the full value of their agreement.

In sum, the contract in this case did not confer upon

respondents a level of discretion that allowed them to deprive

the Douglases of a substantial portion of the agreement’s value.

Thus, petitioners have failed to state a claim for breach of the

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See

Centronics, 132 N.H. at 144-45. Accordingly, respondents are

entitled to dismissal of the Douglases’ petition.

Conclusion

For the reasons detailed above, respondents’ motion to

dismiss, document no. 7, is granted. The clerk of the court

shall enter judgment in accordance with this order close the

case.

SO ORDERED.

Landya 4fcq£perty United Staphs Magistrate Judge

May 6, 2013

cc: Samuel J. Donlon, Esq. Jeremy A. Miller, Esq. Michael R. Stanley, Esq.