Douglas v. New York Elevated Railroad

45 A.D. 596, 61 N.Y.S. 411
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedDecember 15, 1899
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 45 A.D. 596 (Douglas v. New York Elevated Railroad) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Douglas v. New York Elevated Railroad, 45 A.D. 596, 61 N.Y.S. 411 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1899).

Opinion

Ingraham, J.:

The judgment in this action enjoins the defendants from the maintenance and operation of the elevated railroad structure in front of the plaintiffs premises,. Nos. 125,173 and 179 Pearl street, unless the defendants should pay the plaintiff the sum of $38,000, and further awards judgment fur the damages for the past trespass [597]*597upon the plaintiff’s interests in Pearl street of $33,371. The appellants take the point on this appeal that the evidence shows that the plaintiff had no title to No. 179 Pearl street prior to the year 1895, and attention is called to certain quitclaim deeds dated in 1895, and also to a partition deed dated the 16th df January, 1834, as the only deeds or instruments offered in evidence relating to the title to No. 179 Pearl street. These deeds are not printed in full, the case merely containing a statement of the deeds, naming the parties to them, and that they affect 179 Pearl street, with a statement that the exhibits are' not printed, but may be produced and used by either party upon the argument with the same force and effect as if so printed. The appellants having stated that the effect of these deeds was to show that no title to this property was vested in the plaintiff prior to 1895, they sign a stipulation by which it appears that this deed of 1834 conveyed in fee simple to George Douglas, therein mentioned, the premises No. 179 Pearl street; that in the record of the partition suit, introduced in evidence, it is alleged in the complaint, and the judgment found as a fact, that William P. Douglas is the only son and only heir at law of his father George Douglas, deceased, and that William P. Douglas (the plaintiff) was entitled to the real estate of which George Douglas died seized; and there is further evidence that plaintiff’s father died in 1863, leaving plaintiff his only heir at law, and that this property was in the possession of the plaintiff and his father for over thirty years prior to the trial of the action. It thus appeared in proof .on the trial that plaintiff’s father acquired the property in 1834, and that plaintiff inherited it on his father’s death.

The premises at 125 Pearl street face Hanover street. The elevated railroad structure in front of this station is nineteen feet eight inches in height from the street to the top of the ties, and the distance from the track walk on the side of the elevated structure to the building line is from ten feet ten inches to fourteen feet eight inches. There are two tracks in front of this property, the tracks being from fifteen feet seven inches to nineteen feet from the building. Nos. 173 and 179 Pearl street are on the east side of Pearl street between Cedar and Pine streets. The elevated structure in front of this property is about twenty-five feet from the surface of the street, and the distance from the house to [598]*598the column in the street is nine feet four inches, and the distance from the house to the rail is about fourteen feet.

Before discussing the principal objections taken by the appellants upoii the ground that the awards were excessive, we will consider the objections to testimony.' The. question was asked, “ Taking the region bounded by Broadway, Cedar and Pearl streets down to Whitehall street, what has been the general course of values, in your Opinion, rental and fee, in that district in streets, through which the elevated railroad does not run, since 1878?” This was objected to by the defendants on the ground that it “ is too general and indefinite; that it includes a territory wholly dissimilar in the improvement of property, and in the use and occupation of property, from the street on which the plaintiff’s property is located.” After answering that question the witness was further asked: “Now, take the región south of Cedar and Fletcher streets and east of Pearl street, between Pearl street and the river, what has been the course of values in that district, rental and fee, since 1878?” to which the same objec-' tion was taken. While it may be said, that .some of the property within the boundaries mentioned is quite dissimilar from the plaintiff’s property, still the section specified is bounded upon the street upon which the plaintiff’s property abuts, and the question calls for thé general course of values of that property on both sides of Pearl street upon which the defendants’ road is constructed. The district to which the inquiry related is not remote from the plaintiff’s property, and while there are undoubtedly causes operating in favor of portions of this property which would not operate in favor of the plaintiff’s property, it was competent to show the general course of values in this portion of the city. Property in the lower part of the city of New York, solely devoted to business purposes, would be subject to the general course of values; and while particular blocks of property might be subject to greater fluctuation because of the local condition affecting a special locality, either advantageously or disadvantageous^, if. a general course of value could be ¡Droved in that part of the city which includes the plaintiff’s property, it would be competent evidence to show the general course of value to which the plaintiff’s property would, under ordinary conditions, be subjected.

This case is entirely different from the case of Stuyvesant v. New [599]*599York Elevated R. R. Co. (4 App. Div. 159), for there the value .of certain leaseholds upon Third avenue at and below Twenty-first street was compared with leaseholds on Fifth avenue between Forty-seventh and Fifty-first streets, property entirely dissimilar in character and use, not in any way contiguous to the property in question and having no .general relation to it. Here, as before stated, the locality is in the immediate neighborhood of the plaintiff’s property. The two questions taken together inquire as to the general course of values of the portion of the city devoted to business purposes which adjoins the plaintiff’s property, both on the east and the west; and it was quite material, it seems to me, for the plaintiff to establish that all of the property surrounding his upon both the east and the west had materially advanced in value since the construction of the elevated railroad. Under the Jamieson Case (Jamieson v. Kings County Elevated R. Co., 147 N. Y. 322) all evidence of value of specified pieces ■of property m ust be excluded. It is only the general course of values •of neighboring property that can be compared with the changes in the "value of the property affected by the trespass; and, in determining these questions, the court must ascertain the facts and compare the course of the value of the property in question with the general ■course of the value of other property in the same locality. There is nothing in the rule that restricts such an inquiry to immediate adjoining streets. A general view of the property used for similar purposes in a general locality would often be quite as useful in arriving at the correct result as to mention specific streets which would be more or less affected by local conditions.

The ruling of the court that the defendants are bound by the principle established in the Jamieson case is not an open question in this court.

We now come to the main question in the case, viz., the amount ■of the awards. As to Ho. 125 Pearl street, the evidence shows that the rent from 1873 to 1876 was $5,500 ; from 1876 to 1877, $5,930, and in 1878 $5,036. The year after the elevated road was built, in 1878, the rent decreased to $4,284 per year, and it is held at about that sum, the rent for 1895 being $4,050.

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Bluebook (online)
45 A.D. 596, 61 N.Y.S. 411, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/douglas-v-new-york-elevated-railroad-nyappdiv-1899.