Douglas v. Merceles

25 N.J. Eq. 144
New Jersey Court of Chancery·Decided May 15, 1874·Published·Cited by 1 cases

Opinion

The Chancellor.

By an order made in this .cause, on the 31st of March, 1873, it was referred to a master, to ascertain what the market value was per share, of the stock of the Riverside Land Improvement Company, on the 1st day of November, 1867, and also the number of shares of stock of that company, which, at the par value, $50 per share, would be equal to the one twenty-fifth part of $22,500 and interest thereon, from September 28th, 1866, to November 1st, 1867, and what the value of such shares would have been at that market value, so ascertained, on the last named day, and the amount of such market value of those shares, together with the interest thereon, up. to the day on which the master should make his report. The master having reported, exception was filed to so much of his report as relates to the market value of the stock. He reports that that value was, on the 1st of November, 1867, $211.30 per share, and gives as his reasons for this conclusion, that the evidence shows that, on the day last mentioned, the stock was not in the market; that the company then owned three thousand one hundred and eighty lots of land ; that each share of stock represented two and sixty-seven one hundred and twenty-fifths lots ; that each acre of land [146] then owned by the company, contained twelve lots, and was worth $1000, at an average valuation, and that each lot was therefore worth $83.33.

Finding that the stock was not in the market on the day as of which the market value was to be fixed, he has found and reported what he considers to have been its intrinsic value. The market value and the intrinsic value are, by no means, necessarily the same; the terms are not convertible. The intrinsic value of a stock is not only not an infallible guide to its price in the market, but is, in fact, no guide at all. A stock intrinsically worthless, may bring a good price, while, on the other hand, one of great intrinsic value, may be greatly depreciated. If, under such a reference as that under consideration, the master should find no guide to which he could reasonably commit his conclusions — if he should find no market price within a reasonable period, either before or after the day to which his inquiries are to be directed, the intrinsic value may then enter into his estimate. But, the order in this case called for his report as to the market value, a term deliberately employed as being exactly expressive of the meaning of the court. And if a marketable value could be established, the master was bound to find and report it. The late Chancellor found no fraud in the conduct of the owners of the four and a-half shares of the original association. His language is (Douglas v. Merceles, 8 C. E. Green 335 :) “ The bait of the profits was held out by the others, but Douglas did not believe in any profits ; he had lost confidence in the speculation, and, like a prudent man, was not willing to make himself liable for more than he was already liable for. He rightly apprehended what the others did not see — that, if the scheme was a failure, he would be liable for losses in proportion to his interest. I can see no fraud practised upon him by the others. He was, perhaps, over cautious — at all events, as it turned out, those that had faith in it were right. But he cannot protect himself by his over-cautiousness, and then ask for a share of the profits of his less prudent associates, who chose to run the risk, and who have made the profits. I [147] •am of opinion that the complainant is not, by the agreement, ■entitled to any part of these four and a-half shares in the •original association.” He held, however, that those who took those shares, ought to have paid for them with their own funds; but, instead of that, they paid for them in the funds ■of the association, and therefore with money of which the ■complainant was entitled to one-twenty-fifth part, for which part they are bound to account to him in the stock of the ■company, at its “ real market value” at the time of the conveyance, the 1st of November, 1867. The company dissolved on the 17th of July, 1872. Its dissolution had taken place, and its assets had been divided among its stockholders, when the opinion above quoted was delivered. The order ■contemplated, therefore, that payment was to be made in money, instead of stock. The intention of the court was, to require the owners of those shares to account to the complain.•anl for the one twenty-fifth part of the moneys of the association, taken to pay for those four and a-half shares, with interest, as in the stock of the company at its current value In the market on the 1st day of November, 1867.

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Douglas v. Merceles, 25 N.J. Eq. 144 (N.J. Ct. App. 1874).

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