Douglas v. Florida Parole Commission

710 So. 2d 142, 1998 Fla. App. LEXIS 4222, 1998 WL 176561
District Court of Appeal of Florida·Decided April 17, 1998·No. No. 97-1333·Published·Cited by 1 cases

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

James Douglas (defendant) appeals the trial court’s order denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus. In the petition, the defendant contended that the cancellation of his control release credits by the Department of Corrections was an ex post facto application of law. We affirm. To be an ex post facto application, the law must apply to events occurring before its enactment. See Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-30, 101 S.Ct. 960, 963-65, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981). In this case, at the time he committed his crime and was sentenced as an habitual offender, the defendant was not entitled to control release credits. See § 947.146(4)(e), Fla. Stat. (1989). Thus, the cancellation of control release credits pursuant to section 947.146(3)(g), Florida Statutes (1995), was not an ex post facto application of law.

AFFIRMED.

COBB, W. SHARP and ANTOON, JJ„ concur.

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Douglas v. Florida Parole Commission, 710 So. 2d 142, 1998 Fla. App. LEXIS 4222, 1998 WL 176561 (Fla. Ct. App. 1998).

710 So. 2d 142 (Douglas v. Florida Parole Commission) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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