Douglas v. Florida Parole Commission

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Douglas v. Florida Parole Commission

710 So. 2d 142, 1998 Fla. App. LEXIS 4222, 1998 WL 176561

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedApril 17, 1998

DocketNo. 97-1333

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 710 So. 2d 142 (Douglas v. Florida Parole Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Douglas v. Florida Parole Commission, 710 So. 2d 142, 1998 Fla. App. LEXIS 4222, 1998 WL 176561 (Fla. Ct. App. 1998).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

James Douglas (defendant) appeals the trial court’s order denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus. In the petition, the defendant contended that the cancellation of his control release credits by the Department of Corrections was an ex post facto application of law. We affirm. To be an ex post facto application, the law must apply to events occurring before its enactment. See Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-30, 101 S.Ct. 960, 963-65, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981). In this case, at the time he committed his crime and was sentenced as an habitual offender, the defendant was not entitled to control release credits. See § 947.146(4)(e), Fla. Stat. (1989). Thus, the cancellation of control release credits pursuant to section 947.146(3)(g), Florida Statutes (1995), was not an ex post facto application of law.

AFFIRMED.

COBB, W. SHARP and ANTOON, JJ„ concur.

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PER CURIAM.

James Douglas (defendant) appeals the trial court’s order denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus. In the petition, the defendant contended that the cancellation of his control release credits by the Department of Corrections was an ex post facto application of law. We affirm. To be an ex post facto application, the law must apply to events occurring before its enactment. See Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-30, 101 S.Ct. 960, 963-65, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981). In this case, at the time he committed his crime and was sentenced as an habitual offender, the defendant was not entitled to control release credits. See § 947.146(4)(e), Fla. Stat. (1989). Thus, the cancellation of control release credits pursuant to section 947.146(3)(g), Florida Statutes (1995), was not an ex post facto application of law.

AFFIRMED.

COBB, W. SHARP and ANTOON, JJ„ concur.

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710 So. 2d 142, 1998 Fla. App. LEXIS 4222, 1998 WL 176561, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/douglas-v-florida-parole-commission-fladistctapp-1998.

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