Douglas Prestidge v. United States

Ninth Circuit

Douglas Prestidge v. United States

612 F. App'x 466

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedAugust 11, 2015

Docket14-16740

StatusUnpublished

This text of 612 F. App'x 466 (Douglas Prestidge v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Douglas Prestidge v. United States, 612 F. App'x 466 (9th Cir. 2015).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

Douglas L. Prestidge appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his civil action alleging negligence, medical malpractice, and other various claims in connection with medical care provided by the Department of Veterans Affairs. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a. district court’s dismissal based on res judicata. Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 381 (9th Cir.1998). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed the action because Prestidge’s claims were raised, or could have been raised, in a prior federal action between the parties that resulted in a final judgment on the merits. See id. (elements of res judicata); Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 956-57 (9th Cir.2002) (the doctrine of res judicata bars subsequent litigation both of claims that were raised and those that could have been raised in the prior action).

We reject Prestidge’s contention that the district court erred by decision to consolidate the cases. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(a); Burchinal v. Cent. Wash. Bank (In re Adams Apple, Inc.), 829 F.2d 1484, 1487 (9th Cir.1987) (“[Cjonsolidation is within the broad discretion of the district court.”).

We reject Prestidge’s contention that the district court erred by not granting his request for oral argument, as the district court was not required to do so under the local rules and, in any event, there is no showing of prejudice. See Houston v. Bryan, 725 F.2d 516, 518 (9th ’ Cir.1984).

*467 We do not consider arguments not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n. 2 (9th Cir.2009) (per curiam).

We grant Prestidge’s motion to accept his late-filed reply brief.

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM **

Douglas L. Prestidge appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his civil action alleging negligence, medical malpractice, and other various claims in connection with medical care provided by the Department of Veterans Affairs. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a. district court’s dismissal based on res judicata. Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 381 (9th Cir.1998). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed the action because Prestidge’s claims were raised, or could have been raised, in a prior federal action between the parties that resulted in a final judgment on the merits. See id. (elements of res judicata); Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 956-57 (9th Cir.2002) (the doctrine of res judicata bars subsequent litigation both of claims that were raised and those that could have been raised in the prior action).

We reject Prestidge’s contention that the district court erred by decision to consolidate the cases. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(a); Burchinal v. Cent. Wash. Bank (In re Adams Apple, Inc.), 829 F.2d 1484, 1487 (9th Cir.1987) (“[Cjonsolidation is within the broad discretion of the district court.”).

We reject Prestidge’s contention that the district court erred by not granting his request for oral argument, as the district court was not required to do so under the local rules and, in any event, there is no showing of prejudice. See Houston v. Bryan, 725 F.2d 516, 518 (9th ’ Cir.1984).

*467 We do not consider arguments not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n. 2 (9th Cir.2009) (per curiam).

We grant Prestidge’s motion to accept his late-filed reply brief.

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

In Re Adams Apple, Inc., Debtor. Robert C. Burchinal, Donald G. Ott, Meton G. Raine, Karen O. Raine, John Ruud, Richard H. Mason, Phyllis Mason, Richard Floren, Rachel Floren, Kenneth R. Irwin, Sharon Irwin, Richard J. Willsey and Cheri Ann Willsey, Plaintiffs v. Central Washington Bank, Bank of California v. Central Washington Bank

829 F.2d 1484 (Ninth Circuit, 1987)

Margaret Stewart Jamey L. Paulson William Keith Laura Spencer Lee Callison Stephanie Glowa Terri Gorecki Dan Berryman v. U.S. Bancorp

297 F.3d 953 (Ninth Circuit, 2002)

Padgett v. Wright

587 F.3d 983 (Ninth Circuit, 2009)

Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park

159 F.3d 374 (Ninth Circuit, 1998)

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