Douglas Leroy Blunkall

CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. California
DecidedApril 13, 2020
Docket19-27512
StatusUnknown

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Bluebook
Douglas Leroy Blunkall, (Cal. 2020).

Opinion

1 2 POSTED ON WEBSITE 3 NOT FOR PUBLICATION 4 5 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 6 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 8 9 In re ) Case No. 19-27512-A-7 ) Docket Control No. ALG-1 10 DOUGLAS LEROY BLUNKALL, ) ) 11 Debtor. ) ) 12 13 This Memorandum Decision is not appropriate for publication. It may be cited for persuasive value on the matters addressed. 14 15 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND DECISION 16 Arvest Central Mortgage Company (“Movant”) seeks relief from the automatic stay with 17 respect to Douglas Leroy Blunkall’s (“Debtor”) real property commonly known as 24567 Clement 18 Avenue, Los Molinos, California (“Property”). The hearing on the Motion was set for April 9, 2020. 19 As stated in the Civil Minutes, the filing of a supplemental pleading was required to clearly have a 20 correct record in this Contested Matter. The court continued the hearing to April 30, 2020, to allow 21 for the filing of the supplemental pleading, for the court to consider the full records, and, if the 22 documentation warranted it, removing the matter from the April 30, 2020 calendar and issuing the 23 order without further hearing. 24 Such supplemental pleading was filed on April 9, 2020. Dckt. 22. The record being 25 complete, the matter is removed from the April 30, 2020 calendar and the court issues this Decision 26 and order pursuant thereto. 27 This is a core matter arising under the Bankruptcy Code for which the Bankruptcy judge 28 issues the final order. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and 157(a), and the referral of bankruptcy cases and all 1 related matters to the bankruptcy judges in this District. ED Cal. Gen Order 182, 223. 2 REVIEW OF MOTION, SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADING, AND SUPPORTING POINTS AND AUTHORITIES, 3 DECLARATION, AND EXHIBITS 4 Movant seeks relief from the automatic stay to allow it to exercise its rights in the Property 5 to foreclose on, obtain possession of, and take all other related actions necessary to realize the value 6 of its collateral for its secured claim. Movant has provided the Declaration of Latoya Johnson to 7 introduce evidence to authenticate the documents upon which it bases the claim and the obligation 8 secured by the Property. 9 In the Supplement to the Motion filed on April 9, 2020 (Dckt. 22), Movant states with 10 particularity the grounds upon which the relief is based. 11 Movant argues Debtor has not made two (2) post-petition payments, with a total of $2,488.14 12 in post-petition payments past due. Declaration, Dckt. 15. Movant also provides evidence that there 13 are 16 pre-petition payments in default, with a pre-petition arrearage of $19,659.82. Id. 14 CHAPTER 7 TRUSTEE’S NON-OPPOSITION 15 Nikki B. Farris (“the Chapter 7 Trustee”) filed a statement of no opposition. Trustee’s 16 March 6, 2020 Docket Entry Statement. 17 DISCUSSION 18 From the evidence provided to the court, and only for purposes of this Motion for Relief, the 19 debt secured by this asset is determined to be $118,481.43 (Declaration, Dckt. 15), while the value 20 of the Property is determined to be $100,000.00, as stated in Schedules B and D filed by Debtor. 21 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1): Grant Relief for Cause 22 Whether there is cause under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) to grant relief from the automatic stay 23 is a matter within the discretion of a bankruptcy court and is decided on a case-by-case basis. See 24 J E Livestock, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In re J E Livestock, Inc.), 375 B.R. 892 (B.A.P. 10th 25 Cir. 2007) (quoting In re Busch, 294 B.R. 137, 140 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2003)) (explaining that 26 granting relief is determined on a case-by-case basis because “cause” is not further defined in the 27 Bankruptcy Code); In re Silverling, 179 B.R. 909 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1995), aff’d sub nom. Silverling 28 v. United States (In re Silverling), No. CIV. S-95-470 WBS, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4332 (E.D. Cal. 1 1996). While granting relief for cause includes a lack of adequate protection, there are other 2 grounds. See In re J E Livestock, Inc., 375 B.R. at 897 (quoting In re Busch, 294 B.R. at 140). The 3 court maintains the right to grant relief from stay for cause when a debtor has not been diligent in 4 carrying out his or her duties in the bankruptcy case, has not made required payments, or is using 5 bankruptcy as a means to delay payment or foreclosure. W. Equities, Inc. v. Harlan (In re Harlan), 6 783 F.2d 839 (9th Cir. 1986); Ellis v. Parr (In re Ellis), 60 B.R. 432 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1985). The 7 court determines that cause exists for terminating the automatic stay, including defaults in post- 8 petition payments that have come due. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1); In re Ellis, 60 B.R. 432. 9 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) 10 A debtor has no equity in property when the liens against the property exceed the property’s 11 value. Stewart v. Gurley, 745 F.2d 1194, 1195 (9th Cir. 1984). Once a movant under 11 U.S.C. 12 § 362(d)(2) establishes that a debtor or estate has no equity in property, it is the burden of the debtor 13 or trustee to establish that the collateral at issue is necessary to an effective reorganization. 11 U.S.C. 14 § 362(g)(2); United Sav. Ass’n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs. Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 15 375–76 (1988). Based upon the evidence submitted, the court determines that there is no equity in 16 the Property for either Debtor or the Estate. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2). This being a Chapter 7 case, the 17 Property is per se not necessary for an effective reorganization. See Ramco Indus. v. Preuss (In re 18 Preuss), 15 B.R. 896 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1981). 19 Discharge Granted Debtor 20 Debtor was granted a discharge in this case on March 11, 2020. Dckt. 20. Granting of a 21 discharge to an individual in a Chapter 7 case terminates the automatic stay as to that debtor by 22 operation of law, replacing it with the discharge injunction. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(c)(2)(C), 23 524(a)(2). There being no automatic stay, the Motion is denied as moot as to Debtor. The Motion 24 is granted as to the Estate. 25 The court shall issue an order terminating and vacating the automatic stay to allow Movant, 26 and its agents, representatives and successors, and all other creditors having lien rights against the 27 Property, to conduct a nonjudicial foreclosure sale pursuant to applicable nonbankruptcy law and 28 their contractual rights, and for any purchaser, or successor to a purchaser, at the nonjudicial 1 || foreclosure sale to obtain possession of the Property. 2 || Request for Waiver of Fourteen-Day Stay of Enforcement 3 Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure

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