Douglas Lawhon v. the State of Texas

• Court: Texas Court of Appeals, 2nd District (Fort Worth)
• Decided: June 25, 2026
• Docket: 02-25-00140-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________

No. 02-25-00140-CR ___________________________

DOUGLAS LAWHON, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

On Appeal from Criminal District Court No. 4 Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 1844259

Before Kerr, Wallach, and Walker, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr MEMORANDUM OPINION

Douglas Lawhon was charged by indictment with three counts of aggravated

sexual assault (Counts One, Two, and Three), one count of assaulting a family

member by impeding breath or blood (Count Four), and one count of assaulting a

pregnant person (Count Five). See Tex. Penal Code §§ 22.01(a)(1), (b)(2)(B), (b)(8),

22.021(a)(1)(A)(i), (a)(2)(A)(ii). The indictment included a repeat-offender notice

alleging that Lawhon had previously been convicted of a felony.1 Lawhon pleaded not

guilty, and a jury trial was held. After hearing all the evidence, the jury convicted

Lawhon on all five counts; found the repeat-offender notice true; and assessed his

punishment at 50 years’ imprisonment on each of Counts One, Two, and Three and

20 years’ imprisonment on each of Counts Four and Five. The trial court sentenced

him accordingly. This appeal followed.

After determining that Lawhon’s appeal was frivolous, his court-appointed

appellate attorney filed a motion to withdraw as counsel and, in support of that

motion, a brief. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744–45, 87 S. Ct. 1396,

1400 (1967). The attorney’s motion and brief meet the requirements of Anders by

presenting a professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are no

arguable grounds for relief. See id. at 744, 87 S. Ct. at 1400. Additionally, in compliance

with Kelly v. State, Lawhon’s attorney has certified that he provided Lawhon with

1 The indictment also included a family-violence notice, but the State waived it during trial.

2 copies of the brief and the motion to withdraw, informed him of his right to file a pro

se response and to receive a free copy of the appellate record, provided him with a

motion for pro se access to the appellate record lacking only his signature, and

informed him of his right to file a petition for discretionary review with the Court of

Criminal Appeals if he does not receive relief from this court. See 436 S.W.3d 313,

319 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). This court afforded Lawhon an opportunity to file a pro

se response, but he has not done so.2 In lieu of a brief, the State filed a letter stating

that it agreed with appellate counsel’s determination that the appeal is wholly

frivolous.

We have carefully reviewed the record and counsel’s brief and have determined

that this appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit. We find nothing in the record

that might arguably support the appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–

28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see also Meza v. State, 206 S.W.3d 684, 685 n.6 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2006). We therefore grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the trial

court’s judgments.

2 Lawhon filed a motion to access the appellate record, which we granted. But he never filed a pro se response.

3 /s/ Elizabeth Kerr Elizabeth Kerr Justice

Do Not Publish Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: June 25, 2026