IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA No. 141 / 04-1675
Filed May 4, 2007
DOUGLAS JONES,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dallas County, Gregory A.
Hulse, Judge.
Applicant seeks further review of court of appeals decision affirming
district court judgment rejecting his claim for postconviction relief.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED IN PART AND
REVERSED IN PART; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED; CASE
REMANDED.
Patricia A. Reynolds, Acting State Appellate Defender, and Martha J.
Lucey, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Douglas Jones, appellant, pro se.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Richard J. Bennett, Assistant
Attorney General, and Wayne M. Reisetter, County Attorney, for appellee. 2
TERNUS, Chief Justice.
The primary issue addressed in this opinion is whether the trial court
properly refused to consider the appellant’s pro se pleadings and rule upon
the appellant’s pro se claims for postconviction relief. Although the
appellant, Douglas Jones, was represented by counsel throughout this
postconviction relief (PCR) action, he filed several pleadings in the district
court asserting the attorneys appointed to represent him in his criminal
case rendered ineffective assistance. The trial court refused to consider any
of Jones’s pro se pleadings because Jones was represented by counsel. The
court considered and rejected the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims
made by Jones’s attorney.
On appeal, the court of appeals apparently determined Jones’s pro se
claims should have been considered by the district court because the court
of appeals rejected his claims on the merits, based on the record before it.
In addition to ruling on the claims raised by Jones in the district court, the
court of appeals also rejected an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim
raised by Jones on appeal that was based on alleged prosecutorial
misconduct in closing arguments.
Jones and his counsel sought further review, which we granted in order to consider whether the court of appeals properly rejected Jones’s
pro se claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Jones argues the court of
appeals erred in addressing and deciding his pro se claims without giving
him an opportunity to present evidence to prove his claims. We agree.
Therefore, we reverse that part of the court of appeals decision rejecting the
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel raised by Jones in the district
court. We agree with the court of appeals that the claim made by Jones on
appeal that his defense attorneys should have objected to the prosecutor’s
closing argument is without merit. Therefore, we affirm that aspect of the 3
court of appeals decision without further discussion. We reverse the district
court judgment dismissing Jones’s application for postconviction relief, and
remand the case for further proceedings on Jones’s claims.
I. Factual Background and Prior Proceedings.
In 1992, Jones was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder
and one count of attempted murder. His appeal of these criminal
convictions was unsuccessful.
Subsequently, an attorney was appointed to represent Jones for
purposes of filing an action for postconviction relief. Counsel filed an
application for postconviction relief, which was later amended, in which
several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were asserted. This
attorney later withdrew, and the district court then appointed attorney
Maria Ruhtenberg to represent Jones.
Over time, Jones became unhappy with Ruhtenberg’s representation
of him and filed a motion to remove her as counsel. At the pretrial
conference, the court discussed Jones’s motion with Jones, pointing out the
disadvantages of trying to get new counsel at this stage of the proceedings.
The court proposed giving Jones thirty days to work with counsel, and if he
was not satisfied, he could come back to court and ask that counsel be removed. Jones thought that proposal was fair, so the court did not remove
Jones’s attorney.
Prior to trial, Jones filed a pro se amendment to his petition, raising
additional claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, and asked for “specific
discovery.” The court took no action, stating “these matters should be
presented by counsel.”
Subsequently, at a hearing attended only by the attorneys, Jones’s
counsel and the State agreed to submit the case on the depositions and
briefs. The matter was to be considered submitted on September 20, 2001. 4
There is no indication in the record that Jones was notified of this hearing
or its result. In fact, on August 22, 2001, Jones filed a “memorandum of
constitutional issues,” raising additional claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel. This pleading was followed one month later with a pro se motion
requesting that Ruhtenberg be dismissed and new counsel appointed.
On May 16, 2002, Jones wrote to the clerk of court, requesting a copy
of the file and asking when the hearing on his motion to remove counsel
would be held. The court then advised Ruhtenberg and Jones that all
pleadings and communications to the court should come through counsel
and that anything from Jones would be ignored unless it related to
representation.
Notwithstanding the court’s admonition, Jones filed a pro se motion
for summary judgment. He claimed that pursuant to this court’s decision
in Leonard v. State, 461 N.W.2d 465 (Iowa 1990), he was entitled to file
pleadings and papers in addition to those filed by his attorney. The court
refused to consider Jones’s motion or the other pro se filings made by
Jones.
A status conference was held in September 2004, attended only by
the attorneys for the parties. The attorneys agreed the case was fully submitted and ready for ruling by the court. On September 28, 2004, the
district court entered its ruling, denying the application for postconviction
relief.
Appellate counsel for Jones then filed this appeal raising two issues:
(1) the district court erred in failing to rule on Jones’s pro se claims, and (2)
the district court erred in failing to find that Jones had ineffective
assistance of counsel in his criminal case. The appeal was transferred to
the court of appeals, with the result described above. We granted further
review to consider the appropriate disposition of Jones’s pro se claims. 5
II. Discussion.
We think the proper resolution of the matter presented in the appeal
before us is guided by our prior decisions in Leonard and in Gamble v. State,
723 N.W.2d 443 (Iowa 2006). Therefore, we begin our discussion with a
brief review of those decisions.
In Leonard, this court held that the district court in a postconviction
relief action has discretion to refuse an applicant’s request to remove his
court-appointed attorney and dispense with counsel. 461 N.W.2d at 468.
We observed the district court could properly determine that,
notwithstanding an applicant’s wish to remove his attorney, counsel would
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA No. 141 / 04-1675
Filed May 4, 2007
DOUGLAS JONES,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dallas County, Gregory A.
Hulse, Judge.
Applicant seeks further review of court of appeals decision affirming
district court judgment rejecting his claim for postconviction relief.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED IN PART AND
REVERSED IN PART; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED; CASE
REMANDED.
Patricia A. Reynolds, Acting State Appellate Defender, and Martha J.
Lucey, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Douglas Jones, appellant, pro se.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Richard J. Bennett, Assistant
Attorney General, and Wayne M. Reisetter, County Attorney, for appellee. 2
TERNUS, Chief Justice.
The primary issue addressed in this opinion is whether the trial court
properly refused to consider the appellant’s pro se pleadings and rule upon
the appellant’s pro se claims for postconviction relief. Although the
appellant, Douglas Jones, was represented by counsel throughout this
postconviction relief (PCR) action, he filed several pleadings in the district
court asserting the attorneys appointed to represent him in his criminal
case rendered ineffective assistance. The trial court refused to consider any
of Jones’s pro se pleadings because Jones was represented by counsel. The
court considered and rejected the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims
made by Jones’s attorney.
On appeal, the court of appeals apparently determined Jones’s pro se
claims should have been considered by the district court because the court
of appeals rejected his claims on the merits, based on the record before it.
In addition to ruling on the claims raised by Jones in the district court, the
court of appeals also rejected an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim
raised by Jones on appeal that was based on alleged prosecutorial
misconduct in closing arguments.
Jones and his counsel sought further review, which we granted in order to consider whether the court of appeals properly rejected Jones’s
pro se claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Jones argues the court of
appeals erred in addressing and deciding his pro se claims without giving
him an opportunity to present evidence to prove his claims. We agree.
Therefore, we reverse that part of the court of appeals decision rejecting the
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel raised by Jones in the district
court. We agree with the court of appeals that the claim made by Jones on
appeal that his defense attorneys should have objected to the prosecutor’s
closing argument is without merit. Therefore, we affirm that aspect of the 3
court of appeals decision without further discussion. We reverse the district
court judgment dismissing Jones’s application for postconviction relief, and
remand the case for further proceedings on Jones’s claims.
I. Factual Background and Prior Proceedings.
In 1992, Jones was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder
and one count of attempted murder. His appeal of these criminal
convictions was unsuccessful.
Subsequently, an attorney was appointed to represent Jones for
purposes of filing an action for postconviction relief. Counsel filed an
application for postconviction relief, which was later amended, in which
several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were asserted. This
attorney later withdrew, and the district court then appointed attorney
Maria Ruhtenberg to represent Jones.
Over time, Jones became unhappy with Ruhtenberg’s representation
of him and filed a motion to remove her as counsel. At the pretrial
conference, the court discussed Jones’s motion with Jones, pointing out the
disadvantages of trying to get new counsel at this stage of the proceedings.
The court proposed giving Jones thirty days to work with counsel, and if he
was not satisfied, he could come back to court and ask that counsel be removed. Jones thought that proposal was fair, so the court did not remove
Jones’s attorney.
Prior to trial, Jones filed a pro se amendment to his petition, raising
additional claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, and asked for “specific
discovery.” The court took no action, stating “these matters should be
presented by counsel.”
Subsequently, at a hearing attended only by the attorneys, Jones’s
counsel and the State agreed to submit the case on the depositions and
briefs. The matter was to be considered submitted on September 20, 2001. 4
There is no indication in the record that Jones was notified of this hearing
or its result. In fact, on August 22, 2001, Jones filed a “memorandum of
constitutional issues,” raising additional claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel. This pleading was followed one month later with a pro se motion
requesting that Ruhtenberg be dismissed and new counsel appointed.
On May 16, 2002, Jones wrote to the clerk of court, requesting a copy
of the file and asking when the hearing on his motion to remove counsel
would be held. The court then advised Ruhtenberg and Jones that all
pleadings and communications to the court should come through counsel
and that anything from Jones would be ignored unless it related to
representation.
Notwithstanding the court’s admonition, Jones filed a pro se motion
for summary judgment. He claimed that pursuant to this court’s decision
in Leonard v. State, 461 N.W.2d 465 (Iowa 1990), he was entitled to file
pleadings and papers in addition to those filed by his attorney. The court
refused to consider Jones’s motion or the other pro se filings made by
Jones.
A status conference was held in September 2004, attended only by
the attorneys for the parties. The attorneys agreed the case was fully submitted and ready for ruling by the court. On September 28, 2004, the
district court entered its ruling, denying the application for postconviction
relief.
Appellate counsel for Jones then filed this appeal raising two issues:
(1) the district court erred in failing to rule on Jones’s pro se claims, and (2)
the district court erred in failing to find that Jones had ineffective
assistance of counsel in his criminal case. The appeal was transferred to
the court of appeals, with the result described above. We granted further
review to consider the appropriate disposition of Jones’s pro se claims. 5
II. Discussion.
We think the proper resolution of the matter presented in the appeal
before us is guided by our prior decisions in Leonard and in Gamble v. State,
723 N.W.2d 443 (Iowa 2006). Therefore, we begin our discussion with a
brief review of those decisions.
In Leonard, this court held that the district court in a postconviction
relief action has discretion to refuse an applicant’s request to remove his
court-appointed attorney and dispense with counsel. 461 N.W.2d at 468.
We observed the district court could properly determine that,
notwithstanding an applicant’s wish to remove his attorney, counsel would
still benefit the applicant and the court, would contribute to the fairness of
the proceedings, and would aid in developing a record in the event of an
appeal. Id. at 467. We pointed out that the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel and the corollary constitutional right to dispense with counsel
“applies only to criminal prosecutions and so has no application to
postconviction relief proceedings.” Id. at 468. Yet we recognized the
dilemma in which an applicant is placed when a court refuses to remove
counsel the applicant wishes to dismiss. “Therefore, [w]e temper[ed] our
holding with one qualification”:
A postconviction relief applicant may file applications, briefs, resistances, motions, and all other documents the applicant deems appropriate in addition to what the applicant’s counsel files. This qualification should give the applicant assurance that all matters the applicant wants raised before the district court will be considered.
Id.
In the Gamble case, James Gamble filed an application for
postconviction relief claiming he received ineffective assistance from his
attorney in a prior robbery prosecution. 723 N.W.2d at 443-44. At
Gamble’s request, the court appointed counsel for him in the PCR action 6
and then ordered Gamble’s PCR attorney to evaluate his client’s case and
report that evaluation to the court. Id. Counsel filed his report and, at the
same time, filed an amended application raising the one issue PCR counsel
believed had merit. Id. Subsequently, the court ruled on the amended
application, rejecting the one ineffective-assistance claim raised by
Gamble’s attorney. Id. The court did not address Gamble’s pro se claims.
Id. On appeal, this court held it was inappropriate for the court to require
PCR counsel to assess the validity of his client’s claims. Id. at 446. More
pertinent to the present appeal, we also held that the case must be
remanded for a new hearing on Gamble’s pro se claims. Id. We stated the
district court was required to make findings of fact and conclusions of law
with respect to each issue raised by Gamble. Id. (citing Iowa Code § 822.7
(1999)).
We cull the following relevant principles from these decisions. First, a
PCR applicant who is dissatisfied with his attorney’s representation is
permitted to raise issues pro se and file papers and pleadings pro se.
Gamble, 723 N.W.2d at 446; Leonard, 461 N.W.2d at 468. Second, the
district court must give the applicant an opportunity to be heard on his
pro se claims and must then rule on each issue raised. Gamble, 723 N.W.2d at 446. Clearly, an applicant’s opportunity to supplement counsel’s
pleadings and raise additional claims pro se would be meaningless if the
applicant did not have a corresponding opportunity to be heard on the
pro se claims and obtain a ruling on them.
In the present case, the district court erred in refusing to consider the
pro se pleadings filed by Jones. Although the court of appeals correctly
recognized this error, that court should have remanded this case back to
the district court so Jones could be given an opportunity to submit evidence
in support of his claims. 7
III. Disposition.
We affirm that part of the court of appeals decision rejecting Jones’s
claim arising from alleged prosecutorial misconduct. We reverse that part
of the court of appeals decision addressing Jones’s pro se claims on the
merits. We remand this case to the district court for a hearing on Jones’s
pro se claims, after which the court must issue findings of fact and
conclusions of law with respect to all issues raised by Jones. See generally
id. (stating court need not address every allegation made by an applicant,
but must respond to every issue raised).
All justices concur except Hecht, J., who takes no part.