UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA CASE NO. 2:25-cv-00988-GJL Plaintiff, v. SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL Defendant.
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Fed. R. Civ. P. 73 and Local Magistrate Judge Rule 13. See also Consent to Proceed Before a United States Magistrate Judge, Dkt. 4. This matter has been fully briefed. See Dkts. 12, 14, 15. Having considered the administrative record (AR) and all memoranda, the Court concludes the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) erred in finding Plaintiff not disabled. Accordingly, this matter is REVERSED and REMANDED for CALCULATION of an AWARD of BENEFITS. Plaintiff’s applications for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits and Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) were denied initially and following reconsideration. AR 105–82. ALJ Gordon Griggs held a hearing on Plaintiff’s applications in December 2013 (AR 43–75) and
issued a decision in July 2014 (AR 183–206) which was subsequently reversed by the Appeals Council in June 2016 (AR 207–10). ALJ Griggs held another hearing in November 2016 (AR 76–104) and issued a decision in February 2017 (AR 10–37) which was subsequently reversed on appeal to this Court by U.S. District Judge Benjamin Settle (AR 1630–63). On remand, ALJ Eric Basse held a hearing in April 2019 (AR 1560–63) and issued a decision in June 2019 (AR 1669–95) which was reversed by the Appeals Council in May 2020 (AR 1696–1702). ALJ Glenn Meyers (“the ALJ”) held another hearing on March 9, 2021. AR 1564–92. He issued a decision on March 31, 2021. AR 1528–59. Over four years later, in April 2025, the Appeals Council declined to consider Plaintiff’s exceptions to the ALJ’s decision, making the ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s final decision subject to judicial review. AR 1508–13. On
May 29, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this Court seeking judicial review of the ALJ’s decision. Dkt. 4. Defendant filed the sealed AR in this matter on July 28, 2025. Dkt. 7. Plaintiff was born in 1973 and was 36 years old on June 3, 2011, his alleged date of disability onset. See AR 1531, 1547. Plaintiff has at least a high school education. AR 1547. According to the ALJ, Plaintiff suffers from, at a minimum, the severe impairments of right knee meniscal tear, statuspost arthroscopic repair; neurogenic motor changes of upper extremities; right rotator cuff tendinopathy; asthma; degenerative disc disease; major depressive disorder; anxiety disorder; personality disorder; attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD); and
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). AR 1534. However, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the following Residual Functional Capacity (RFC): to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) with some additional limitations. The claimant is able to remember, understand, and carry out simple and routine instructions and tasks consistent with the learning and training requirements of SVP level one and two jobs. He cannot reach overhead and can frequently reach at or below shoulder level. The claimant can frequently handle and finger. He can have no contact with the public. The claimant is capable of working in proximity to but not in coordination with co-workers. He can have occasional contact with supervisors. The claimant can occasionally stoop and never crouch, crawl, kneel, or climb ramps, stairs, ropes, ladders, scaffolds. He must avoid concentrated exposure to dust, smoke, fumes, chemicals, and pulmonary irritants and must avoid moderate exposure to vibrations and hazardous conditions.
AR 1537. Based on this RFC, the ALJ found Plaintiff could perform work existing in significant numbers in the national economy. AR 1547–48. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court may set aside the Commissioner’s denial of benefits if, and only if, the ALJ’s findings are based on legal error or not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1214 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 1999)). In his opening brief, Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred in assessing the medical opinion evidence and his subjective symptom testimony. See Dkt. 12. As an initial matter, as Plaintiff points out throughout his brief, some of the ALJ’s discussion of Plaintiff’s testimony and the medical opinion evidence relied upon the same reasoning as that rejected in Judge Settle’s previous order in this matter. See generally id. “[T]he law of the case doctrine . . . appl[ies] in the social security context.” Stacy v. Colvin, 825 F.3d 563, 567 (9th Cir. 2016). It “generally prohibits a court from considering an issue that has already been decided by that same court or a higher court in the same case.” Id. (citing Hall v. City of Los Angeles, 697 F.3d 1059, 1067 (9th Cir. 2012)). The Court therefore will not revisit issues which were resolved by Judge Settle’s previous order. A. Subjective Symptom Testimony Plaintiff testified he cannot be around large groups of people without discomfort, anxiety,
and hypervigilance; that he is prone to anger which can be triggered by irritations from noise, remarks, and glances from others, and which can result in physical and verbal confrontation; and that he has some difficulties with memory and concentration. See AR 59–60, 87–90, 1579–82. Where (as is the case here) the ALJ finds Plaintiff has presented evidence of one or more impairments which could be reasonably expected to cause his alleged symptoms and there is no affirmative evidence of malingering, the ALJ must give specific, clear, and convincing reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s testimony. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014–15 (citing Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1996)). Much of the ALJ’s discussion of Plaintiff’s testimony mirrors the same discussion that was rejected by Judge Settle. Compare e.g., AR 1539 (ALJ rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony based
on, inter alia: evidence he controlled his anger at times, his anger was caused by situational aggravators, his purported avoidance of work to receive disability benefits, and inconsistencies related to using a car) with AR 1637–44 (Judge Settle rejecting same rationales). The Commissioner defends only two of the ALJ’s reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony, neither of which was addressed by Judge Settle: (1) inconsistencies between Plaintiff’s physical allegations and physical examinations, and (2) Plaintiff’s activities of traveling and performing freelance photography. See Dkt. 14 at 2–4. As to the first reason, Plaintiff has challenged only the ALJ’s assessment of his mental symptom testimony. See Dkt. 12 at 4–5. Plaintiff’s physical functioning on examination is not a
rationale which is specific to that testimony, so it is not an adequate basis for rejecting it. See Smith v. Kijakazi, 14 F.4th 1108, 1112–13 (2021) (finding ALJ erred in discrediting all of claimant’s testimony based on inconsistencies “only clearly applicable to the late-period testimony”).
As for Plaintiff’s travel and freelance photography, an ALJ may discount a claimant's testimony based on daily activities that either contradict their testimony or that meet the threshold for transferable work skills. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 639 (9th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff traveled twice during the decade-long relevant period due to family issues. See AR 2427, 3256. But he testified that, for at least one of these trips, he continued to experience symptoms related to being in public although he was only able to mitigate, and not resolve, his aggravations that occurred throughout his travels including his difficulties functioning in public (e.g., by using rideshare services). See AR 1574–75. And even if this were not so, the ability to travel due to family necessity twice over a decade hardly contradicts claims of debilitating symptoms from social interactions. Cf. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1998)
(“[D]isability claimants should not be penalized for attempting to lead normal lives[.]”). Similarly, Plaintiff’s submission of a photograph to an online stock photo company (see AR 2711) did not appear to involve any social interaction or involve the sustained task requirements of a work environment. In sum, the ALJ’s reliance upon isolated public encounters was insufficient and failed to provide specific, clear, and convincing reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony. Defendant does not contend such an error was harmless, so the Court reverses. See Ferguson v. O'Malley, 95 F.4th 1195, 1204 (9th Cir. 2024) (“The Commissioner does not contend that the ALJ's error was harmless. Consequently, we reverse the judgment …”).
B. Medical Opinion Evidence Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s assessment of the medical opinions of five examining sources: Paul Connor, PhD (rendered March 2013, AR 714–23); Wayne Dees, PsyD (October 2012, AR 550–58); Tasmyn Bowes, PsyD (September 2016, AR 2368–82); J. Alex Crampton,
PsyD (September 2018, AR 2546–50); and Danielle Jenkins, PsyD (October 2014, AR 2363– 67). Under the regulations applicable to this case, an examining physician's opinion is generally “entitled to greater weight than the opinion of a non-examining physician.” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830–31 (citations omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(1). Opinions of examining sources can only be rejected “for specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 830–31.1 Dr. Connor opined Plaintiff had “significant neuropsychological impairment” in the areas of “focusing and maintaining attention as well as impulsivity and difficulties with inhibiting responses.” AR 719. He also noted Plaintiff “may experience greater troubles with memory and
problem solving” and impulsivity. AR 720. Drs. Dees, Bowes, Crampton, and Jenkins opined Plaintiff had marked or severe limitations in the following areas: performing within a schedule, maintaining attendance, and being punctual; maintaining appropriate behavior; setting realistic goals and planning independently; communicating and performing effectively; and completing a normal workday and workweek without psychological interruptions. See AR 552–53, 2365, 2372, 2548. All sources except Dr. Bowes opined Plaintiff had at least a marked limitation in adapting to 1 This standard does not apply to claims filed on or after March 27, 2017. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527, 404.1520c; Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 792 (9th Cir. 2022). changes. See AR 552–53, 2365, 2548. Dr. Crampton opined Plaintiff had several other marked and severe limitations, including in making simple decisions and performing tasks without special supervision. See AR 2548. In support, the sources described severe symptoms of anxiety and depression, along with
paranoia and hallucinations. Dr. Connor observed Plaintiff had an irritable demeanor, was agitated, had troubles with appropriate social interaction, and required some redirection. AR 718–19. He said Plaintiff’s performance on one test “indicat[ed] troubles with impulsivity” and “focusing and maintaining attention;” other tests indicated “severe levels of psychological distress.” AR 718, 719. Drs. Dees, Crampton, and Jenkins observed abnormal thought process and content, orientation, perception, and fund of knowledge. AR 554, 2550, 2366–67. Drs. Bowes, Crampton, and Jenkins noted scores on anxiety and depression index tests indicating severe anxiety and depression. See AR 2370, 2549, 2366. Dr. Bowes conducted a personality assessment inventory: the results “support[ed] an extreme level of reported subjective experience of overall distress,”
along with “clinically significant problem[s]” in Plaintiff’s affect, acting out, health problems, psychotic features, and social withdrawal. AR 2370. The ALJ found these opinions unpersuasive, relying on similar reasons for rejecting them. See AR 1542–45. The ALJ found the opinions inconsistent with some evidence showing Plaintiff had a “normal mood and affect, average cognitive functioning, normal behavior, and cooperative attitude.” AR 1544 (rejecting opinions of Drs. Bowes, Crampton, and Jenkins, citing AR 567–68, 585, 620, 854, 863, 907, 910, 912, 1020–21, 1052, 1063, 1091, 1370, 1393, 1404– 05, 2394, 2631, 2801, 3077–78, 3124, 3126, 3130, 3136, 3139, 3141, 3143, 3161, 3163, 3166,
3285, 3314, 3339, 3361); see also AR 1542–43 (rejecting opinions of Drs. Connor and Dees on similar basis, citing the same evidence). Judge Settle found similar reasoning, made with respect to Plaintiff’s subjective testimony, in a previous denial decision was:
not a reasonable interpretation of the evidence. In analyzing the medical evidence, the ALJ “cannot simply pick out a few isolated instances” of medical heath that support his conclusion, but must consider those instances in the broader context “with an understanding of the patient’s overall well-being and the nature of [his] symptoms.” Attmore v. Colvin, 827 F.3d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 2016). Here, the ALJ acknowledged medical evidence of [Plaintiff’s] mental health issues, such as anxiety and anger, but downplayed them because [Plaintiff] was cooperative with his providers at times and did not have any obvious crises due to his anger issues. [AR 21–22]. The record is replete with evidence of ongoing psychological issues, however. [Plaintiff’s] providers regularly noted that he was anxious, depressed, and had a blunted affect. See, e.g., [AR] 512, 515, 522, 525–26, 567, 573, 611, 620, 692, 707, 785, 1167, 1173. AR 1637–38. Judge Settle also found there was evidence supporting impulsivity and anger- related issues in the record which undermined findings to the contrary. AR 1638 (citing AR 512, 913). Evidence from after Judge Settle’s decision confirms the same: although the evidence identified by the ALJ reveals normal findings related to mood and affect, other records show Plaintiff was often observed to be angry, anxious, and irritable. See, e.g., AR 2695, 2700, 2709, 2747, 2759, 2765, 2771, 2791, 3124, 3128, 3133, 3136, 3143, 3163, 3188, 3197, 3204, 3233, 3239. There were also further incidents confirming Plaintiff’s propensity to anger and difficulties with impulsivity. See AR 3145 (angry outbursts leading to ban from certain health facilities). The ALJ’s failure to address the evidence contrary to his finding and explain why that evidence was insufficiently probative as to Plaintiff’s functioning was error. As Judge Settle noted, the ALJ must consider the broader context of the entire record. See Attmore, 827 F.3d at 877. One who is substantially affected by depression, impulsivity, and anger would not be expected to constantly be depressed, impulsive, and angry. Rather, “cycles of improvement and debilitating symptoms are a common occurrence, and in such circumstances it is error for an ALJ to pick out a few isolated instances of improvement over a period of months or years and to treat them as a basis for concluding a claimant is capable of working.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1017.
The ALJ found inconsistent with the opinions evidence that Plaintiff was noted to have interacted with others appropriately at several group physical therapy sessions. AR 1542, 1543, 1544; see also AR 1536 (noting the same, citing AR 3066–74, 3079). The ALJ’s reliance upon four group physical therapy sessions where Plaintiff appropriately interacted with others suffers from the same flaw as his assessment of Plaintiff’s presentation at other appointments—it failed to consider the many appointments in which Plaintiff did not interact appropriately and displayed symptoms consistent with anger, impulsivity, and irritability. The ALJ also found Plaintiff’s travel and photography activities inconsistent with these opinions. See AR 1542–45. However, for the same reasons that these activities were not reasonably found inconsistent with Plaintiff’s testimony, these activities are not legitimate bases
for rejecting the examining sources’ opinions. The ALJ found the opinions of Drs. Dees and Connor unsupported: he noted that Dr. Connor’s opinion did “not document functional barriers that would preclude all employment” while Dr. Dees failed to provide any narrative explanation of his opinion. See AR 1542, 1543. As discussed, all the opinions included abnormal observations and discussed the results of relevant testing. Although Dr. Connor observed many normal results in the 15 tests he administered (see AR 718–19), this is not a reason to find as less probative the abnormal results he described. Although Dr. Dees did not provide a specific function-by-function explanation of his opinion, his opinion included a clinical interview (AR 550–51), clinical findings describing
the severity of Plaintiff’s symptoms (AR 551), and a mental status examination describing abnormal findings (AR 553–54). “[A]n opinion cannot be rejected merely for being expressed as answers to a check-the-box questionnaire[.]” Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1155 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Popa v. Berryhill, 872 F.3d 901, 907 (9th Cir. 2017)).
Finally, the ALJ discounted all five examining sources’ opinions because they had not reviewed the longitudinal record. See AR 1542–45. As Judge Settle noted, this is not a legitimate reason for rejecting an examining doctor’s opinion, since the “regulations place more weight on opinions from doctors who examine claimants than those who simply review medical records.” AR 1653 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(1), Lester, 81 F.3d at 830–31). In sum, the ALJ failed to provide specific and legitimate reasons for discounting the opinions of examining sources Drs. Connor, Dees, Bowes, Crampton, and Jenkins. Because those opinions suggest Plaintiff would be further limited than found in the RFC, this error was not inconsequential to the disability determination and therefore was not harmless. See Stout v. v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 2006).
Plaintiff also argues the ALJ failed to provide germane reasons for rejecting the opinion of his therapist, Bryant Christlieb, LMFT. Dkt. 12 at 22–23. Having found the ALJ reversibly erred, the Court need not consider this argument. C. Remedy The Court “generally remand[s] for an award of benefits only in ‘rare circumstances.’” Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1100 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882, 886 (9th Cir. 2004)). A remand for award of benefits is proper only if (1) the record has been fully developed and further administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose; (2) the ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, whether claimant testimony or medical opinion; and (3) if the improperly discredited evidence were credited as true, the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled on remand. Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1020. A remand for an award of benefits is appropriate only if, reviewing the record as a whole, the improperly discredited evidence would leave no doubt Plaintiff would be found disabled on remand if that evidence was credited as true. See Leon v. Berryhill, 880 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2017). The first two elements of the credit-as-true test are easily satisfied. First, the record is over 3,400 pages in length and contains fourteen medical opinions and the transcripts of four hearings; there is no contention that it is incomplete. See Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648, 668– 69 (9th Cir. 2017) (finding record developed where it contains two treating medical opinions, function reports, and over fifty treatment notes); Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 683 (first element satisfied by “extensive” record of “hundreds of pages,” claimant testimony, VE testimony, and a medical opinion). Indeed, Plaintiff’s date last insured, for the purposes of his DIB claim, is in September 2012. AR 1531–32. Further evidence related to Plaintiff’s disability thirteen years ago is unlikely to be forthcoming. Moreover, Ninth Circuit “precedent and the objectives of the credit-as-true rule foreclose the argument that a remand for the purpose of allowing the ALJ to have a mulligan qualified as a remand for a ‘useful purpose’ under the first part of the credit-as-true analysis.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1021–22 (citing Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 595 (9th Cir. 2004) and Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882, 887 (9th Cir. 2004)). Second, the Court has found the ALJ erred in assessing the opinions of five examining sources and in assessing Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony. Turning to the third element, if the improperly discredited evidence were credited as true, the ALJ would be required to find Plaintiff disabled on remand. The five improperly discredited opinions of examining sources, if credited as true, must be given more weight than the contrary medical opinions of non-examining sources. See Lester, 81 F.3d at 830; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(1). The Court therefore considers whether these opinions, along with Plaintiff’s testimony, would compel a finding of disability. See Leon, 880 F.3d at 1045. The Vocational Expert testified that an individual would be found disabled if he
repeatedly engaged in aggressive and threatening behavior; had more than one absence per month; left his job site during his shift; or was off task more than 15% of the time or had a like reduction in pace. See AR 1588–89. It is difficult to imagine an RFC assessment consistent with the improperly discredited evidence which did not include at least one of these work-prohibitive limitations. Drs. Dees, Bowes, Crampton, and Jenkins opined Plaintiff had at least a marked limitation in performing activities within a schedule, maintaining attendance, and being punctual, as well as in completing a normal workday and workweek without psychological interruptions. See AR 552–53, 2365, 2372, 2548. A “marked limitation” means the claimant’s “functioning in this area independently, appropriately, effectively, and on a sustained basis is seriously limited.”
20 C.F.R. § 404, Supb. P, App’x 1, 12.00(F)(2)(d). A serious limitation in the ability to perform activities within a schedule, maintain attendance, and be punctual, coupled with a serious inability to complete a workday or workweek without psychological interruptions, would likely result in at least one absence per month, would require Plaintiff to leave his jobsite during his shift, or would otherwise result in Plaintiff being off task more than 15% of the time. Plaintiff also testified he has angry outbursts easily triggered by normal characteristics of a workplace settings. See AR 59, 87, 1579–80. Drs. Dees, Bowes, Crampton, and Jenkins found he had at least marked limitations in maintaining appropriate behavior and communicating. See AR 552–53, 2365, 2372, 2548. Dr. Connor’s discussion of Plaintiff’s impulsivity is consistent
with such limitations. AR 719–20. Crediting such evidence compels a finding that Plaintiff would engage in the sort of aggressive and threatening behavior the VE testified would be work- prohibitive. For these reasons, the improperly discredited evidence would, if credited as true, compel a finding of disability.
As Defendant notes, the Court may decline to remand for an award of benefits where the record discloses “serious doubt” that the claimant is disabled. See Dkt. 14 at 11; Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1023. But Defendant identifies no basis to find the record creates serious doubt of disability, and the Court has not discerned one from its independent review. Although the record contains two medical opinions of non-examining sources which are less restrictive than the examining sources’ opinions (see AR 1542–43), the examining sources’ opinions are given greater weight in the disability analysis, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(1). And although the record contains some normal findings on examination, as discussed, this does not necessarily raise serious doubt as to Plaintiff’s disability, as mental impairments are oftentimes cyclical and can impair some areas of function significantly without touching others.
Finally, “inequitable conduct on the part of the Commissioner can strengthen, though not control, the case for” an award of benefits. Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1019. The Court may consider “equitable concerns about the length of time that had elapsed since the claimant had filed [his] application.” Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1100 (citing Varney v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 859 F.2d 1396, 1398–99 (9th Cir. 1988)); see also Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 683 (considering “exceptional facts” such as seven year delay and “extensive medical needs requiring significant care”). Here, Plaintiff filed his applications over thirteen years ago. See AR 13. After Judge Settle reversed the second ALJ decision in this matter, the Appeals Council reversed the third ALJ decision because it failed to comply with Judge Settle’s Order. See AR 1698–70. The fourth
ALJ decision reviewed by this Court, as discussed, also largely relied upon the same rationale rejected by Judge Settle. And although Plaintiff filed exceptions to that decision in April 2021 (see AR 1866–72), the Appeals Council did not decline to consider those exceptions until four years later (AR 1508) due to an apparent administrative error. See AR 1859 (initially indicating
exceptions had not been received). Such a procedural history strengthens Plaintiff’s case for an award of benefits. Given the Commissioner’s repeated reliance upon the same reasons Judge Settle rejected, it also underscores the conclusion that further administrative proceedings would be unlikely to serve a useful purpose in this case, and that “[a]llowing the Commissioner to decide the issue again would create an unfair ‘heads we win; tails, let’s play again’ system of disability benefits adjudication.” Benecke, 367 F.3d at 887. For these reasons, this case presents the rare circumstance in which a direction to award benefits is appropriate.
Based on these reasons and the relevant record, the Court ORDERS that this matter be REVERSED and REMANDED pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for CALCULATION of an AWARD of BENEFITS. Dated this 27th day of October, 2025. A Grady J. Leupold United States Magistrate Judge