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5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 9 10 DOUGLAS H., CASE NO. 2:25-cv-00988-GJL 11 Plaintiff, v. SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY 12 APPEAL ORDER COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 13 SECURITY, 14 Defendant.
15 16 This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Fed. R. Civ. P. 73 and Local 17 Magistrate Judge Rule 13. See also Consent to Proceed Before a United States Magistrate Judge, 18 Dkt. 4. This matter has been fully briefed. See Dkts. 12, 14, 15. 19 Having considered the administrative record (AR) and all memoranda, the Court 20 concludes the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) erred in finding Plaintiff not disabled. 21 Accordingly, this matter is REVERSED and REMANDED for CALCULATION of an 22 AWARD of BENEFITS. 23 24 1 I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 2 Plaintiff’s applications for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits and Disability 3 Insurance Benefits (DIB) were denied initially and following reconsideration. AR 105–82. ALJ 4 Gordon Griggs held a hearing on Plaintiff’s applications in December 2013 (AR 43–75) and
5 issued a decision in July 2014 (AR 183–206) which was subsequently reversed by the Appeals 6 Council in June 2016 (AR 207–10). ALJ Griggs held another hearing in November 2016 (AR 7 76–104) and issued a decision in February 2017 (AR 10–37) which was subsequently reversed 8 on appeal to this Court by U.S. District Judge Benjamin Settle (AR 1630–63). On remand, ALJ 9 Eric Basse held a hearing in April 2019 (AR 1560–63) and issued a decision in June 2019 (AR 10 1669–95) which was reversed by the Appeals Council in May 2020 (AR 1696–1702). 11 ALJ Glenn Meyers (“the ALJ”) held another hearing on March 9, 2021. AR 1564–92. He 12 issued a decision on March 31, 2021. AR 1528–59. Over four years later, in April 2025, the 13 Appeals Council declined to consider Plaintiff’s exceptions to the ALJ’s decision, making the 14 ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s final decision subject to judicial review. AR 1508–13. On
15 May 29, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this Court seeking judicial review of the ALJ’s 16 decision. Dkt. 4. Defendant filed the sealed AR in this matter on July 28, 2025. Dkt. 7. 17 II. BACKGROUND 18 Plaintiff was born in 1973 and was 36 years old on June 3, 2011, his alleged date of 19 disability onset. See AR 1531, 1547. Plaintiff has at least a high school education. AR 1547. 20 According to the ALJ, Plaintiff suffers from, at a minimum, the severe impairments of right knee 21 meniscal tear, statuspost arthroscopic repair; neurogenic motor changes of upper extremities; 22 right rotator cuff tendinopathy; asthma; degenerative disc disease; major depressive disorder; 23 anxiety disorder; personality disorder; attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD); and
24 1 posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). AR 1534. However, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the 2 following Residual Functional Capacity (RFC): 3 to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) with some additional limitations. The claimant is able to remember, understand, and carry out 4 simple and routine instructions and tasks consistent with the learning and training requirements of SVP level one and two jobs. He cannot reach overhead and can 5 frequently reach at or below shoulder level. The claimant can frequently handle and finger. He can have no contact with the public. The claimant is capable of working 6 in proximity to but not in coordination with co-workers. He can have occasional contact with supervisors. The claimant can occasionally stoop and never crouch, 7 crawl, kneel, or climb ramps, stairs, ropes, ladders, scaffolds. He must avoid concentrated exposure to dust, smoke, fumes, chemicals, and pulmonary irritants 8 and must avoid moderate exposure to vibrations and hazardous conditions.
9 AR 1537. Based on this RFC, the ALJ found Plaintiff could perform work existing in significant 10 numbers in the national economy. AR 1547–48. 11 III. DISCUSSION 12 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court may set aside the Commissioner’s denial of 13 benefits if, and only if, the ALJ’s findings are based on legal error or not supported by 14 substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1214 n.1 (9th 15 Cir. 2005) (citing Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 1999)). 16 In his opening brief, Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred in assessing the medical opinion 17 evidence and his subjective symptom testimony. See Dkt. 12. 18 As an initial matter, as Plaintiff points out throughout his brief, some of the ALJ’s 19 discussion of Plaintiff’s testimony and the medical opinion evidence relied upon the same 20 reasoning as that rejected in Judge Settle’s previous order in this matter. See generally id. “[T]he 21 law of the case doctrine . . . appl[ies] in the social security context.” Stacy v. Colvin, 825 F.3d 22 563, 567 (9th Cir. 2016). It “generally prohibits a court from considering an issue that has 23 already been decided by that same court or a higher court in the same case.” Id. (citing Hall v. 24 1 City of Los Angeles, 697 F.3d 1059, 1067 (9th Cir. 2012)). The Court therefore will not revisit 2 issues which were resolved by Judge Settle’s previous order. 3 A. Subjective Symptom Testimony 4 Plaintiff testified he cannot be around large groups of people without discomfort, anxiety,
5 and hypervigilance; that he is prone to anger which can be triggered by irritations from noise, 6 remarks, and glances from others, and which can result in physical and verbal confrontation; and 7 that he has some difficulties with memory and concentration. See AR 59–60, 87–90, 1579–82. 8 Where (as is the case here) the ALJ finds Plaintiff has presented evidence of one or more 9 impairments which could be reasonably expected to cause his alleged symptoms and there is no 10 affirmative evidence of malingering, the ALJ must give specific, clear, and convincing reasons 11 for discounting Plaintiff’s testimony. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014–15 (citing Smolen 12 v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1996)). 13 Much of the ALJ’s discussion of Plaintiff’s testimony mirrors the same discussion that 14 was rejected by Judge Settle. Compare e.g., AR 1539 (ALJ rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony based
15 on, inter alia: evidence he controlled his anger at times, his anger was caused by situational 16 aggravators, his purported avoidance of work to receive disability benefits, and inconsistencies 17 related to using a car) with AR 1637–44 (Judge Settle rejecting same rationales). 18 The Commissioner defends only two of the ALJ’s reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s 19 testimony, neither of which was addressed by Judge Settle: (1) inconsistencies between 20 Plaintiff’s physical allegations and physical examinations, and (2) Plaintiff’s activities of 21 traveling and performing freelance photography. See Dkt. 14 at 2–4. 22 As to the first reason, Plaintiff has challenged only the ALJ’s assessment of his mental 23 symptom testimony. See Dkt. 12 at 4–5. Plaintiff’s physical functioning on examination is not a
24 1 rationale which is specific to that testimony, so it is not an adequate basis for rejecting it. See 2 Smith v. Kijakazi, 14 F.4th 1108, 1112–13 (2021) (finding ALJ erred in discrediting all of 3 claimant’s testimony based on inconsistencies “only clearly applicable to the late-period 4 testimony”).
5 As for Plaintiff’s travel and freelance photography, an ALJ may discount a claimant's 6 testimony based on daily activities that either contradict their testimony or that meet the 7 threshold for transferable work skills. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 639 (9th Cir. 2007). 8 Plaintiff traveled twice during the decade-long relevant period due to family issues. See 9 AR 2427, 3256. But he testified that, for at least one of these trips, he continued to experience 10 symptoms related to being in public although he was only able to mitigate, and not resolve, his 11 aggravations that occurred throughout his travels including his difficulties functioning in public 12 (e.g., by using rideshare services). See AR 1574–75. And even if this were not so, the ability to 13 travel due to family necessity twice over a decade hardly contradicts claims of debilitating 14 symptoms from social interactions. Cf. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1998)
15 (“[D]isability claimants should not be penalized for attempting to lead normal lives[.]”). 16 Similarly, Plaintiff’s submission of a photograph to an online stock photo company (see 17 AR 2711) did not appear to involve any social interaction or involve the sustained task 18 requirements of a work environment. 19 In sum, the ALJ’s reliance upon isolated public encounters was insufficient and failed to 20 provide specific, clear, and convincing reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony. Defendant 21 does not contend such an error was harmless, so the Court reverses. See Ferguson v. O'Malley, 22 95 F.4th 1195, 1204 (9th Cir. 2024) (“The Commissioner does not contend that the ALJ's error 23 was harmless. Consequently, we reverse the judgment …”).
24 1 B. Medical Opinion Evidence 2 Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s assessment of the medical opinions of five examining 3 sources: Paul Connor, PhD (rendered March 2013, AR 714–23); Wayne Dees, PsyD (October 4 2012, AR 550–58); Tasmyn Bowes, PsyD (September 2016, AR 2368–82); J. Alex Crampton,
5 PsyD (September 2018, AR 2546–50); and Danielle Jenkins, PsyD (October 2014, AR 2363– 6 67). 7 Under the regulations applicable to this case, an examining physician's opinion is 8 generally “entitled to greater weight than the opinion of a non-examining physician.” Lester v. 9 Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830–31 (citations omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(1). Opinions 10 of examining sources can only be rejected “for specific and legitimate reasons that are supported 11 by substantial evidence in the record.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 830–31.1 12 Dr. Connor opined Plaintiff had “significant neuropsychological impairment” in the areas 13 of “focusing and maintaining attention as well as impulsivity and difficulties with inhibiting 14 responses.” AR 719. He also noted Plaintiff “may experience greater troubles with memory and
15 problem solving” and impulsivity. AR 720. 16 Drs. Dees, Bowes, Crampton, and Jenkins opined Plaintiff had marked or severe 17 limitations in the following areas: performing within a schedule, maintaining attendance, and 18 being punctual; maintaining appropriate behavior; setting realistic goals and planning 19 independently; communicating and performing effectively; and completing a normal workday 20 and workweek without psychological interruptions. See AR 552–53, 2365, 2372, 2548. All 21 sources except Dr. Bowes opined Plaintiff had at least a marked limitation in adapting to 22 23 1 This standard does not apply to claims filed on or after March 27, 2017. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527, 404.1520c; 24 Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 792 (9th Cir. 2022). 1 changes. See AR 552–53, 2365, 2548. Dr. Crampton opined Plaintiff had several other marked 2 and severe limitations, including in making simple decisions and performing tasks without 3 special supervision. See AR 2548. 4 In support, the sources described severe symptoms of anxiety and depression, along with
5 paranoia and hallucinations. Dr. Connor observed Plaintiff had an irritable demeanor, was 6 agitated, had troubles with appropriate social interaction, and required some redirection. AR 7 718–19. He said Plaintiff’s performance on one test “indicat[ed] troubles with impulsivity” and 8 “focusing and maintaining attention;” other tests indicated “severe levels of psychological 9 distress.” AR 718, 719. 10 Drs. Dees, Crampton, and Jenkins observed abnormal thought process and content, 11 orientation, perception, and fund of knowledge. AR 554, 2550, 2366–67. Drs. Bowes, Crampton, 12 and Jenkins noted scores on anxiety and depression index tests indicating severe anxiety and 13 depression. See AR 2370, 2549, 2366. Dr. Bowes conducted a personality assessment inventory: 14 the results “support[ed] an extreme level of reported subjective experience of overall distress,”
15 along with “clinically significant problem[s]” in Plaintiff’s affect, acting out, health problems, 16 psychotic features, and social withdrawal. AR 2370. 17 The ALJ found these opinions unpersuasive, relying on similar reasons for rejecting 18 them. See AR 1542–45. The ALJ found the opinions inconsistent with some evidence showing 19 Plaintiff had a “normal mood and affect, average cognitive functioning, normal behavior, and 20 cooperative attitude.” AR 1544 (rejecting opinions of Drs. Bowes, Crampton, and Jenkins, citing 21 AR 567–68, 585, 620, 854, 863, 907, 910, 912, 1020–21, 1052, 1063, 1091, 1370, 1393, 1404– 22 05, 2394, 2631, 2801, 3077–78, 3124, 3126, 3130, 3136, 3139, 3141, 3143, 3161, 3163, 3166, 23
24 1 3285, 3314, 3339, 3361); see also AR 1542–43 (rejecting opinions of Drs. Connor and Dees on 2 similar basis, citing the same evidence). 3 Judge Settle found similar reasoning, made with respect to Plaintiff’s subjective 4 testimony, in a previous denial decision was:
5 not a reasonable interpretation of the evidence. In analyzing the medical evidence, the ALJ “cannot simply pick out a few isolated instances” of medical heath that 6 support his conclusion, but must consider those instances in the broader context “with an understanding of the patient’s overall well-being and the nature of [his] 7 symptoms.” Attmore v. Colvin, 827 F.3d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 2016). Here, the ALJ acknowledged medical evidence of [Plaintiff’s] mental health issues, such as 8 anxiety and anger, but downplayed them because [Plaintiff] was cooperative with his providers at times and did not have any obvious crises due to his anger issues. 9 [AR 21–22]. The record is replete with evidence of ongoing psychological issues, however. [Plaintiff’s] providers regularly noted that he was anxious, depressed, and 10 had a blunted affect. See, e.g., [AR] 512, 515, 522, 525–26, 567, 573, 611, 620, 692, 707, 785, 1167, 1173. 11 AR 1637–38. Judge Settle also found there was evidence supporting impulsivity and anger- 12 related issues in the record which undermined findings to the contrary. AR 1638 (citing AR 512, 13 913). 14 Evidence from after Judge Settle’s decision confirms the same: although the evidence 15 identified by the ALJ reveals normal findings related to mood and affect, other records show 16 Plaintiff was often observed to be angry, anxious, and irritable. See, e.g., AR 2695, 2700, 2709, 17 2747, 2759, 2765, 2771, 2791, 3124, 3128, 3133, 3136, 3143, 3163, 3188, 3197, 3204, 3233, 18 3239. There were also further incidents confirming Plaintiff’s propensity to anger and difficulties 19 with impulsivity. See AR 3145 (angry outbursts leading to ban from certain health facilities). 20 The ALJ’s failure to address the evidence contrary to his finding and explain why that 21 evidence was insufficiently probative as to Plaintiff’s functioning was error. As Judge Settle 22 noted, the ALJ must consider the broader context of the entire record. See Attmore, 827 F.3d at 23 877. One who is substantially affected by depression, impulsivity, and anger would not be 24 1 expected to constantly be depressed, impulsive, and angry. Rather, “cycles of improvement and 2 debilitating symptoms are a common occurrence, and in such circumstances it is error for an ALJ 3 to pick out a few isolated instances of improvement over a period of months or years and to treat 4 them as a basis for concluding a claimant is capable of working.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1017.
5 The ALJ found inconsistent with the opinions evidence that Plaintiff was noted to have 6 interacted with others appropriately at several group physical therapy sessions. AR 1542, 1543, 7 1544; see also AR 1536 (noting the same, citing AR 3066–74, 3079). The ALJ’s reliance upon 8 four group physical therapy sessions where Plaintiff appropriately interacted with others suffers 9 from the same flaw as his assessment of Plaintiff’s presentation at other appointments—it failed 10 to consider the many appointments in which Plaintiff did not interact appropriately and displayed 11 symptoms consistent with anger, impulsivity, and irritability. 12 The ALJ also found Plaintiff’s travel and photography activities inconsistent with these 13 opinions. See AR 1542–45. However, for the same reasons that these activities were not 14 reasonably found inconsistent with Plaintiff’s testimony, these activities are not legitimate bases
15 for rejecting the examining sources’ opinions. 16 The ALJ found the opinions of Drs. Dees and Connor unsupported: he noted that Dr. 17 Connor’s opinion did “not document functional barriers that would preclude all employment” 18 while Dr. Dees failed to provide any narrative explanation of his opinion. See AR 1542, 1543. 19 As discussed, all the opinions included abnormal observations and discussed the results 20 of relevant testing. Although Dr. Connor observed many normal results in the 15 tests he 21 administered (see AR 718–19), this is not a reason to find as less probative the abnormal results 22 he described. Although Dr. Dees did not provide a specific function-by-function explanation of 23 his opinion, his opinion included a clinical interview (AR 550–51), clinical findings describing
24 1 the severity of Plaintiff’s symptoms (AR 551), and a mental status examination describing 2 abnormal findings (AR 553–54). “[A]n opinion cannot be rejected merely for being expressed as 3 answers to a check-the-box questionnaire[.]” Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1155 (9th Cir. 2020) 4 (citing Popa v. Berryhill, 872 F.3d 901, 907 (9th Cir. 2017)).
5 Finally, the ALJ discounted all five examining sources’ opinions because they had not 6 reviewed the longitudinal record. See AR 1542–45. As Judge Settle noted, this is not a legitimate 7 reason for rejecting an examining doctor’s opinion, since the “regulations place more weight on 8 opinions from doctors who examine claimants than those who simply review medical records.” 9 AR 1653 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(1), Lester, 81 F.3d at 830–31). 10 In sum, the ALJ failed to provide specific and legitimate reasons for discounting the 11 opinions of examining sources Drs. Connor, Dees, Bowes, Crampton, and Jenkins. Because 12 those opinions suggest Plaintiff would be further limited than found in the RFC, this error was 13 not inconsequential to the disability determination and therefore was not harmless. See Stout v. v. 14 Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 2006).
15 Plaintiff also argues the ALJ failed to provide germane reasons for rejecting the opinion 16 of his therapist, Bryant Christlieb, LMFT. Dkt. 12 at 22–23. Having found the ALJ reversibly 17 erred, the Court need not consider this argument. 18 C. Remedy 19 The Court “generally remand[s] for an award of benefits only in ‘rare circumstances.’” 20 Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1100 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Moisa v. 21 Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882, 886 (9th Cir. 2004)). A remand for award of benefits is proper only if 22 (1) the record has been fully developed and further administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose; (2) the ALJ has failed to provide 23 legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, whether claimant testimony or 24 1 medical opinion; and (3) if the improperly discredited evidence were credited as true, the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled on remand. 2 Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1020. A remand for an award of benefits is appropriate only if, reviewing 3 the record as a whole, the improperly discredited evidence would leave no doubt Plaintiff would 4 be found disabled on remand if that evidence was credited as true. See Leon v. Berryhill, 880 5 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2017). 6 The first two elements of the credit-as-true test are easily satisfied. First, the record is 7 over 3,400 pages in length and contains fourteen medical opinions and the transcripts of four 8 hearings; there is no contention that it is incomplete. See Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648, 668– 9 69 (9th Cir. 2017) (finding record developed where it contains two treating medical opinions, 10 function reports, and over fifty treatment notes); Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 683 (first element satisfied 11 by “extensive” record of “hundreds of pages,” claimant testimony, VE testimony, and a medical 12 opinion). Indeed, Plaintiff’s date last insured, for the purposes of his DIB claim, is in September 13 2012. AR 1531–32. Further evidence related to Plaintiff’s disability thirteen years ago is unlikely 14 to be forthcoming. Moreover, Ninth Circuit “precedent and the objectives of the credit-as-true 15 rule foreclose the argument that a remand for the purpose of allowing the ALJ to have a mulligan 16 qualified as a remand for a ‘useful purpose’ under the first part of the credit-as-true analysis.” 17 Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1021–22 (citing Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 595 (9th Cir. 2004) 18 and Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882, 887 (9th Cir. 2004)). 19 Second, the Court has found the ALJ erred in assessing the opinions of five examining 20 sources and in assessing Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony. 21 Turning to the third element, if the improperly discredited evidence were credited as true, 22 the ALJ would be required to find Plaintiff disabled on remand. The five improperly discredited 23 opinions of examining sources, if credited as true, must be given more weight than the contrary 24 1 medical opinions of non-examining sources. See Lester, 81 F.3d at 830; 20 C.F.R. § 2 404.1527(c)(1). The Court therefore considers whether these opinions, along with Plaintiff’s 3 testimony, would compel a finding of disability. See Leon, 880 F.3d at 1045. 4 The Vocational Expert testified that an individual would be found disabled if he
5 repeatedly engaged in aggressive and threatening behavior; had more than one absence per 6 month; left his job site during his shift; or was off task more than 15% of the time or had a like 7 reduction in pace. See AR 1588–89. 8 It is difficult to imagine an RFC assessment consistent with the improperly discredited 9 evidence which did not include at least one of these work-prohibitive limitations. 10 Drs. Dees, Bowes, Crampton, and Jenkins opined Plaintiff had at least a marked 11 limitation in performing activities within a schedule, maintaining attendance, and being punctual, 12 as well as in completing a normal workday and workweek without psychological interruptions. 13 See AR 552–53, 2365, 2372, 2548. A “marked limitation” means the claimant’s “functioning in 14 this area independently, appropriately, effectively, and on a sustained basis is seriously limited.”
15 20 C.F.R. § 404, Supb. P, App’x 1, 12.00(F)(2)(d). A serious limitation in the ability to perform 16 activities within a schedule, maintain attendance, and be punctual, coupled with a serious 17 inability to complete a workday or workweek without psychological interruptions, would likely 18 result in at least one absence per month, would require Plaintiff to leave his jobsite during his 19 shift, or would otherwise result in Plaintiff being off task more than 15% of the time. 20 Plaintiff also testified he has angry outbursts easily triggered by normal characteristics of 21 a workplace settings. See AR 59, 87, 1579–80. Drs. Dees, Bowes, Crampton, and Jenkins found 22 he had at least marked limitations in maintaining appropriate behavior and communicating. See 23 AR 552–53, 2365, 2372, 2548. Dr. Connor’s discussion of Plaintiff’s impulsivity is consistent
24 1 with such limitations. AR 719–20. Crediting such evidence compels a finding that Plaintiff 2 would engage in the sort of aggressive and threatening behavior the VE testified would be work- 3 prohibitive. For these reasons, the improperly discredited evidence would, if credited as true, 4 compel a finding of disability.
5 As Defendant notes, the Court may decline to remand for an award of benefits where the 6 record discloses “serious doubt” that the claimant is disabled. See Dkt. 14 at 11; Garrison, 759 7 F.3d at 1023. But Defendant identifies no basis to find the record creates serious doubt of 8 disability, and the Court has not discerned one from its independent review. Although the record 9 contains two medical opinions of non-examining sources which are less restrictive than the 10 examining sources’ opinions (see AR 1542–43), the examining sources’ opinions are given 11 greater weight in the disability analysis, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(1). And although the record 12 contains some normal findings on examination, as discussed, this does not necessarily raise 13 serious doubt as to Plaintiff’s disability, as mental impairments are oftentimes cyclical and can 14 impair some areas of function significantly without touching others.
15 Finally, “inequitable conduct on the part of the Commissioner can strengthen, though not 16 control, the case for” an award of benefits. Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1019. The Court may consider 17 “equitable concerns about the length of time that had elapsed since the claimant had filed [his] 18 application.” Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1100 (citing Varney v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 859 19 F.2d 1396, 1398–99 (9th Cir. 1988)); see also Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 683 (considering “exceptional 20 facts” such as seven year delay and “extensive medical needs requiring significant care”). 21 Here, Plaintiff filed his applications over thirteen years ago. See AR 13. After Judge 22 Settle reversed the second ALJ decision in this matter, the Appeals Council reversed the third 23 ALJ decision because it failed to comply with Judge Settle’s Order. See AR 1698–70. The fourth
24 1 ALJ decision reviewed by this Court, as discussed, also largely relied upon the same rationale 2 rejected by Judge Settle. And although Plaintiff filed exceptions to that decision in April 2021 3 (see AR 1866–72), the Appeals Council did not decline to consider those exceptions until four 4 years later (AR 1508) due to an apparent administrative error. See AR 1859 (initially indicating
5 exceptions had not been received). 6 Such a procedural history strengthens Plaintiff’s case for an award of benefits. Given the 7 Commissioner’s repeated reliance upon the same reasons Judge Settle rejected, it also 8 underscores the conclusion that further administrative proceedings would be unlikely to serve a 9 useful purpose in this case, and that “[a]llowing the Commissioner to decide the issue again 10 would create an unfair ‘heads we win; tails, let’s play again’ system of disability benefits 11 adjudication.” Benecke, 367 F.3d at 887. 12 For these reasons, this case presents the rare circumstance in which a direction to award 13 benefits is appropriate. 14 IV. CONCLUSION
15 Based on these reasons and the relevant record, the Court ORDERS that this matter be 16 REVERSED and REMANDED pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for 17 CALCULATION of an AWARD of BENEFITS. 18 19 Dated this 27th day of October, 2025. 20 A 21 22 Grady J. Leupold United States Magistrate Judge 23 24