Douglas Giebel v. Mary Bonilla

Ninth Circuit

Douglas Giebel v. Mary Bonilla

404 F. App'x 184

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedNovember 22, 2010

Docket08-36061

StatusUnpublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 404 F. App'x 184 (Douglas Giebel v. Mary Bonilla) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Douglas Giebel v. Mary Bonilla, 404 F. App'x 184 (9th Cir. 2010).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM ***

Douglas Giebel appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional violations arising from a sexual harassment complaint filed against him after the expiration of his employment as an adjunct university professor. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo dismissals based on Eleventh Amendment immunity and for failure to state a claim. Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir.2004). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed under the Eleventh Amendment Giebel’s claims for damages against defendants that are arms of the State of Montana or who are state officials sued in their official capacities. See Flint v. Dennison, 488 F.3d 816, 824-25 (9th Cir.2007).

The district court properly dismissed Giebel’s due process claim based on his alleged property interest in employment at the university because he admits that he was a former employee whose contract had expired. See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 578, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972) (professor hired for one year and not rehired did not have property interest in continued employment).

To the extent Giebel’s due process claim was based on his liberty interest in his reputation, the district court properly dismissed the claim because Giebel admits that he received notice of the sexual *186 harassment allegations and “an opportunity to refute the charge.” Id. at 573 & n. 12, 92 S.Ct. 2701 (“The purpose of such notice and hearing is to provide the person an opportunity to clear his name.”).

Giebel has waived claims not argued in his opening brief. See Miller v. Fairchild Indus., Inc., 797 F.2d 727, 738 (9th Cir.1986).

Giebel’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.

AFFIRMED.

***

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.

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